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
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THE BRITON'S FIRST DUTY,

BY

GEORGE F. SHEE, M.A.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS on the First Edition (1900).

The Times.—"The book should be read by all who regard the honour and the security of the Empire as a sacred trust, to guard which is without doubt the Briton's first duty."

The Morning Post.—"... This is the most effective of all the many appeals which the War period has produced for a National Army, and it is the one which deserves to be most widely read. Mr. Shee writes modestly but clearly and well, and with the force of a genuine and earnest patriotism."

The Daily Mail.—"A very interesting and able book."

The Athenæum.—"A book which should be studied by all who are interested in the present condition and the future of the defences of the Empire. ... We put down the book with the feeling that Mr. Shee has given us the best statement which exists in favour of a conscript home army."

Saturday Review.—"... A contribution to the literature of the subject, which is useful on account of its directness and simplicity, combined with the fulness and pertinence of the information contained in it. ... The special service which Mr. Shee has rendered consists in the clear manner in which he has marshalled the facts which give the appeal made by him its pressing and practical importance. ... He puts the more important of the detailed facts of the case so clearly and strongly that the ordinary man who reads this volume through in an hour will feel ... that he has at all events learned from him (the writer) the character of the general situation on which a judgment has to be formed, and how important it is that he should form one."

Vanity Fair.—"The lessons that he has to drive home may be usefully studied both by politicians and by the public."

The Spectator.—"Mr. Shee in this book makes an earnest and well-written appeal to his countrymen. ..."

The Speaker.—"Mr. Shee has presented his case with obvious sincerity, moderation, and ability."

Pall Mall Gazette.—"Mr. Shee has produced a most convincing, a most readable, and a highly interesting book. It deserves to be widely read because the subject is treated in an impartial, scientific, and statesmanlike spirit."

The Glasgow Herald.—"... A statesman-missioner might save the country if he would devote himself to Mr. Shee's cause and use Mr. Shee's book as his Bible."

The Star.—"The Briton's First Duty" is not merely an able treatise; it is a sombre portent . . . this extremely interesting and able book."

The Literary World.—"We recognize a very definite advantage in the publication of a book on Army Reform so temperate and ably reasoned, and so well adapted to readers without military experience. It should claim the serious attention of every man with a sense of his duty and responsibility as a citizen."

The Sunday Special.—"Mr. Shee preaches a very vigorous sermon. . . . The volume is a serious contribution to a subject that will, if we are not mistaken, be within the realms of practical politics before many years have passed."

People.—" . . . A remarkable volume; it is conceived and written in the right spirit . . . you cannot fail to enjoy a work . . . that is alive with 'thoughts that breathe and words that burn.'"

The Liverpool Mercury.—"We commend Mr. Shee's book to the notice of all interested in the question."

South Wales Daily News.—"A new work, ominous in its wording, terribly effective in its terse summing up of the case . . . a judicial pronouncement upon a national situation, so carefully worded and moderate in tone that it compels attention even from a reader whose strong prejudice creates aversion from military service. . . . The book is one to be read."

The Manchester Courier.—" . . . The author expresses opinions which many public men give utterance to in private, but which they are afraid to avow in Parliament or on the platform."

Birmingham Post.—"A well-reasoned essay."

The Sheffield Independent.—" . . . Mr. Shee's earnest book . . . should serve a useful purpose in awakening thoughtful citizens to a greater sense of national responsibility and danger."

The Nottingham Guardian.—" . . . Supplies the reader with matter and arguments worth serious study and reflection."

The Cheltenham Examiner.—"Simply, clearly, and ably written throughout . . . I would strongly urge all those at all affected, directly or indirectly, by the great question of the hour—Army Reform—to read the book."

The United Service Magazine.—"This book should be read. . . ."

The National Review. (*Article by Lord Newton*).—"It is safe to say that if this little book had been written by some prominent leader instead of by a man unknown to fame, who is merely actuated by feelings of patriotism, it would have been hailed as the work of a fearless and original genius."

Tagliche Rundschau. (*Leader by General von Boguslawski*).—"If it could be thought that there were among the youth of England many who share his (the author's) opinions, a new era might dawn upon England."

The New Liberal Review.—" . . . An exhaustive and thoughtful book. . . . Mr. Shee relies on logic rather than fervour to make his points, which are made with great ability."

The British Empire Review.—"The writer . . . states his arguments clearly and practically . . . and his reasoning is clear. . . . It is well and concisely written . . . and the average Briton will find it a most useful storehouse of facts and figures, demanding close and careful attention."

THE
BRITON'S FIRST DUTY,

The Case for Universal
Military Training . . .

106373 *on*

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G.

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FIFTH EDITION.



THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE,
72, Victoria Street, S.W.

To
THE PATRIOTS
OF
GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK.

PREFACE.

THIS edition of "THE BRITON'S FIRST DUTY" is something more than a revised version of the fourth edition. A great deal of it has been completely re-written in the light of the experience gained by the establishment of the Territorial Force in place of the Volunteers. Our relationship with foreign Powers has also altered materially and has made it necessary to recast the chapter dealing with their attitude towards Great Britain. The chapters on The Advantages of Compulsory Service and the Objections which may be urged against it have been re-written in view of the many new facts which have been ascertained, especially in relation to the alleged interference of a system of compulsory training with the industrial and commercial life of the country.

In this connexion I have to thank the *Manchester Daily Dispatch* for the kind permission

Preface

to make considerable use of a series of articles which I wrote for that paper in November of this year.

I must ask the indulgence of my readers for the many shortcomings which I fear this book will show. But it has been written and revised in the scant leisure left by my secretarial and editorial duties.

I have to thank Mr. W. R. Field, the Assistant Secretary of the League, for his invaluable help in checking statistics, in the revision of the proofs, and, especially, for his illustrative diagrams, which make the comparisons between our position 100 years ago and to-day so clear to the reader's mind.

If the new edition of this little book can contribute in some slight measure to further the great cause to which Lord Roberts is devoting the last years of a splendid career, I shall feel that it has achieved its purpose.

GEORGE F. SHEE.

December, 1910.

INTRODUCTION.

"THE BRITON'S FIRST DUTY," the fifth edition of which, entirely revised and re-written by the author, is now published under the auspices of the National Service League, gives in a concise form the chief arguments in favour of the adoption by this country of compulsory Military Training for Home Defence. Other arguments might have been brought forward and those employed might have been more fully elaborated, but it has been considered best to keep the work within a limited number of pages. There are, however, one or two points to which I would call the special attention of the reader.

It cannot be too often repeated that the proposals of the National Service League do not involve sending a single compulsorily-trained citizen soldier out of the country for service abroad in either peace or war, unless he actually volunteers for the purpose. All service abroad

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would remain, as at present, absolutely voluntary ; but every able-bodied man who might be willing to give his aid to the Defence of the Empire, would have been sufficiently trained to enable him to render useful service.

Another point is that, while the members of the National Service League are absolutely in agreement with those who wish to see all disputes referred to arbitration, yet they feel bound to remind the nation at large that, as it takes two to make a quarrel, so it takes two to abide by the decision of the arbitrators if arbitration is to be effectual. If we are strong, there is some chance of the other party in a quarrel agreeing to arbitration ; if we are weak, the other side will certainly prefer to fight. This is a truth which would seem to be obvious, but which, nevertheless, appears to be overlooked by those who recommend arbitration as the one panacea for all disputes.

A third point presents itself. Well-meaning people of all classes often point to the terribly difficult social problems that face us in this country ; the abject poverty of many millions of our fellow-subjects, the squalor of the

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homes, the number of unemployed, etc., etc., and urge that these problems must first be solved ere the nation can turn its mind to the consideration of questions of National Defence. But to this I emphatically dissent. We must have our roof water-tight before we make our house comfortable. We cannot postpone the question of national safety; we must secure a sound and truly national system of Home Defence, founded on the bed-rock principle that it is the duty of every citizen to be trained for the defence of his home. The universal military training thus involved will of itself largely help to solve many of our social problems, by improving the character, the *moral* and the physique of the race. When asked to speak in public on this supremely important question of National Military Training, I have often found that my difficulty has been not what to say, but what to leave unsaid. The subject touches every aspect of the national life: it appeals to the statesman, the soldier, the sailor, the clergyman, the physician, the employer of labour; in fact, to the men who toil to supply the thousand

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varied wants of our complex modern civilisation: it appeals to the mothers whose children are being taught, indeed, to read and to write, but who for the most part are left untrained in character, without discipline, and ignorant of their duty.

It is for this reason that I am glad to write a few words of recommendation for this little book, in which National Defence is dealt with from every point of view, shortly, yet fully and ably. I earnestly invite my countrymen to read its terse and well-written arguments, and, if they agree with them as to what is "the Briton's First Duty," to do all in their power to urge forward this most important movement in favour of the greatest national reform ever yet placed before the British race.

ROBERTS, F.M.

December, 1910.

PART I.

The Present Position of Great Britain.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL SURVEY.

WHEN the history of Great Britain during the nineteenth century comes to be written by a historian far enough away from the period to enable him to view it in due perspective, the fact which will assuredly strike him most forcibly in dealing with the latter part of it will be this: that a fabric of Empire so vast should have reposed upon a foundation so precarious.

Such a historian will have ample scope for brilliant pages descriptive of the country's progress in material well-being, a progress in which each new advance in the domains of science, each new triumph of inventive genius has been made to minister to the comfort and convenience of our teeming millions. Nor will his attention be confined to the signs of material progress alone. He will, of course, dwell on the increased facilities of communication which the railway, steam navigation, the telegraph, the telephone and the Marconi system have brought about; on the wonderful advance which the science of

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surgery has made, owing to the discovery of anæsthetics and the application of the Röntgen rays; and on the improvement in sanitation, which has caused such a marked decrease in the death-rate. He will also note with satisfaction that education has made enormous strides, while crime has greatly diminished; and that in no age has charity in all its forms, whether aiming at the material or the moral welfare of the people at large, done such beneficent work, or counted so many noble and devoted servants.

It is, however, particularly the material aspect of Britain's development during the century which is under consideration here.

And looking to this alone, it may safely be affirmed that no century in the course of our history has witnessed so extraordinary a development of national progress and prosperity as the last.

The population of the United Kingdom has increased from 15,000,000 to 45,000,000; that of the Empire from 25,000,000 to 400,000,000. The area of the British Empire, which was about 1,500,000 square miles in 1800, is now 11,350,000. Exports and imports amount to £2,020,000,000, as against £79,000,000 at the beginning of the last century, while the tonnage of our mercantile marine is seven times what it was then.

Nevertheless, the future historian will not lack a fit subject for antithesis in turning from the picture of so vast an Empire and such fabulous wealth to the means by which those treasures are defended. For he will find, to his amazement,

that while the British people have shown a very full sense of the splendour of their Empire, and have even been extremely anxious to extend its bounds wherever an opportunity has seemed to offer, yet they and—stranger still—their statesmen have been content with about the same forces for its defence with which their forefathers guarded an inheritance far less valuable. In other words, he will find that this people, who have prided themselves on their business habits and practical commonsense, have failed to apply to their Empire those principles of prudent insurance which each individual would adopt in dealing with his business or private property.

For many years past thoughtful Englishmen have watched with ever-increasing anxiety the growing disproportion between the territorial expansion of Great Britain and her almost stationary military resources. Province after province has been added to our dominions beyond the seas, and instead of increasing the number of our troops we have, for some time past, been actually engaged in decreasing them, at least so far as the regular forces are concerned.

In order to realize fully how inadequate our military resources are for the proper protection of our Empire, it is necessary to compare the situation of England at the present day with that which existed at the beginning of the last century.

Such a comparison is all the more necessary, because the majority of our fellow-countrymen labour under the delusion that Great Britain is stronger at the present moment, both absolutely and relatively, than she ever was before. And

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there is no doubt that Great Britain was never wealthier or more prosperous than at the present time. Her possessions are larger, her population more numerous, her commerce vaster, her revenue greater, even her navy bigger* (*absolutely*, not *relatively*, as will be shown later on) than ever they were at any period of her past history.

We propose, however, to show that our national defences are far weaker now than they were a hundred years ago, *relatively*—

(1) To the increased size of our Empire and the corresponding enormous growth of our commerce, on the one hand; and

(2) To the concomitant prodigious increase in the armed forces (*naval* as well as *military*) of the chief foreign Powers, on the other.

* "I am saying what I am sure you will hear with pleasure, and what the Board of the Admiralty knows I am thoroughly justified in saying—never in the whole history of the country has the Navy been stronger than it is at the present time."—Mr. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty. Speech at the Guildhall Banquet, November 9, 1908. This statement is an extraordinary example of the way in which the public may be misled, no doubt unintentionally, as to the true state of our national defences. *Literally*, Mr. McKenna's statement was perfectly true, but, as an indication of our naval position *relatively* to other Powers—the only real standard of "strength"—its inaccuracy seems almost grotesque in view of the revelations made in the course of the Debates on the Navy Estimates in March, 1909.

CHAPTER II.

THE ARMY.

"I can only reiterate my conviction that our present military policy involves a wilful gambling with the safety of the Empire. It is incapable of providing a force sufficient to deal with the serious military problems that confront us. . . ."

"The only standard by which our Forces can be judged is that of the strength of the Forces which they may be called upon to meet. . . ."

"Our Army is absolutely insignificant in numbers as compared with the armies of first-class Powers. . . ."

LORD ROBERTS: *House of Lords, July 12th, 1909.*

"The second and far more serious defect in our military preparations for the war was in not having a sufficient number of trained men to furnish (by voluntary effort in a national emergency) the large reinforcements demanded both by the wastage of war and by the vast area of the operations. In close relation with this defect was the lamentable insufficiency of trained officers."—SIR GEORGE TAUBMAN-GOLDIE. *Memorandum published with the Report of the Elgin Commission on the War in South Africa.*

SURVEYING our position at the beginning of the nineteenth century, we find that, in virtue of the native energy of our race, a splendid geographical position, and a coast dotted with good harbours, together with the practical absence of serious

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competition, we had attained the most complete commercial supremacy. Other nations were occupied either with conquest (France), or with a struggle for existence (Prussia), or, later, for national unity (Germany, and, still later, Italy); or still asleep in semi-barbarism (Russia); or more or less decayed (Spain and Portugal). The very cause which absolutely prevented most of the Continental nations from entering into commercial competition with us—viz., war—had resulted in giving us the commerce and the carrying trade of the world.

Yet, great as our Empire and commerce must have seemed to those who had seen colony after colony of our enemies fall like ripe fruit into our hands, while our fleets swept the ocean with none to dispute their supremacy, the following figures will show that our dominions were small in comparison with those over which the British flag now waves. They show the growth of our possessions, trade, and commerce from 1800 to the present day.

	Population of United Kingdom.	Population of Empire.	Area of Empire ; square miles.
1800 ...	15,000,000	25,000,000	1,500,000
1909 ...	45,000,000	400,000,000	11,350,000

	Revenue of United Kingdom. £	Nominal Tonnage of British Shipping (including Colonial Vessels).	Exports and Imports (British Empire). £
1800 .	37,500,000*	1,856,000	79,000,000
1907-8	156,000,000	13,183,000	2,020,000,000†

* In 1809 the Revenue was £68,500,000.

† Including inter-Imperial Trade.

Let us now see what were the forces employed to guard our possessions a hundred years ago, and

compare them with those which are now maintained by Great Britain to defend territories and wealth infinitely greater.

On March 8, 1805, Lord Hawkesbury made a remarkable speech, in which he gave a detailed account of our military forces, and at the same time instituted a careful comparison between them and the armies employed by the chief foreign Powers. We have therefore taken 1805 as the date for the earlier period, though it must be remembered that we had then been at war with France since May, 1803. As, however, the numbers of our Army increased steadily from 1803 till 1813, in which year they reached the maximum, we shall not be accused of choosing 1805 as a year of exceptionally large numbers.

A return of officers and men serving in each year from 1800 to 1858, issued in 1859, gives the following figures for the total forces, regular and auxiliary, exclusive of India :

1805.	Establishment (Number of Men voted).	Effectives (Number obtained).	Amount voted.
Regular Army	208,718*	184,728†	} £22,272,051
Militia ...	103,328	101,451	
Volunteers ...	—	429 165	
		715,344	

*. Exclusive of Artillery and Engineers.

† Including Artillery and Engineers.

The following were the Establishments for, and the Effectives in, the year 1910-11. The facts are taken in every case from official figures. Taken in conjunction with the figures for past

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years,* they afford the clearest proof that the voluntary system, as applied to Home Defence, has been gradually breaking down; even if we look to the test of numbers only; though, as we shall see later, numbers without adequate

	Establishments. All Ranks. 1910-11.	Effectives. All Ranks.		Deficiency.
		Numbers by latest Returns.	Date of latest Returns.	
Regular Forces (Regimental, Home and Colonial, including Regular Establishment of Special Reserves) ...	170,083	165,686†	Jan. 1, 1910	4,397
Colonial and Native Indian Corps ...	8,580	8,375	"	205
Army Reserve ...	138,000	133,990	"	4,010
Special Reserves (excluding Regular Establishments) ...	86,539	70,486	"	16,053
Militia, Channel Islands (including Permanent Staff) ...	3,163	3,010	Oct. 1, 1909	153
Militia, Malta and Bermuda, and Bermuda Volunteers (including Permanent Staff) ...	2,894	2,582	Jan. 1, 1910	312
Territorial Force (including Permanent Staff) ...	315,408	274,188	"	41,220
Officers Training Corps (Officers and Permanent Staff) ...	823	522	"	301
Total Home and Colonial Establishments ...	725,490	658,839	—	66,651

training merely serve to mislead the public by making them think that they have an Army when they only have a certain number of men who have been through less military training than any

* See "The Briton's First Duty," 3rd Edition, price 6d., p. 78.

† Of this number 128,000 were in the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands, the balance being distributed in Egypt, the Mediterranean, South Africa, etc., etc.

other fully organized body of troops in the world. As Lord Roberts has said : " The only standard by which our Forces can be judged is that of the strength of the Forces which they may be called upon to meet."

Thus, while the area of the British Empire has increased nearly eightfold and its population sixteenfold, the total effective forces outside India in 1909 were 56,000 less than in 1805.

But if the forces just described seem small in comparison with those which England had at her call in 1805, when the population of the United Kingdom was only 17,000,000, they must be deemed insignificant indeed when we consider how the armies of the other Powers have increased since the beginning of the century.

In the speech referred to above, Lord Hawkesbury gave the following very interesting figures, in which the Armies of the chief Powers are compared :

	Total Military Force, excluding Volunteers.	Population.	Population capable of bearing Arms.	Proportion of Soldiers to Men capable of bearing Arms.
England	390,000*	15,000,000†	3,800,000	1 in 10
France ...	562,000	32,000,000	8,000,000	1 in 14
Russia ...	590,000	34,000,000	8,500,000	1 in 14
Austria ...	370,000	20,000,000	5,000,000	1 in 13 or 14
Prussia ...	250,000	9,000,000	2,500,000	1 in 10

* Including the India Forces.

† Population in 1800.

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He added that there were 380,000 Volunteers and 30,000 Sea-Fencibles ; so that "the whole number of men in arms in the United Kingdom was 800,000, which was equal to 1 in 4 of the whole population of this country capable of bearing arms."

The following table shows the armed strength of the principal countries of Europe at the present day :

COMPARISON OF LAND FORCES OF THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN POWERS IN 1906.

Country.	Population.	Peace Strength.	War Footing.	Number of Soldiers to Males of Military Age
Great Britain ...	44,538,718*	243,511*	742,036†	1 in 15
France...	39,252,245	677,581†	3,630,363†	1 " 3
Russian Empire ...	152,009,200	1,225,000	3,249,000	1 " 12
Austria " ...	50,000,000	409,638	2,209,638	1 " 6
Germany " ...	60,641,278	610,000	4,010,000	1 " 4

January 1. 1910, including British Troops in India and Colonies.

† This figure includes 275,000 Territorial Troops, which will not be available till six months after the outbreak of war. If the war strength is calculated upon the basis of "the number of efficiently trained men who could be produced on sudden mobilization," which was the basis adopted by Captain (the late Major-General Sir John) Ardagb in a paper read before the R.U.S.I. in March, 1876, 470,000 would be the utmost number which could be so described by any stretch of the imagination. Without the troops in India and the Colonies, who would not be available for service in Europe, 340,000 would be nearer the mark.

† Figures for 1905.

It is assumed, for purposes of comparison with the earlier table, that the males of military age are one in four of the whole population.

No survey of our present military strength in comparison with foreign armies can be complete,

however, unless the important factor of training is considered. Nothing is more misleading than merely to count heads without examining the training which the various forces have received. Bacon's dictum, "It matters little to the wolf how many sheep there are," has unfortunately been ignored by some of the supporters of the voluntary system who, adding up all the men and boys in Great Britain who have gone through any kind of military drill or discipline, proudly claim that we have more men who have been "trained to arms" than any Continental Power! Such statements are as misleading as to facts as they are lamentable in their consequences. For they are only too successful in lulling the mass of the people who have not been "trained to arms" into thinking that the voluntary system is a marvellous secret possessed only by the British people, and enabling us literally to conjure *armies* from the ground, whereas what we really do is to label a certain number of men and boys as "trained," without inquiring what the training consists of. We propose, therefore, briefly to state the training which obtains in foreign armies and in the different categories of our own forces.

Broadly speaking, all the chief armies of the Continent and that of Japan consist of men who, on the completion of their twentieth year, go through two or three years' continuous service in the Active Army, with two or three trainings of four to six weeks in the Reserve, after which they pass into the Landwehr (2nd Reserve), in which they go through one or more further

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repetition courses, finally passing into the Land-sturm (3rd Reserve), which is fully organized, armed, and provided with the machinery of mobilization, but which does not entail any further training, and is intended purely for Home Defence. Switzerland (population 3,300,000) and Norway (population 2,800,000) have an admirable Militia system, which is fully described in "A Territorial Army in Being" (by Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe and F. W. Lewis; 1s.; John Murray). Spain and Portugal alone still retain the system of *conscription* which enables the well-to-do to purchase a substitute for the personal service which, in theory, is laid down for every able-bodied man. But the late war in Morocco seems likely to give the final blow to the system in Spain, while the demand for its abolition and for the adoption of universal military service is one of the most urgent which the new democratic Government of Portugal will have to meet. These smaller Powers are, in any case, the only exceptions to the general system we have described above.

When, therefore, we speak of Germany as having 4,000,000, France 3,000,000, and Austria 2,000,000 men on a war footing, it must be remembered that the great majority are men between twenty-one and thirty-five, most of whom have gone through a full two years' rigorous training, followed by further training in the Reserve.

The training of the several branches of our military forces may be summarised as shown on p. 21.

BRITISH MILITARY FORCES.

Branch.	Establishment.	Strength.	Date.	Age of Enlistment.	No. of Years Service.	Training.
Regular Army— Home and Colonial ...	170,083	165,686	Jan. 1, 1910	18 (special cases 17)	7 years average	Continuous.
Indian Establishment	75,884	77,825	"	18 (special cases 17)	"	"
Army Reserve ...	138,000	133,990	"	On quitting the Regular Army	5 years	Men are liable to annual training (not enforced) of 12 days or 20 drills.
Special Reserve ...	86,539	70,486*	"	17	6 years	6 months on enlistment, 21 days in each subsequent year.
Territorial Force ...	315,408	274,188	"	17	4 years	40 drills and camp training on joining; 10 drills and camp in each subsequent year; camp, 8 days minimum, 15 days maximum.
	785,914	722,175				

* During the 12 months ending September 30, 1909, 11,020 Special Reservists joined the Regular Army, and were counted twice over. That is to say, 11,000 ought to be deducted either from the Regular Army in the above table (in which case the strength would be 15,500 short of the Establishment), or from the Special Reserve (in which case the latter would be 27,000 short of the numbers required, instead of 16,000, as shown above).

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Taking these categories of our military forces in turn, we may state their value as follows :

The Regular Army is thus described by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, in his speech in the House of Lords on July 12, 1909 : "That our Regular Army is quite excellent, as far as it goes, no one has better reason to know than I myself. I believe it to be as good, if not better, than any army in the world ; but, however good it is, the fact remains that the maximum force theoretically available for over-sea purposes is barely 150,000 men, and any consideration of the strategical requirements either of the defence of India or of the self-governing Colonies will show that such a force is entirely inadequate for the purpose. But, my Lords, as a matter of fact, are 150,000 men really available to-day, or likely to be available in the future ? Have we got, or are we likely to get, the officers, the seasoned men over twenty years of age, and the trained horses required to mobilize six big Divisions ? All the information that reaches me points to a very different conclusion, and there are the gravest doubts whether we could at this moment mobilize and send over-sea a force of more than about 100,000 men, leaving little else in this country than a number of recruits, lads under nineteen and twenty, and even less mature and less adequately trained Special Reservists."

Of the Regular Reserve it is only necessary to say that, while it consists of men of a good age, and is at present, owing to Mr. Brodrick's temporary adoption of three years' service, larger than it has ever been, it receives no training

whatever, that it will henceforth rapidly diminish in numbers, and that 10,000 men are to be encouraged to emigrate and will therefore not be available for a sudden call.*

The Special Reserve has been established by Mr. Haldane as a substitute for the old Militia, with an

Establishment of	and an Effective Strength of
86,539,	70,486 on January 1, 1910,
as compared with a	
Militia with an	
Establishment of	and an Effective Strength of
130,737,	90,138 on January 1, 1908.

The great advantage of the Special Reserve is that it is liable for foreign service in time of war, a liability which did not technically rest upon the Militia. But the difference is more apparent than real, since the Militia never failed to respond with alacrity to the call for foreign service, and 51,488 Militiamen served either in South Africa or in Mediterranean garrisons during the Boer War. Another point in favour of the new Force is the increased length (six months) of recruit training which, in the words of the Assistant Adjutant-General for Recruiting "has given excellent results."† This opinion is endorsed by those critics who have watched the last annual training of the Special Reserve, and when it is

* See "Military Needs and Military Policy," by H. O. ARNOLD-FORSYER, pp. 117 and 182-187.

† General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending September 30, 1909.

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remembered that hunger and unemployment are the chief recruiting agents for this Force, the results obtained constitute a striking testimony to what could be achieved by training the picked manhood of the country on the lines proposed by the National Service League, which closely resemble the training laid down for the Special Reserve.

There are, however, two grave defects in Mr. Haldane's creation which greatly diminish its efficiency as a fighting force. These are (1) the lack of physique and *esprit de corps* on the part of the rank and file resulting, for the year ending September 30, 1909, in a wastage of more than one-third of the recruits enlisted.

Recruits taken	...	27,653
Died	...	267
Discharged for various causes	...	6,851
Struck off as deserters or absentees	...	2,551
From other causes	...	45
Total wastage	...	<u>9,714</u>

"The majority of men who enlist in the Special Reserve, do so in the hope of improving their physique to the Line standards* and of then passing on to the regular army. The possibility of attracting a class of men who will remain in the Special Reserve is a subject which is receiving attention, and it is hoped that such a class may yet be reached."†

* See Part II., Chap. II., p. 94.

† General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending September 30, 1909.

(2) The alarming deficiency of officers of subaltern rank.

* Establishment of Lieutenants and			
2nd Lieutenants—all arms ...	...	1,990	
Strength, March 1, 1910 ...	...	807	
Wanting to complete ...	...	<u>1,183</u>	

The Territorial Force has been established by Mr. Haldane as a substitute for the old Volunteers and Yeomanry, and the League has from the first recognized "to the full the great ability, the earnestness, and the single-mindedness with which the Secretary of State for War has carried out his" scheme for reorganization. (See Manifesto signed by the President and Vice-Presidents of the League, April 3, 1907.) Moreover, in the opinion of the League, "Mr. Haldane has had the clearness of view to see, and the courage to declare, that the problem before him was 'the problem of a nation in arms with all the forces of the country welded into one,' which was 'the only safeguard for the public interests should war break out.'" Nor can there be any doubt that, from the point of view of organization, the Territorial Force represents a great advance upon the heterogeneous collection of troops which were covered by the term the Auxiliary Forces. Mr. Haldane has provided those special arms and auxiliary services which were practically non-existent under the old system, and without which the Auxiliary Forces were simply a mass of

* Parliamentary Return (Cd. 5018).

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armed men incapable of being mobilized for war. Further, by the establishment of the County Associations, which are borrowed from the Swiss Cantonal system under a name which revives the memory of Cromwell's splendid army, the Minister of War has brought local ambition and tradition into relation with national needs, and has thus laid the foundation of a National Army such as the League has been advocating for the past eight years.

But when we turn to the crucial question of *numbers and training*, we shall see that, here again, the advance is more apparent than real.

The Establishment of the Volunteers and Yeomanry under the Army Estimates, 1905-6, was, including Permanent Staff 371,683

Effectives on February 1, 1906... 267,107

The Establishment of the Territorial Force under the Army Estimates of 1910-11 (excluding Permanent Staff) was 312,898

Effectives on October 1, 1910 ... 268,203

or less than four years ago.

The peace training is practically the same as that of the Volunteers, though a larger number of men go through a fortnight's training, the numbers for 1909, given by the Under-Secretary of State for War in Parliament on March 9, 1910, being as follows :

Total number attending camp ... 248,237

Number attending for 15 days or over 169,911

On the other hand, both Mr. Haldane (Speech at Ashford, June 17, 1908) and Lord Lucas

(Under Secretary of State for War, reply to Lord Portsmouth, House of Lords, July 17, 1909) have admitted that the Territorial Force can receive so little training in time of peace "that they would not be ready to help should invasion become imminent," and that, therefore, on the outbreak of hostilities, the Force would be "mobilized to go into war training" for six months.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that, in the opinion of its founder and its chief sponsors,

(1) the Territorial Force is not fit to meet Continental troops till it has had six months' consecutive training;

(2) it is not even suggested that this serious training should begin until after war has broken out.

Anyone who has followed the comparison which has been established between our present military forces and those we had one hundred years ago, will admit that they are absolutely insufficient having regard—

(1) To the enormous expansion of the Empire.

(2) To the colossal armed forces of the Continental Powers.

CHAPTER III.

THE NAVY.

"At this time (1801) the British Navy was superior to the combined forces of all Europe." — MAHAN :
"The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution and Empire."

"A new situation in this country is created by the German programme. . . . When that programme is completed Germany, a great country close to our own shore, will have a fleet of 33 'Dreadnoughts.' That fleet would be the most powerful which the world has ever seen. . . . That imposes upon us the necessity . . . of rebuilding the whole of our fleet." — SIR EDWARD GREY, *speaking on the Vote of Censure in the House of Commons, March 29, 1909.*

DOUBTLESS some readers have followed the above analysis of the military resources of the Empire a little impatiently, convinced that all this is of comparatively small importance, seeing what a splendid Navy we have.

"We admit all this," they probably say ;
"but we really do not need a large Army. We"
"are essentially a naval Power, and as long as"
"our Navy is the splendid and efficient force it "

"is, we may snap our fingers at foreign Powers"
"and their huge Armies." Or thus: "If the"
"Navy is strong enough, we cannot be attacked;"
"if it is not strong enough, no Army can save"
"us."

But there are several important considerations which destroy the efficacy of the argument that, if our Navy is strong, we do not need a large Army in time of war.

1. Though Great Britain is an island, the British Empire is not. We have in Canada the second largest land frontier in the world, and outside Europe we are a Continental Power in the strict sense of the word. Our fleet cannot go to Kabul, and it is not easy to see how our Navy would help us if trouble in Abyssinia, consequent upon the accession of a new ruler, should lead to an attack from that direction upon our weak garrisons in the Sudan.*

Besides these considerations, which point to the necessity of providing powers of expansion for our military forces in time of war for the defence of distant parts of the Empire, it must always be borne in mind that the fact of our possessing a large reserve of trained men at home would in itself act as a powerful deterrent to a hostile Power which might otherwise be tempted to play a bold game by breaking through

* In a powerfully-written book, "Völker Europas," which has appeared in Germany, the anonymous author, who is obviously a staff officer of exceptional ability and knowledge, shows Abyssinia taking the offensive against us while we are trying to cope with a pan-Islamic revolt in Egypt and the Sudan, which has been engineered by Turkey, the ally of Germany, against England and France.

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our first defence in the assurance (and all the chief Continental Powers *have* the assurance) that they would have no formidable difficulties to deal with on land. (The Problem of Invasion is dealt with in Chapter IV.)

2. It is a most dangerous fallacy to imagine that a war can be won by merely warding off blows. As Pitt said in 1783: "A defensive war can only end in inevitable defeat." Yet, strange to say, while the root idea that governs our naval strategy is to find and destroy the enemy's fleet in his own waters, we behave as if *offensive military* operations, which alone can bring a war to a successful conclusion, were absolutely out of the question.

3. It is always forgotten that our Treaty obligations may compel us to act on the offensive with those allies to whom we have incurred obligations of honour in the defence of common interests. We are in actual alliance with Japan, we have an *entente cordiale* with France, we are guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland, and of the integrity of Turkey and Norway.* Our national honour is pledged to offensive action on behalf of these and other interests, and it is impossible for us to keep faith with our friends and allies unless we are prepared to throw into the scale an appreciable military contribution. In this connection, those

* The neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by a Treaty signed in London in 1839, the signatory Powers being Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. The integrity of Norway is guaranteed by the Treaty of Christiania, the signatories being Great Britain, Germany, France and Russia.

who welcome alliances as guarantees of peace should remember that allies will easily be found by the strong, who have something to give, while other Powers will shrink from alliance with a nation which has great commitments in every part of the globe, but is apparently not prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to meet them. Such Powers in search of an ally will naturally argue that the nation which is not fully prepared to defend its own interests is not likely to be a very reliable partner when it is a question of paying a common debt. Signs of this attitude of mind have not been wanting recently in France, notwithstanding municipal visits and reciprocal banqueting. And it is worthy of note that in 1905 a question was asked in the Japanese Parliament as to whether the British ally was prepared to reorganize its military resources on an efficient basis.

4. The maintenance of our sea power itself is ultimately dependent upon our ability to help our allies with serious military forces. This will be seen at once if we consider the case of an attack by Germany upon Holland and Belgium, with a view to their incorporation in the German Empire. Such an eventuality is by no means impossible; it is, indeed, constantly discussed and almost taken for granted by German publicists.*

* The recent efforts to strengthen the Dutch coast defences are said to be due to the fact that the German Emperor wrote to the Queen of Holland, stating that it would be "necessary" for Germany to occupy that country on the outbreak of war unless it could show that it was able to guard its neutrality against a strong sea Power (meaning, of course, Great Britain).

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What would the acquisition of Holland and Belgium by Germany mean for us? It would mean :

(a) A powerful nation in possession of a coast-line stretching from Memel to the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt.*

(b) An immense increase in wealth to that Power.

(c) A large addition to its maritime population.

(d) A closer proximity to our shores.

(e) Every facility for the creation of a great Navy, which could challenge our own on equal terms.†

In other words, the acquisition of Holland and Belgium by a great military Power like Germany would at one blow, and without a single naval battle, *undermine our sea power*, upon which, it is suggested, we can rely alone to maintain our commerce, our freedom from invasion and our Empire. We see, therefore, that our sea power actually depends, in the long run, on our ability to help Holland and Belgium by land in alliance with France. Nor would our *entente* with France

* The well-known German, Professor Treitschke, who has exercised such a profound influence on the mind of modern Germany, wrote, sixteen years ago :—" It is an indispensable task of our policy to secure the mouths of the Rhine."

† What the establishment of a great naval Power, based upon the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt, would mean to us to-day, can be readily understood if we remember the offensive power which it conferred upon the Dutch fleet in the period when it was disputing with us the command of the North Sea and the Channel. In July, 1667, the Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames beyond Gravesend, entered the Medway, sailed up to Rochester, 30 miles from London, and burnt a number of ships, including the flagship of the Duke of York. For a graphic account of this event see, " The Nation in Arms," the journal of the National Service League, September, 1909.

stand the strain it would be subjected to if, in a Continental war, we were to leave her to carry on the land campaign entirely with her own resources, contenting ourselves with helping her at sea. France knows well enough that Germany would, in that case, make *her* pay for the loss of the German fleet and commerce and the bombardment of German towns. In fine, honour, self-interest and the maintenance of our naval supremacy alike demand that we should be able to place a large army in the field in the event of serious European complications.

Let us now examine carefully how we stand with regard to the command of the sea. Many people suppose that our Navy, at least, is far stronger than it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century.* *Absolutely* it is indeed stronger than ever it was, but we shall show that it is far weaker now than a century ago *relatively*:

(1) To the expansion of the Empire and the enormous responsibilities it entails on the Navy.

(2) To the extraordinary development of the naval power of other nations, some of which had no existence on the seas one hundred, or, indeed, fifty—nay, thirty—years ago.

What was England's position as a naval Power at the beginning of the last century? It is best summed up in the words of Captain Mahan: "At this time (1801) the British Navy was" 'superior to the combined forces of all Europe.'†

* This is, indeed, the natural impression created by Mr. McKenna's statement at the Guildhall Banquet, November 1908. See p. 12. *ante*.

† "The Influence of Sea-Power upon the French Revolution and Empire."

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The only important Navies besides our own were those of France and Spain, and throughout the Napoleonic wars we always had a very considerable preponderance over the fleets of France, or of France and Spain, during the short period in which they were combined against us. The following quotation from Mr. C. McL. McHardy's admirable little work, "The British Navy for a Hundred Years" (to which we are indebted for most of the early facts here quoted with regard to the Navy), will fully illustrate the commanding position we held at that time on the ocean.

"The relative strength of the British and "French Navies at about that period, 1794—"1805, may be judged from the following "figures abstracted from Parliamentary Return "No. 168 of 1860.:

		British.	French.	Proportion of British to French.
1794	{ Ships of the line	145	77	About 6 to 3
	{ Frigates ...	176	72	Nearly 7½ to 3
	Total ...	321	149	Rather more than 6 to 3
		British.	French.	Proportion of British to French.
1804	{ Ships of the line	175	50	Exactly 10½ to 3
	{ Frigates ...	244	32	Rather more than 22½ to 3
	Total ...	419	82	Rather more than 15 to 3."

Again, this was "our state of preparation "when our two last great naval wars occurred," "viz., 1793 to 1801 and 1805 to 1815.

"In 1772 we had 11,575 seamen and 4,425 "

"marines, a total of 16,000 men; 211 ships in " commission and 197 in reserve, building," "etc., a total of 408 ships; during the war " "we lost 59 ships with 1,272 guns, but we " "captured from the enemy or destroyed " " (exclusive of 903 privateers) 570 ships with " "15,936 guns—a large proportion of these " "were taken into the service of the Royal " "Navy; the press-gang was available for " "manning them—with the result that to " "close the war in 1801 we had 105,000 sea- " "men, 30,000 marines, a total of 135,000 " "men; 833 ships in commission, 213 in " "reserve, building, etc., making a total of " "946 ships.

"For the second of these wars, 1803 to " "1815, we had at the commencement 38,000 " "seamen, 12,000 marines, a total of 50,000 " "men; during the war we captured from the " "enemy or destroyed 569 more ships—with " "the result that in 1810 we had 113,600 sea- " "men, 31,400 marines, a total of 145,000 men " "and 1,239 ships."

Trafalgar practically annihilated the fleets of France and Spain. "From 1807 no organized " French fleet existed. In 1811 Lord Minto " announced that the French flag was nowhere " to be seen flying from Cape Cormorin to Cape " Horn."

In comparing our present naval strength with that which we possessed at the beginning of the

* "The Functions of the Navy and Army in the Maintenance of the British Empire." (Captain W. H. James.)

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nineteenth century, we cannot simply add up the ships in each case and draw our conclusions from the totals as we do in the case of the Army, and even the *personnel* of the Navy.*

The only way to arrive at a just estimate of our naval power is to compare our forces with those of our rivals and possible foes on the one hand, and with the task which our Navy would have to fulfil in time of war on the other.

Before entering on such a comparison, however, it may be well to point out one or two facts as to the disadvantages to us which the change from sails to steam power has effected in naval warfare :

1. We have largely lost the advantage which superior seamanship always conferred upon us in our struggles with France and Spain. "English" "pluck and superior seamanship, which won" "our victories in the past, are discounted by" "steam and machinery." (Admiral Close, in an interview with a representative of the *Daily Graphic*.) Seamanship has given way to engineering, a fact that has been practically recognized by the abolition of the old training squadron of sailing ships ; and it is at least doubtful whether in this matter of engineering we are superior to the French, the Germans, the Russians, the Americans, or the Japanese.

2. The task of blockading an enemy's fleet in harbour becomes an infinitely more difficult one

* The men and money voted in 1809 and 1909 were :

		Men.		Money Vote.
		£		
1809	...	...	130,000	19,578,467
1909	...	...	128,000	35,142,700

than in the old days, when our ships of the line could lie off the enemy's coast for months without any difficulty except that of provisions. Now, when war-vessels must at least have their fires banked up ready for full steam, the enormous consumption of coal* makes it imperative that blockading ships should be relieved by others of equal strength at fairly frequent intervals—a fact which must therefore also be taken into account in comparing the number of our ships with those of other fleets. It is hardly necessary to point out that this difficulty is one that affects us only, for it is an axiom with us that the first task of our Navy is to destroy the enemy's fleets or blockade them in their own ports; *their* task would be to prey upon our commerce, to land expeditions in our Colonies, or to convoy an invading force after eluding or defeating one of our fleets. •

3. The advent of steam has reduced the distance which divides England from France, or even from Germany, and, by making the blockaded fleet independent of wind and weather, will entail ceaseless vigilance on the part of our blockading ships at times when, in the old days, they could safely avoid a lee shore, trusting to an onshore gale to keep the enemy in port.

Let us now consider the strength of our fleet to-day compared with those of other Powers. We give below the numbers of armoured ships of the principal fleets of the world, compiled from the Dilke Return, May, 1910.

* The anonymous author of "Völker Europas" shows that the British Squadron blockading the German coasts and fleet in the imaginary war would use about 300,000 tons of coal in a month.

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Battleships.					Armoured Cruisers.		
	Dread-nought Type.	Launched 1900—06.	Launched 1891—99.	Total.	Invincible Type.	Previous Types.	Total.
Great Britain	5 9 B	19	32	65 Since 1900 33	3 3 B	35	41
Germany ...	2 8 B	16	15	41 Since 1900 26	3 B	9	12
United States	4 4 B	16	10	34 Since 1900 24	—	15	15
France ...	6 B	6	11	23 Since 1900 12	—	20 2 B	22
Japan ...	1 3 B	6	7	17 Since 1900 10	—	12 1 B	13
Russia ...	4 B	3 4 B	3	14 Since 1900 11	—	4 2 B	6
Italy ...	2 B	6	3	11 Since 1900 8	—	8 2 B	10
Austria * ...	7 1 B	9	—	10 Since 1900 10	—	3	3

B = Building.

* From "Naval Annual," 1910.

It will be seen that the Two-Power Standard has gone by the board as far as battleships of the

newest type are concerned and that, in the matter of this type of ship, Mr. Balfour's words in the House of Commons in the Debate on the Vote of Censure on March 19, 1909, are literally true.

Mr. Balfour said: "I do not mean to compare"

"our strength with foreign nations. That I"

"should do if I were dealing with the pledge"

"of the Prime Minister with regard to the"

"Two-Power Standard. I regret to say we"

"have reached the point when the matter of"

"debate among us is not whether in respect to"

"this particular class of ships we are maintain-

"ing the Two-Power Standard, but whether we"

"are maintaining a One-Power Standard! It is"

"the One-Power Standard, the question of the"

"One-Power Standard, that I address myself to."

It is noteworthy that this view was expressed

not only by the Leader of the Opposition, but by

so prominent a Liberal as Mr. Chiozza Money,

who said: "We are face to face in this novel"

"situation with a profound historic fact. We"

"are face to face with the fact that at last we,"

"the pre-eminent nation in the shipbuilding,"

"have actually got in this House to reconsider"

"our ship-building programme, not in the light"

"of the Two-Power Standard but, so far as the"

"latest type of battleship is concerned, in"

"regard to the One-Power Standard."

And if it be urged that we have a great

superiority over Germany alone in pre-Dread-

nought ships, viz., 51 to 31, we must observe

that Mr. McKenna himself admitted in his speech

introducing the Navy Estimates (March 16, 1909),

that "We cannot be sure of retaining our"

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"superiority at sea if we ever allow ourselves"
 "to fall behind in this newest and best class of"
 "ship." The whole matter cannot be better
 summarized than in the weighty words of Sir
 Edward Grey: "If we fall into a position of"
 "inferiority our self-respect is gone. . . . We"
 "should cease to count for anything amongst"
 "the nations of Europe, and we should be"
 "fortunate if our liberty was left, and we did"
 "not become the conscript appendage of some"
 "stronger Power. That is a brutal way of"
 "stating the case, but it is the truth."

It is, however, not only a case of ships, but also
 of men. There is one important point by which
 the efficiency of our Navy is seriously impaired,
 namely, the inadequacy of our Naval Reserve.
 The following was the number of men available
 for manning the Navy on January 1, 1910:

Total officers and men, Sea and Administrative Services (including naval cadets and boys under training, 4,540)	...	...	...	129,111
Royal Naval Reserve	...	...	...	22,268*
Royal Fleet Reserve	...	...	...	21,116
Royal Naval Volunteers	...	...	...	4,147
Pensioners under 55 years of age	...	...	...	8,297
				<u>55,828*</u>

The whole Naval Reserve numbers, therefore,
 55,828 men, or, roughly speaking, one Reservist
 to two on the Active list. But of these 56,000
 only the 21,116 who belong to the Royal Fleet
 Reserve and the 8,297 Pensioners under 55 years

* Of these, 1,440 are in Newfoundland, Malta, and Australia.

of age, are fully trained men who have been through the Navy. These 30,000 represent our equivalent to the 100,000 men of the German Naval Reserve, every one of whom has been through the Active Navy. The men of the Royal Naval Reserve are men of the maritime population (fishermen, men of the Mercantile Marine, yachtsmen, etc.) who have never been in the Navy, but who go through a short training on a man of war occasionally.

It is noteworthy that, according to Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund Fremantle, we require a Naval Reserve of not less than 80,000 men.

It must be remembered, too, that even the 56,000 men are not wholly a Reserve in the real sense of the word, seeing that a large proportion of them would be required to bring the peace complements of our ships up to war strength at the very commencement of hostilities. "To place the fleet on a war footing," says an expert in the Navy League pamphlet (October, 1906), "would take approximately 138,120 men, and "we should require a considerable reserve." And again: "As regards seamen: no satisfactory "solution has yet been found of that difficult "problem which involves the maintenance "constantly and during peace of a large body "of men suitable for manning the Navy, having "at the same time an adequate reserve to be "brought rapidly into action upon an emergency." When we reckon 4,100 Royal Naval Volunteers in the total of our Naval Reserve (56,000) it is important to note the standard of efficiency which is laid down for the Volunteer

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Naval Reserve. "Efficiency" is obtained and the capitation grant given for 40 drills of an hour each in the first year, and not less than 24 such drills in subsequent years, one day's service at sea being considered equivalent to six ordinary drills.

Intimately connected with the difficulty, hitherto insuperable, of providing a sufficient Naval Reserve, is the great proportion of foreigners and Asiatics in the Mercantile Marine, from which our Naval Reserve men are largely drawn. This proportion has risen from 9 per cent. in 1860 to 29·7 per cent. in 1907, although it is satisfactory to note that it has been decreasing during the last four years. It is this grave state of things which, no doubt, led the Naval Reserve Committee of 1903 to state that "the requirements of the Navy have outgrown the power of the Mercantile Marine to supply them."

The Right Hon. C. T. Ritchie, M.P., referring to the result which this circumstance would bring about if the Naval Reserves were called out, said (February 28, 1899): "The result" "would be to deplete British ships of British" "seamen; and, instead of being partially" "manned by foreigners, they would, under" "existing circumstances, be altogether manned" "by foreigners. That, I think, is matter for" "very great regret; and if any suggestion can" "be made to remedy that state of things, or" "to endeavour to remedy that state of things," "which the whole House regrets, then the" "House would do wrong not to consider any" "suggestion that might be made." The National Service League proposes to meet this difficulty in

some degree by providing that the training of the youth of the maritime population should, under its scheme, be on naval, not on military lines.

Having compared our Navy with those of the chief foreign Powers as regards numbers, let us now see what is the task that our fleets would be called upon to fulfil in the event of war. That task may be summarized under four headings:

1. To seek out and destroy the enemy's fleets or to blockade them in their own ports.
2. To protect our trade.
3. To protect our coaling-stations.
4. To convoy our troopships carrying our oversea army and its reinforcements.

1.—TO DESTROY OR BLOCKADE THE HOSTILE SQUADRONS.

In the early part of the century our superiority over hostile fleets varied from about six to three in 1794, to fifteen to three in 1804; and in 1805 we had (before Trafalgar) eighty-three battleships to sixty-one of the combined French and Spanish Navies. This superiority was far from being more than was necessary, seeing that we were always outnumbered in our naval battles—a risk we could not afford to take nowadays, owing to altered conditions of war.

According to the late Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby, we require a superiority in battleships of *two to one*—(according to the Three Admirals' Report (1888) of at least *five to three*)—in order to “maintain an effective blockade of the” “enemy's squadrons.”

We have seen that we are very far indeed

Mercantile Marine Tonnage, 1908.

1 inch to 1 million tons.	British Empire—	13,263,354
	France—	1,452,495
	Russia—	700,959
	Germany—	2,825,404
	Italy—	1,002,062
	United States—*†	940,068
	Japan—*	1,543,827

Naval Expenditure per Ton of Shipping, 1908.

(Or Rate of Insurance.)

1 inch to £1.	United Kingdom—†	£2 9 4
	France—	8 17 7
	Russia—	13 17 11
	Germany—§	5 17 6
	Italy—	5 15 7
	United States—	23 3 3
	Japan—	3 7 4

The Total Annual value of Ocean or Seaborne Commerce of the FOUR European Powers above named is as 95 to 100 of British Commerce; their Shipping or Mercantile Marine Tonnage is as 44 only to 100 of British; and the average of their Naval Expenditure per ton of Shipping owned by them is nearly 3 times as great as British Expenditure per ton of shipping.

* Gross tonnage.

† Foreign trade only.

‡ Including Naval Works.

§ Including cost of Naval Forts.

These figures speak for themselves. But, they become appalling in their significance when we remember that the words "trade" and "commerce" cover "food-supply." These words, "our food supply," open up a question

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so tremendous in its bearing upon our very existence as a nation that it may truly be said that all other questions sink into comparative insignificance beside it.

We shall content ourselves here with citing a few salient facts which will illustrate how we are dependent upon our first line to save us, not merely from defeat at sea, but even from eventual starvation should that defeat be absolute.*

In his book, "War, Famine and Food Supply," Mr. Marston shows that though "at this time" "(1801) the British Navy was superior to the" "combined forces of all Europe," and though "we grew nearly all the corn we required at" "home" for our then population of 15,000,000, yet "the people of these islands were through-" "out the year 1800, and partly in 1801, on the" "brink of famine: . . . Deficient harvests" "raised the price of wheat to 134s. a quarter" "in the spring of 1801. . . . On the 5th of" "March (of that year) the price of the quartern" "loaf was 1s. 10½d.," and a shilling at that time had a far greater purchasing power than it has to-day.

The following figures are taken from the "Statesman's Year Book":

The total consumption of breadstuffs in this				Quarters.
country for the year 1907 was	...	...	...	33,255,870
Total imports of wheat and flour	...	...	...	26,027,000
Grown at home	...	...	...	7,128,870

* We deal with the much misunderstood question of the results of temporary or partial naval defeat in Chapter IV., "The Problem of Invasion."

The Navy

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PRINCIPAL CORN-EXPORTING COUNTRIES TO UNITED KINGDOM (Year 1908).

Country.	Distance (Miles).	Cwts.
U.S.A.	3,000	27,123,400
Russia	{ 3,420 to Odessa } { 1,160 to Riga }	4,609,710
Argentina	6,000	31,680,200
India	6,217	2,948,900
Canada	2,500	14,442,195
Australia	12,000 (Cape Route)	5,518,200
Chili	8,500	2,210,700
Roumania	3,000	1,837,000

It will be seen that we import more than 26,000,000 quarters of wheat out of the 33,000,000 which we consume.

The following figures show the same dangerous state of things from another standpoint:

	1801.	1907.
Population	15,000,000	44,099,000
Population fed on—		
Wheat, home produce ...	14,000,000	9,360,790
Wheat, foreign produce	1,000,000	34,738,210

The Navy is therefore responsible for the protection of the food-supply of 79 per cent. of our population. Moreover, there is another aspect of the question which must not be lost sight of. The hostility of one of the chief importing countries, or the formation of a trust in corn by some of our enemies, might mean the almost complete cessation of the export of food to us from such countries.* No naval strength will prevent such a contingency, and this consideration should induce the nation to take

* "Whitaker," 1907, shows that 73 per cent. of our imported wheat and flour comes from foreign countries, and only 27 per cent. from British Dominions.

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measures in time, so that the day of need may not find us without a reserve of food. The widespread cultivation of the potato has been urged by far-sighted writers. For it would give (1) agricultural employment to thousands and help to stem the flow of the population to the cities; (2) it would give a valuable source of alcohol for heat, light and locomotion; (3) in time of war the soil of the United Kingdom itself would hold a reserve of food for the people.

Leaving aside these considerations, however, it is clear that the burden laid upon our Navy in the event of war with a European Power in the near future would be so huge that we must do our utmost to give strategical freedom to the Navy by relieving it, as far as possible, from the duties of Home Defence. Hence we require adequate and efficient land forces with which to meet an attempt at invasion while our fleets are grappling with their thousand duties. And we may well ask ourselves whether even the gigantic outlay which would be necessary, if we were to spend proportionately the same "trade insurance"* money on the Navy now as our forefathers did a hundred years ago, would enable us ever again to attain such complete supremacy at sea as we had in 1801. There is little doubt that the natural march of events must very soon bring home to

* The amount spent on the Navy in 1801 represented 18.1 per cent. of the value of our trade as against 2.8 per cent. in 1907. Similarly, the Navy cost one-twentieth of the income of the country in 1809. In 1909 its cost was only one-fifty-seventh of the income. ("An 'over-big' Navy and Geographical Investors." Admiral the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Fremantle in the *Financial Review of Reviews*, December, 1909).

every Briton the conviction that even England's wealth cannot in the long run buy what the devoted service of the manhood of the nation can alone give—the peace and security of the Empire.

3.—TO PROTECT OUR COALING-STATIONS.

The third task that our Navy would have to fulfil in time of war is that of protecting our coaling-stations.

It is clear that if our coaling-stations and important colonial ports were provided with good forts, long-range heavy calibre guns, well-constructed submarine mines, and had *adequate garrisons*, they would be much safer from attack by hostile squadrons and expeditionary forces. This would largely relieve the Navy of the burden of doing what can be better done by land defence, instead of obliging us to anchor a fleet at each of our colonial ports and coaling-stations to meet a possible enemy ; in other words, the addition to our military forces which is so urgently needed would at the same time render our Navy far more valuable for offensive purposes than it is at present. It is to aid the Navy in this direction that our Colonies are now taking steps to build local fleets and to train all their able-bodied manhood to the use of arms.

4.—TO CONVOY OUR TROOPSHIPS.

The naval superiority which would enable us effectively to deal with the primary task of destroying or blockading the enemy's fleets would probably suffice for this work.

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The considerations urged in this chapter will show that, while the Navy is far stronger *absolutely* than ever it was, it is far weaker than it was at the beginning of last century *relatively* :

1. To the expansion of the Empire and the enormous responsibilities it entails on the Navy:

2. To the development of the naval power of other nations.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PROBLEM OF INVASION.

"A Home Defence Army is either required or it is not required. If you come to the conclusion that it is not required, and that the Navy can do all that is needed, I would ask you what can be the object of spending vast sums of money on Mr. Haldane's Territorial Army scheme? But if a Home Defence Army is required—and the only purpose for which it can be required is to resist invasion, and that possibly without any previous notice—then surely common sense tells us that it must be on a scale and so organized as to ensure it being able to deal successfully with any troops to which it is likely to be opposed."—LORD ROBERTS. *Speech in the House of Lords, November 23, 1908.*

"We can have no security or confidence in the feelings or the sympathy of other nations; we can have no security except in the efficacy of our own defence and the strength of our own right arm. Everywhere you see the powers of offence increasing. Armies become larger, navies are founded; railways, telegraphs—all the apparatus which science has placed at the disposal of war becomes more perfect and more effective. And all these things may, by one of those strange currents that sweep across the ocean of international politics, be united in one great wave, and dash on your shores."—The late LORD SALISBURY, *at the Primrose League Meeting, May 9, 1900.*

"Depend upon it, if this should ever occur—and that such an eventuality will happen I feel

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morally certain, unless we put our house in order—it will be at a moment when we are least prepared to meet the enemy; that is to say, when we are asleep as we are at present, or when nearly the whole of the Regular Army has been despatched abroad, as in 1900.”—**LORD ROBERTS.** *Speech in the House of Lords, February 18, 1907.*

“Before the days of steam and of the electric telegraph, we should always have had a long time to prepare against any threatened invasion. Then it would have been necessary for the would-be invading enemy to collect not only the necessary army close to the most conveniently situated harbours beyond the Channel, but the vast number of sailing transports that would then have been required for their conveyance across our big wet ditch, as well as the fighting fleet intended for their protection during the passage.

“Other nations—I need not name them—are now very strong at sea as well as ourselves, and any well-planned combination amongst them might, I believe, give to our enemies the command of the Channel for a sufficiently long time to enable a great invading army to be landed on our coast. The only stores it would require would be ammunition, as our rich counties would furnish them with every other requisite.

“I am well aware of how much I lay myself open to hostile criticism—ay, even to angry ridicule—when I humbly assert my belief in the possible invasion of England. But, as a military student, I prefer humbly to err with such very great soldiers as Napoleon and Wellington upon such a question than to agree with the politicians in office upon a matter that might be at no very distant date one of life and death to us as a nation.”—*Extract from a letter written by FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WOLSELEY to Lord Wemyss on November 28, 1906.*

“It is incorrect to consider an invasion of England to be chimerical and unrealizable. The

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distance is short and can easily be traversed by an enterprising admiral who succeeds, by the excellence of his fleet and by his audacity, in obtaining for a short time the command of the sea. Germany can meet the trial when it comes, and must not lose a single day in preparing for it.—GENERAL VON DER GOLTZ, in the "*Deutsche Rundschau*," 1900.

THOUGH we view Imperial Defence as a whole, the problem of invasion demands our special consideration, both because of its gravity and because it is only for the defence of the country of his birth that the services of every citizen can be claimed as a *right*—a right which has been recognized by all nations from the earliest times. A people engaged in industrial pursuits and little given to consider matters of defence will never realize the responsibilities of Empire and the needs of its defence until they are made aware that they may have to defend their own hearths and homes. From such recognition will spring the larger patriotism which regards the whole Empire as a common heritage, having a claim upon the love and service of all who are born under the Flag.

Before entering into details it is necessary to point out that a misconception prevails very widely as to the official attitude on the question of invasion. It is true that Mr. Balfour stated in a speech, delivered in April, 1905, that "serious invasion of these islands was not an event which we need seriously consider"; but since that date his views have undergone considerable modification. Not only is this apparent from a speech delivered at Cardiff on

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November 19, 1908,* but also from a debate on Navy and Army Expenditure which took place in the House of Commons on July 29, 1909, when he said: "At the time of the original " "investigations the conclusion at which I think " "I may say the whole of the Defence Com- " "mittee arrived, and certainly at which I " "arrived, was that in the then condition of " "the country even 70,000 men could not be " "landed on the British shore. I gather from " "the Prime Minister that the Committee of " "Defence is still of opinion that that is an " "extremely improbable event, but they are " "now, I gather, forced to the conclusion that " "it is an hypothesis which you must not " "absolutely exclude as impossible. It must " "be taken as being on the margin of possi- " "bility and something which must be calculated " "for, and, from that point of view I think " "the conclusions at which the Committee of " "Defence have arrived, to use a word to " "describe them, are somewhat more anxious " "than those we arrived at a few years earlier. " "I must confess that from my point of view I " "believe the Defence Committee are absolutely "

* "Let no man be so foolish as to dream that we in these two islands can remain safely sheltered from the storms that shake the outside world, removed from every danger, by overwhelming naval strength. That is a vain and empty dream. If the British Empire is to remain an Empire, in the first place, it is not the fact that the Navy, and the Navy alone, can give us adequate Home Defence. The Navy must be supplemented by an adequate home force, and it is folly to suppose, and no instructed soldier or sailor does suppose, that merely by multiplying our ironclads and neglecting the whole problem of military defence, you can flatter yourself that in any contingency you can sleep safely in your beds."—Mr. Balfour at Cardiff, November 19, 1908.

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"right in the new conclusion, in so far as it"
"is new, at which they have arrived, and if"
"any statement I have made in earlier years"
"requires qualification in the sense of the"
"statement I have just made, I hope every-"
"body who reads my former speeches will"
"make that qualification. New circumstances"
"have arisen, and, whereas I do not think"
"that in 1903 and 1904, when our investiga-"
"tions were originally made, 70,000 was really"
"on the margin of possibility, I think it is"
"just on the margin now, and that it is a"
"possibility you have to contemplate. . . ."
"We know we must aim, if we are to be in"
"a thoroughly satisfactory position, at a Home"
"Defence force capable of dealing with 70,000"
"invaders landing on our shores after the"
"expeditionary force has left these islands."

Coming from a statesman whose judicious caution in dealing with any question, when he is not quite sure that it is as yet within the region of practical politics, is proverbial, the above pronouncement must be regarded as very weighty.

The statement of the Prime Minister, to which Mr. Balfour referred, was that in which the results of the investigations of the Defence Committee on the subject of invasion were made known to the House of Commons in the following words:

"The conclusion to which we unanimously"
"arrived—all the naval as well as military"
"Members of the Committee being at one in"
"this matter—may be summed up under two"

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"heads. In the first place that, so long as the"
"naval supremacy of this country is ade-"
"quately assured invasion on a large scale,"
"by which I mean invasion on such a scale as"
"was contemplated by Lord Roberts, that is,"
"the transport to these shores of 120,000 or"
"150,000 men, is an absolutely impracticable"
"operation; and on the other hand, if we were"
"permanently to lose the command of the sea,"
"then, whatever might be the strength and"
"organization of our military forces, even"
"allowing that you had an Army like the army"
"of Germany, whatever might be its strength"
"and whatever might be its organization, it"
"would be impossible that this country—I"
"will not say be invaded—invasion might not"
"even be necessary—but the subjection of the"
"country to the enemy would be inevitable."
"It followed from that proposition that it is"
"the business of the Admiralty to maintain"
"our naval supremacy at such a point that we"
"cannot lose command of the sea, and that"
"against any reasonable possible combination"
"that could be brought against us we must"
"hold the sea and make invasion impracticable."
"That was the first proposition. . . . The"
"second proposition is, we ought to have a"
"Home Army—I am not now speaking of an"
"Expeditionary Force, but an Army for Home"
"Defences—sufficient in numbers and organiza-"
"tion for two purposes—in the first place, to"
"repel what are called raids, that is to say,"
"sporadic offensive expeditions which are so"
"small in their numbers as to evade even the"

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“best and most carefully watching fleets, but”
“which are not intended permanently to”
“occupy the country against which they are”
“directed, but only to inflict such serious”
“damage as they can. We should have a”
“Home Army not only adequate to repel raids”
“of that description, but — a much more”
“serious thing—to compel an enemy which”
“contemplates invasion to come with such”
“substantial force as to make it impossible for”
“them to evade our fleet. That, we believe,”
“is the real function of the Home Army. You”
“must maintain your Home Army on a scale”
“in numbers, in condition of organization and”
“distribution, as would make it impossible”
“for any opponent contemplating invasion to”
“despatch against you anything but a very”
“considerable army. . . . No one will under-”
“take the task of invasion with a smaller force”
“than something like 70,000 men. I do not”
“believe 70,000 men would ever get through”
“at all, but you must have in these matters”
“an ample margin of safety. It does not do”
“to rely less or more upon nicely-calculated”
“numbers, and we must have an ample margin”
“of safety. Our conclusion was that in order”
“to insure that margin the force for maintain-”
“ing Home Defence should be one capable of”
“dealing with an invading force of 70,000”
“men. Of course you require a great deal”
“more than 70,000 men in your Home Army”
“to cope with the possible invasion of”
“70,000 men from elsewhere. Those were”
“our two general propositions. With regard”

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"to the military aspect, it is, in consequence of the findings of this Committee, the business of the War Office to see that we have, under all circumstances, a properly organized and properly equipped force capable of dealing effectively with a possible invasion by 70,000 men. If these two conditions are satisfied, that is, the naval condition and the military condition, it is the opinion of the Defence Committee, after the most careful investigation that has ever been made, that this country will be safe from invasion. But both those conditions must be satisfied."

"You must have an unassailable supremacy at sea, and you must maintain your Home Army at such dimensions and in such readiness for its work, that it will be able to cope with the force of the size I have described."

In spite of these important declarations from such authoritative sources, the soothing soporifics of Mr. Balfour's speech in April, 1905, and the exaggerations of the extreme Blue Water School have done so much to lull the nation into a false sense of security that it is well to point out what invasion would imply in our case.

In 1860 a great banker, Lord Overstone, gave evidence before a Royal Commission appointed to consider the question of National Defence. His evidence is well worth serious study. "The calamities attendant upon foreign invasion," he said, "must be serious to any country; but upon a country circumstanced as Great Britain is, they would fall with peculiar and overwhelming severity. . . . The complicated and very"

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"delicate network of credit which overlies all"
"the multitudinous transactions of the country"
"would vibrate throughout upon the first touch"
"of our soil by a foreign invader, and would, in"
"all probability, be subject to a sudden and"
"fearful collapse, whilst the confusion and dis-"
"tress produced among the labouring classes"
"would be truly fearful. . . . We may be"
"assured that, under the most favourable"
"supposition, the general confusion and ruin"
"which the presence of a hostile army on"
"British soil must produce will be such that it"
"will be *absolute madness* on the part of the"
"Government and the people of the country"
"were they to omit any possible measure of"
"precaution, or to shrink from present sacrifice"
"by which the occurrence of such a catastrophe"
"may be rendered impossible." *

Similarly, the late Lord Salisbury, speaking at the Albert Hall on May 9, 1900, and urging "the necessity of precaution in time," said: "Allow me to remind you that, as a great" "maritime nation, you stand in a special" "position. The great military Powers on the" "Continent . . . have passed through un-" "successful wars, which again and again have" "landed the enemy in their capitals, and yet" "they are as strong, even stronger, now that" "the experience has passed by." [Because they have profited by the lessons of the past.] "Can"

* The more immediate results of an invasion as it affects the civil population are shown in the two pamphlets, "The Civilian in War Time," by Miss Gabrielle Festing, and "What War Means," by Horace Wyndham, issued by the National Service League, price 1d. each.

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"we say with confidence that that would be the effect if London were the scene of a similar operation? Remember what has happened to the great maritime Powers of the past. . . . " "In every case the great maritime Power has been paralysed and killed, not by the disasters it may have suffered in its provinces, or its outlying dependencies; in every case it has succumbed to a blow directed at the heart. That is a lesson which a Power like Great Britain ought not to neglect. So long as our heart is unstruck, we might look with comparative indifference on the result of any war. . . . But if our heart is once struck there is an end of the history of England."

But if this be so, if the catastrophe which invasion would bring about in our case is so tremendous, is it not clear that it must be the ultimate object at which any enemy is bound to aim, upon which he will concentrate all the skill and science of a highly-trained general staff, and for which he will try to organize all the resources which modern science and modern war have placed at his disposal? It is, no doubt, most blameworthy on the part of foreign Powers to aim at striking a blow which, if successful, would bring us to our knees; but we cannot expect them to refrain from using the weapon which will quickest achieve the purpose of war—the defeat of the enemy.*

It is well, then, to examine briefly the grounds

* "The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of war." "War is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds."—Clausewitz "On War."

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upon which "invasion on a larger scale" was "regarded by the Committee of Defence as an absolutely impracticable operation."

There is nothing subtle or mysterious about an invasion. Provided that a Power possesses the necessary troops and shipping, the question of success resolves itself into the question of defeating or eluding that portion of our fleet which would oppose such an attempt.

To say that this is "impracticable" means either (1) the fulfilment of the first condition laid down by the Committee of Imperial Defence,* viz., that the British Navy is invincible; and that, if invincible, it cannot be evaded; or else (2) that the enemy cannot transport so large a body of troops.

(1) Is the Navy invincible? This is a question which can only be decided by the test of war. We may, however, note some facts which would seem to counsel caution in giving a final answer to this question.

(a) Although our fleet appears to be just up to the Two-Power Standard at the present moment, if we include armoured cruisers, we have lately had ample proof that strenuous efforts will have to be made to maintain that standard unimpaired, as against two such Powers as the United States and Germany. Fortunately the Two-Power Standard has now been accepted as the minimum by both political parties. For the benefit of those of our readers who are unfamiliar with the

* "You must have an unassailable supremacy at sea."—Mr. Asquith, *vide supra*.

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subject, we may explain that the Two-Power Standard is now defined as "a preponderance of 10 per cent. over the combined strength" "in capital ships of the two next strongest" "Powers."

Comparisons of modern British capital ships with those of the other naval powers are given in the preceding chapter, and in Table A of the Appendix.

(b) In the Napoleonic wars we always had a great preponderance at sea over every possible combination; the proportion of British to French ships varying from six to three in 1794 to fifteen to three in 1804. In 1801 "the British Navy" "was superior to the combined forces of all" "Europe," Captain Mahan tells us. Yet such were the demands made on our fleets for the protection of a commerce incomparably less extensive,* and of dominions one-eighth of the present area, that, in every naval battle of importance, we had to meet the enemy with numerically inferior forces. Is it likely that, with the prodigious demands which our Navy would have to meet to-day, we shall always be able to place equal or superior forces against the enemy? If not, have we any right to reckon upon an inferiority in skill, discipline, scientific training, or marksmanship on the part of our opponents which would restore the balance in our favour, as their inferiority in seamanship did in the old wars? In the opinion of experts, the German Navy, at least, is as perfect as modern science,

* See Chapter II., p. 13.

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thorough discipline, and assiduous training can make it.*

(c) Anything like a close blockade of a hostile port is now impossible, since blockading ships are liable to the attacks of torpedoes, floating mines, and submarines. It is thus far easier than in the days of sailing ships for the blockaded fleet, resting upon its base and with ample supplies of coal, to break out of harbour on dark nights or to make sorties against the blockaders, who are thus subjected to a strain which has been found almost intolerable even during peace manœuvres.

It is, of course, quite true that some of these considerations tell against the enemy as well as against the British fleet. But the enemy makes no claim to invincibility. Nor, probably, does the British Navy. We have, however, to consider the claim put forward on its behalf by politicians anxious to "prophesy smooth things to the people."

(d) Can the Navy be evaded? Certainly it would be difficult to evade if it is free to concentrate its whole forces in home waters and remains undefeated. But the present situation, under which our fleets are kept tied to the shores of Great Britain, owing to the lack of a sufficient and efficient Home Defence Army, is fraught with danger for our Empire and our trade. An able article on this subject, by "An Admiral with

* "The new German Navy has come into existence; it is a Navy of the most efficient type, and is so fortunately circumstanced that it is able to concentrate almost the whole of its fleet in its home ports."—White Paper on "Distribution and Mobilization of the Fleet," December, 1904. See also "Heresies of Sea Power," F. T. Jane, p. 330, and "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," Percival Hislam.

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Fifty-one Years' Service," appeared in the issue of *Blackwood's Magazine* for January, 1909, under the heading, "Our Manacled Fleet," from which we quote the following:—"The country " "has not yet realized, and probably will not " "realize until war breaks out, what this tying " "of our fleet to our own shores really means. It " "means that the next time we are involved in " "war with any of our neighbours (and the man " "must be an insane optimist who imagines we " "shall never again be at war), it means that we " "shall have to keep our fleet within three days' " "sail of the North Sea for fear of Germany, " "even though she might not at first be our " "enemy. But with our fleet manacled to the " "shores of these islands, what is to become of " "our scattered possessions in all parts of the " "world? What a temptation to any ambitious " "Power to lay violent hands upon them, if they " "knew we dare not send our ships to defend " "them!"

Should we venture to do so a sudden outbreak of hostilities in home waters might find a considerable part of our fleet engaged elsewhere. If, then, a surprise attack succeeded in disabling or "bottling up" part of the Home Fleet, or if an enterprising enemy, by a feint on our western coasts and trade arteries, drew that fleet into the Atlantic, the command of the North Sea might be lost for several days, during which the number of troops landed would only be limited by the amount of transport controlled by the invader. As we shall show in the course of this chapter, Germany, even under normal conditions of trade,

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has ample transport for an army of 150,000 men berthed in her North Sea ports.

This brings us to another contingency apparently ignored by the Committee of Defence. Mr. Asquith in the course of his statement said: "We should have a Home Army . . . to" "compel an enemy which contemplates inva-" "sion to come with such substantial force as" "to make it impossible for them to evade our" "fleet. . . . I do not believe 70,000 men" "would ever get through at all, but you" "must have in these matters an ample margin" "of safety."

Our cousins across the North Sea are presumably alive to the increased risk and delay which would be caused by concentrating their fleet of transports, and would probably decide on dividing their attack into five or six flotillas, starting from different ports, and with objectives at various points on our coasts. Each of these flotillas, which might only consist of from three to six ships, could carry a force of 18,000 to 36,000 men, a force amply sufficient to effect a landing, to brush aside, when landed, our hastily improvised local forces, and to concentrate into one or two main armies. It must be obvious to any person of common sense that five or six small groups like the above, operating simultaneously on different routes would stand a very much better chance of getting past our fleet than the larger target which Mr. Asquith and his expert advisers at the Admiralty have chosen for the purposes of their examination.

History supplies the best answer to the

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question whether "land forces under naval escort" can escape from ports watched or blockaded by fleets. We give here three instances of such escape: (a) The French fleet, closely blockaded at Brest in 1796, slipped away with 20,000 men on board, and, in spite of bad weather, thirty-six out of forty-three ships reached Bantry Bay, and lay there at anchor for seventeen days without interference by the British Navy. (b) General Humbert's raid of 1,000 men in Ireland in 1798, after sixteen days of navigation unobserved by the British fleet. (c) Napoleon, closely watched at Toulon by Nelson himself, set sail unobserved on May 19, 1798, reached Malta with a total of 54,000 men on 293 transports, escorted by 55 warships, and landed in Egypt without having been discovered in spite of Nelson's strenuous efforts. The latter, as *The Times* military correspondent tells us,* "crossed the track followed" "by the French, steered a course nearly" "parallel with and not a hundred miles distant" "from them for several days, reached Alex-" "andria before them, and sailed away before" "the French arrived." "These historical" "examples show," proceeds the writer, "that" "we were not able to count upon either the" "observation or the interception of great mari-" "time expeditions in the old wars, even though" "our admirals were well placed, had fortune" "favoured them, to observe in the first instance," "and then to destroy, the hostile armaments."

* "The Story of a Raid."—*Times*, 8th and 13th November, 1906. Reprinted in "The Foundations of Reform." Simpkin, Marshall & Co.

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It is sometimes contended that no Power would be willing to run the great risks involved in an attempted invasion. This is not the view of foreign experts.

A well-known French military writer has said :
" A decisive struggle with a European Power "
" will not end without an attempt to land an "
" army upon the English coast."

In discussing the question of over-sea invasion, in the Danish War, 1864, Moltke admitted the risks, but said: " We must not, in my view," " discard the landing project by declaring it " " impracticable or by forbidding it. . . . " " Success depends upon absolute secrecy and " " complete surprise." He added the following significant remark: " If we succeed in effecting " " the passage all these gunboats and useless " " material may go to the bottom of the sea, " " but *nevertheless we shall have won the rubber.*"

A similar view is set forth in a text-book on " The Duties of the General Staff," by the able German authority General Bronsart von Schellendorf, who, after explaining how, in order " to co-operate effectively, the army and navy " " must have a common objective, namely, the " " rapid destruction of the enemy's forces," goes on to say: " The advantages of gaining com- " " mand of the sea—at least for a time—and " " thereby making possible the transport of " " troops by sea, *may justify the loss of our own fleet.*" Moreover, in an article on " The Future Functions of the German Navy " in the *National Review* of April, 1905, a German Staff Officer said that " everything must be prepared beforehand ; "

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"the troops, the place, the time, and so on" "being kept a profound secret, so that the" "opponent may be taken by surprise. Further," "attempts should be made to deceive the enemy" "at least with regard to the purpose for which" "the preparations are undertaken." One of the most striking sentences in this remarkable article is this: "If a landing has taken place, even a" "victorious naval battle is useless to the" "defender, unless he disposes of armies" "sufficiently strong to meet the invader with" "success."

There are two main contingencies to be considered, neither of which was dealt with by Mr. Asquith.

(a) A sudden attack by a strong neutral, possessing a powerful and concentrated fleet and the most ample facilities for the sea transport of troops, at a moment when we are fully occupied on land and sea. Is such an event unthinkable? In the memorable interview with a "Diplomatist" published in the *Daily Telegraph* of October 28, 1908, H.I.M. the German Emperor is reported to have said, with reference to the late South African War: "Again, when the struggle was" "at its height, the German Government was" "invited by the Governments of France and" "Russia to join with them in calling upon" "England to put an end to the war. The" "moment had come, they said, not only to" "save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate" "England to the dust." What has been may be again. More unlikely things have happened. Will it be maintained that in such

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circumstances an invasion by Germany would be an impossibility?

There are other contingencies foreseen by our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand which we need not at present discuss.

(b) A surprise attack without previous declaration of war. Many people imagine that such a thing is inconceivable, and too wicked to be contemplated by any civilized power. Wicked it may be. So far from being inconceivable, however, it has been almost the rule in the past. Those who doubt this statement may be referred to a valuable book, "Hostilities without Declaration of War," by General Sir F. Maurice. He shows that in a period of 171 years (from 1700 to 1870) 107 wars were "commenced by the" "subjects of European Powers or of the United" "States against other Powers without declara-" "tion of war." Less than ten cases are recorded of such declaration during the whole period.

The Japanese attacks on the Russian fleet at Chemulpo and Port Arthur in February, 1904, were surprise attacks. The national loss entailed by defeat is so prodigious that the temptation to "get the blow in first" will probably be too great to be resisted. This would be the case especially with those Powers which are best prepared for war, such as Germany and Japan.*

* "We in Germany must not be blind to the fact that in naval warfare the period of straightforward, honest declarations of war has gone for ever. It is not merely naive, but extremely erroneous to suppose that war could not break out without a formal declaration. The next naval war will begin with such a breach of International Law and at a moment when the enemy least expects an attack."—Count Ernst von Reventlow.

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(2) Let us now glance at a few facts with regard to the transport accommodation available in Germany. The average daily shipping in Hamburg alone in 1905 was 181,000 tons. The tonnage of German steamships over 100 tons was 3,890,000 in 1909. It would be quite easy to accumulate 500,000 tons at Hamburg in a fortnight on the plea of inspection and registration, even without exercising the right of angary or laying an embargo on British shipping. There are harbours at Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Kiel, Lübeck, Danzig, Stettin, Neufahrwasser, Pillau, Königsberg, and Geestemünde.

(See also Appendix, Tables C2, C3, C4, C5.)

As regards the time taken in disembarkation, Sir Evelyn Wood, tells us that in the Crimean War we landed 14,000 infantry and two batteries in less than seven hours, and other authorities state that the Allies landed 30,000 troops in six hours. This was fifty years ago. It is, therefore, safe to say that with modern appliances and previous practice 3,000 men an hour would not be an achievement beyond the means of highly-trained troops—Mr. Jane thinks 5,000 an hour quite possible, but we prefer to take a much lower figure.* It appears, therefore, that 70,000 men could well be disembarked at one spot in twenty-three hours; if Mr. Jane is right, the time would be fourteen hours. Nor is there any reason why the same operation should not be carried out simultaneously at two or three places selected beforehand for the purpose.

* See also "Is Invasion Impossible," by Lieut. A. C. Dewar, R.N. (London, J. Griffin & Co., 1909, price 1s.), and "The German Invasion of England," by a French Staff Officer. (London, D. Nutt, price 1s.)

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In a recent book, "Guerre et Marine," a well-known writer, M. Paul Fontin, calculates that Germany could concentrate at the mouth of the Elbe, within eight hours, a force of 80,000 men, drawn from the garrisons of Kiel, Lübeck, Hamburg, Dantzic, Cologne, and Coblenz. Combined land and sea manœuvres have been constantly practised in recent years, and the embarkation of these troops could be carried out with the greatest ease and rapidity.

Again, the *Times* military correspondent, in an article published on December 2, 1908, pointed out that Lord Roberts, before making his memorable speech of November 23, 1908, had, with the aid of the staff of the White Star Line and other shipping firms, considered in minute detail the material of war and the merchant transport necessary for an invading army. After stating that he "is thoroughly convinced that 150,000" "men at least can be despatched from the North" "Sea ports of Germany within thirty-six hours" "of the receipt of the order to act, given such" "good arrangements as are foreseen, and are" "not considered difficult, in the Staff works published in Germany on this subject," the *Times* correspondent maintains that "no staff will" "provide more than the *minimum* force required" "for victory, and every expedition aimed at" "England will necessarily have a special com-" "position, whether with regard to the number" "of horsed guns, the cavalry, or the *impedimenta*." "Every point in this problem has been" "considered in detail by Lord Roberts and his" "assistants, and the hypothetical expeditionary"

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"force has been allowed everything it requires"
"for success, including 1,000 rounds per gun"
"or rifle. Even then, the transport only works"
"out to some 220,000 tons for 150,000 men,"
"or about one and a-half tons a man."

It may be noted that the Board of Trade allowance for *passengers* in home waters is one ton per man. In the opinion of some experts an enemy attempting to invade England would trust almost entirely to infantry and cyclists and depend largely for his food supply and transport upon what he could find in the country. In this way the amount of tonnage required to carry a given number of men could be reduced to a minimum.* Be that as it may, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt affords us a record of what has actually been accomplished in the past. In that expedition, which lasted six weeks, 41,000 men, were carried in ships amounting to 47,800 tons, or 1.16 tons per man. The transports also carried 171 guns and wagons, 757 carts, 1,230 horses, and three months' provisions, with forty days' supply of water and stores of all kinds. (See Appendix, Table Cl.)

We have put before our readers some of the main considerations which tend to throw doubt on the impossibility of invasion. We think we cannot do better than conclude these considerations with a quotation from that master of war, upon whose teaching the German nation has based its peace and war strategy.

"We must often undertake things," says

* See "The Writing on the Wall," by "General Staff," (London, W. Heinemann, 1906.)

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Clausewitz, "when the probability of succeeding is against us, and if we can do nothing better. We must not on that account consider the undertaking impossible and unreasonable." Reasonable it will always be if we can do nothing better, and if we employ such sparse means as we may possess to the best advantage."

In order, however, to approach the subject from the point of view of our politicians, let us assume that Mr. Asquith is right, and all that we require is "a properly organised and properly equipped force capable of dealing effectively with a possible invasion by 70,000 men."

The actual situation at the present moment (June, 1910) is as follows :

Territorial Force, less 25 per cent. recruits ...	06,000
Special Reserve, less 16 per cent. recruits ...	52,000
Net surplus of Regulars after the despatch of the Expeditionary Force, which, owing to the Army Reserve (134,000) being temporarily increased by the reduction of battalions and the three years' enlistment scheme introduced by Lord Middleton, now stands at a higher than the normal figure, say ...	117,000
	375,000
Deduct sick and absent, 15 per cent. ...	55,750
	319,250
Deduct Garrisons, local defences, etc. ...	200,000*
Field Army available ...	<u>119,250</u>

* In the debate on the Army Estimates (March, 1910) Sir S. Scott put this figure at 240,000, and was not contradicted by Mr. Haldane. The Military Correspondent of the *Times* allows 300,000.

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This Army would be composed of second line troops deficient in training, armament and horses; the regimental Officers would be amateurs, and the only Regular troops in the force—the Army Reservists—would have no cadres or officers at all. It is only necessary to say that in the war of 1870-1871 the French Army of the Loire, a force in no way inferior to the above force in enthusiasm or military capabilities, was annihilated with ease by a German force of Regular troops one half its size.

A final word to those who maintain that, if we were to lose the command of the sea even for a few days or weeks, we should be blockaded by the enemy and starved out, and that consequently no invasion would be needed to bring England to her knees. Even if such a blockade were possible, we have a brilliant example of fortitude given by the population of Paris during the siege of 1870—1871 to nerve us against surrender. But a very little consideration will show us how utterly impracticable such a blockade would be. Any fleet or combination of fleets which defeats part or the whole of the British Navy will not come unscathed out of the encounter, but will lose or have temporarily disabled a corresponding number of ships. It has yet to be shown how such a decimated fleet is effectively to blockade our 1,500 miles of coast line. Risk of capture would undoubtedly raise the cost of imported food, but in such a crisis the onus of supplying the poorer classes would devolve upon Government.*

* "The Prince of Wales' Commission disposed of the contention that such a blockade of the British Isles was possible. They showed what

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Moreover, on the outbreak of a great war, a great portion of our shipping could be transferred to the flag of some neutral Power with a strong Navy, such, for instance, as the United States. By the destruction of the British fleet and the consequent crippling of the hostile navies, the neutral Power would be left in command of the sea, and would thus be in a position to resent and prevent any interference with merchant ships trading under her flag.

Whatever the Committee of Defence may think about the impossibility of invasion "on a large scale," foreign strategists agree in regarding it as possible; and the essence of their contentions is that, given careful preparation, surprise, and some luck, they can break through or elude our fleets, and then make short work of our home forces, of whose inefficiency they are convinced. But in proportion as the defensive forces in this country are (1) efficient and (2) numerous, so do the hazardous character of an invasion and the need for greater forces for its success increase; in other words, the preparations which would be required would be so vast as to make even relative surprise impossible. If foreign nations knew that behind the Navy stood a nation in arms, they would abandon at once and for ever the dream of an invasion of England.

a great extent of coast line would have to be blockaded; they said that this involved watching all our harbours and 'should absolutely preclude any attempt at blockading our home ports.' They further showed that from 9½ to 15 per cent. of the shipping operating in a given year on the main routes of trade would be sufficient to carry the imports of wheat and flour brought to the United Kingdom in the course of a year." ("The Foundations of Reform," Simpkin, Marshall & Co.)

CHAPTER V.

THE ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN POWERS.

"I would have you remember though we are at peace with the whole world to-day, this happy condition cannot be secured to us indefinitely; and if we are content to remain in our present state of unpreparedness we may find ourselves in a far worse plight than we were in the spring of 1900."—LORD ROBERTS:
Speech at the Mansion House, August 1, 1905.

It will be useful to compare the attitude of the chief Continental Powers towards us to-day with that attitude in the early years of last century.

Taking the period of the Napoleonic wars as a whole, we may say that against France and Napoleon's ambition the whole of Europe was arrayed in arms. As a natural result, England, whose "storm-beaten ships stood between" "Napoleon and the conquest of the world," was looked upon with friendly eyes by most of the Continental Powers.

Prussia had been our staunch ally since Frederick's time; and though the vacillation of her king and her geographical position compelled her to remain neutral during a considerable part of the great struggle, and even forced her to accept the disgraceful Treaty of Schönbrunn, she eagerly availed herself of the situation created by

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Napoleon's retreat from Russia in order to rise against her cruel conqueror; no nation made greater sacrifices in the cause of freedom, or, it may added, was so ill rewarded for those sacrifices at the Congress of Vienna.

Austria was constantly in alliance with us, and her friendship went back to the time when Marlborough and Eugene fought side by side in the Wars of the Spanish Succession.

The Northern Powers, especially Sweden, were our allies,* though Napoleon compelled them for a time to obey the Berlin Decree, "the most" "stupendous proof of his incapacity as a states-" "man, and destined to bring about the collapse" "of the Empire."†

Portugal, the last country which held out against the "Continental System," was our firm friend, and Spain, which had at first been forced to lend itself to Napoleonic policy, rose against the insolence and cruelty of her oppressor in 1808, and gave the first example of the power of nationhood by its splendid rebellion, thus inspiring Stein and Scharnhorst and the patriots of Prussia. Spain looked naturally to Britain for help and protection, and found it in the Peninsular War.

Russia was, at least, for a time, an active ally, both before and after the Peace of Tilsit.

In fact, sentiment and interest alike caused England to be regarded with friendship by

* The Armed Neutrality was of short duration and was due to England's high-handed action towards neutrals rather than to any hostility on the part of the allied Powers.

† Lodge. "Modern Europe."

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every nation which suffered under Napoleon's aggression,—and which did not? In their struggles against the tyrant the peoples of Europe looked with sympathy and hope to the one nation which, by its command of the seas, was enabled to defy the common enemy and play so important a part in freeing them from his dominion. England upheld the cause of an oppressed Europe amid the applause of all nations.

What is the attitude of the chief Powers towards us now?

It is idle for us to suppose that we are very popular on the Continent. The test of friendship is to be found in times of storm and stress. The outburst of hatred which our reverses in South Africa called forth showed us unmistakably the position we held in the affections of foreign Powers.

At the present moment the *entente cordiale* with France is a valuable asset in our favour, and provides a good basis for the amicable settlement of outstanding difficulties in Egypt and Newfoundland.

At the same time, this *entente* carries with it heavy responsibilities, and our friends have frequently expressed their misgiving as to whether our military weakness may not involve them in disaster. (See Chapter III., p. 28.)

There are a hundred reasons why England and Germany should be firm friends. There is the common Teutonic origin, the relationship of language, the same religion, the same integrity of public life, the same love of truth and justice,

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the same respect for women, and, on the part of the Germans, a profound admiration for our past history and literature.

But, unfortunately, with all these reasons for a good understanding between the two nations, there has been in the last few years nothing but misunderstanding and irritation.

We have frequently been told that there is no reason whatever why England and Germany should quarrel, and that our interests are the same in every part of the globe. Those who write thus evidently act on the old dictum, "*Quae volumus, credimus libenter.*" For, while we sincerely wish that such an assertion were true, we believe it to be made without a true appreciation of facts that point quite the other way. Those who speak thus forget that, because *we* have everything we wish for and have no quarrel with Germany, that is no reason in itself for concluding that Germany may have no causes of quarrel with us. With regard to the commerce and trade of the world, England and Germany are at present in the relative position of "Have" and "Getting"—*i.e.*, while England has a large preponderance over any nation in the world as a commercial and colonial nation, and her trade is still increasing, Germany's trade and commerce are going up by leaps and bounds; and this, coupled with the rapid increase of her population, is bound sooner or later to make her look for territorial increase in the shape of colonies. It is because she is well aware of these facts, and knows that they will bring her into collision with us, that

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Germany is so strenuously bent on increasing her Navy. Germany believes, in fact, that she is destined to play the part of Rome to our Carthage in the twentieth century.

Italy is friendly on the whole. There can be no doubt that the vast majority of Italians regard this country with affectionate admiration and with a warm recollection of the sympathetic attitude of England towards the cause of Italian unity and the *risorgimento*. But unfortunately Italy is not strong enough to move with us against Germany and the other member of the Triple Alliance.* She is gradually losing ground as a naval Power, and with the state of her finances cannot hope to keep pace with the naval development of the richer nations.

With Spain, Portugal and Greece we have often had interests in common, but they have all three had more benefit from the help we have been able to give them than we can ever expect to derive from their assistance. At most we can only hope for their neutrality. Holland does not regard us with a very friendly eye.

There remains to be considered the disposition of the United States and Japan. With the latter we have secured an offensive and defensive alliance till 1915. At the end of that time there is nothing to prevent Japan, if she thinks it is for her interests to do so, from allying herself

* This is well illustrated in the opening chapters of the book, "Völker Europas." Italy at first takes sides against Austria, and destroys the Austrian Fleet at Lissa. But she is hopelessly beaten on land, and is obliged to rejoin the Triple Alliance, eventually uniting her Navy with that of France against us in the Mediterranean.

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with Russia instead of England. The question of the attitude of the United States towards this country is one with which it is not easy to deal. There is surely nothing more worthy of the best efforts of the enlightened men, of both nations than the promotion of a cordial understanding between England and America. How splendid it would be if, on a basis of mutual respect and of common striving after the ideals of Freedom and Truth, the whole of the Anglo-Saxon race, numbering as it does some 140,000,000, were to stand shoulder to shoulder in the forefront of the nations of the earth! But it would be folly to pretend that there is any solid basis for such a consummation at present. It has become the fashion with us on every occasion to speak with effusive affection of "our cousins across the water" and the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes intertwined are a common feature in our scheme of decoration on the occasion of national celebrations. But it is noteworthy that these manifestations are confined to this side of the Atlantic. In spite of our attitude during the Spanish-American War, an attitude which probably prevented foreign intervention on behalf of Spain, the United States was, as a whole, distinctly hostile to this country during the South African War; they repudiated the idea of an alliance when it was suggested by a British Statesman, and some of their publicists have hinted that we must abandon our alliance with Japan in view of the trouble that has arisen over the question of Japanese immigration in the Western States. These facts should suffice to warn us against the

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too common delusion that in any trouble the United States would, as a matter of course, be on our side. The presence of a powerful German and Irish element in the population should suffice to counsel caution.

PART II.

The Justice and Necessity of Compulsory Training for Home Defence.

CHAPTER I.

THE JUSTICE OF COMPULSORY TRAINING FOR HOME DEFENCE.

**"He shall not plead another's act,
Nor bind him in another's oath,
To weigh the Word above the Fact,
Or make or take excuse for sloth."**

The Reformers—**RUDYARD KIPLING.**

"The defence of the country is not the business of the War Office or the Government, but the business of the people themselves."—The late LORD SALISBURY: May 9, 1900.

"The personal duty of the defence of the sanctity of our country and homes ought to be the duty of every man capable of carrying arms."—Sir HENRY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN. House of Commons, 1900.

"It is the duty of every citizen of military age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence, and to take part in it should emergency arise."—Extract from the Report of the Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, 1904.

"Home defence is a duty for all who are capable of fulfilling that duty." "Nicht stehendes Heer sondern Volkswehr."—By AUGUST BEBEL, the German Socialist Leader. [The italics are his own.]

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BEFORE proceeding to show the right of the State to require the armed service of every able-bodied man in defence of the country, it will be well to say a few words on the *injustice* of the present system. It is all the more necessary to clear the ground in this way, since the most extraordinary self-deception prevails on the subject among the public at large—a self-deception fostered by the flattery of politicians and nourished by the unpatriotic selfishness which it serves to hide, or, rather, which it raises into a virtue. The British public is accustomed to hear, with a vague feeling of honest pride, that compulsory service is “repugnant to the feelings of the nation,” and that it cannot be tolerated “in a country where” “the sentiment of individual freedom and” “conscience is as highly developed as here.”

The tone in which these grandiloquent phrases are generally uttered would lead one to suppose that the nation were being complimented on refusing to consider, even for a moment, some base and disgraceful course of action, especially as they are frequently accompanied by an expression of pitying contempt for those poor Continental nations which languish under the tyrannical slavery of manhood service to their country. Mr. Brodrick (now Viscount Midleton), was the first British War Minister who had the courage to deprecate this kind of cant. In introducing his Army proposals, in March, 1901, he said: “I know very well” “how easy it is in this House to win cheap” “cheers by a proud declaration of adhesion”

“to the voluntary system. I think the voluntary system for Home Defence is not a thing”
“to be proud of unless you have an efficient”
“defence.”

It may well be doubted, indeed, whether national vanity has ever led a people so far astray as to make a boast of that which is rather a subject for regret. The fact is, there is a strange confusion of thought behind this self-righteous denunciation of “compulsory” as compared to “voluntary” service. We are the only European nation which recruits its whole military forces on a system of “voluntary” enlistment; hence we are apt to conclude that the men of other nations are less patriotic, as they are *compelled* to serve their country. We forget that all these nations have representative government, and many of them universal suffrage. The “compulsion” is therefore imposed upon the people by the voice of the people as an obligation of citizenship, and it is only as such that it will be accepted by the people of Great Britain. As a matter of fact, there were in 1908, some 42,000 voluntarily enlisted Colonial troops serving in the French Army, while in Germany, over 33,700 one-year Volunteers joined the Army in that year.

It is high time that we should see this matter in its true light. Putting aside preconceived notions on the subject, is it not juster, fairer, and more honourable that a nation should take the burden of its defence upon its shoulders *as a nation*, rather than shift it on to the backs of those who are compelled by circumstances to

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bear it? There is assuredly nothing more splendid than the patriotism of those men who come forward at great personal loss, inconvenience, and risk to serve their country, whether in the Regulars or Territorials. But we must decline to go into ecstasies over the patriotism of the *nation* on that account. Because some thousands of men do infinitely more than their duty, are we to indulge in rhapsodies over the millions whose patriotism is confined to cheering vociferously and singing "Tommy Atkins" and "Rule Britannia"? Our boast would be questionable enough if our system were in very truth as "voluntary" as it pretends to be. But is it really voluntary in the case of the average recruit in the Regular Army? Does he, as a rule, freely choose the Army as a career when other occupations are open to him? "The times are serious," wrote the late Professor Cairnes,* "let us purge our souls of cant." "What does this system of 'voluntary' recruiting, which we are asked to believe is "the only system suited to our highly-developed "political and moral feelings, mean? Simply "this, that people who have sufficient means, "instead of being required to pay their just "debt to their country, in their own persons, "are allowed to hire others, who have little "choice but to accept this offer, to expose "their persons on their behalf. No less lofty "principle than this, it seems, can satisfy the "

* "A National or a Standing Army?" in "Political Essays," by J. E. Cairnes, Emeritus Professor of Political Economy, University College, London, pp. 232, 233, 1875.

"highly-developed conscience of the English" people. The moral fastidiousness displayed "is only surpassed in China, where, it is said," "men may procure substitutes for the gallows." ". . . Well, all this may be highly convenient ;" "but, in the name of common decency, let" "us cease to put it forward as a national" "distinction to be proud of—a practice entitling" "us to look down, as from a lofty height, on" "the nations who expect each capable citizen" "to bear his share in his own and his country's" "defence."

The testimony of recruiting officers, Army medical officers, and the Army Returns alike shows clearly enough that there is very little choice in the case of the vast majority of those who enter the Army.

"The majority of recruits were growing" "lads, and a large number were out of work" "at the time of enlistment. Experienced" "recruiting agents estimate the proportion of" "the latter as high as 95 per cent. of the total." "In many instances the lads were suffering" "from want of food, and were generally in" "poor condition." *

But while the voluntary system as applied to our Army *as a whole* is unfair, our foreign service Army cannot, of course, be recruited in any other way. For it is obvious that we cannot demand garrison service abroad of the compulsorily enlisted citizen. The "normal" "foreign garrisons . . . must be furnished"

* Army Medical Department Report for 1907.

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“from this country, and must be voluntarily”
 “recruited. This is not a condition peculiar”
 “to Great Britain, since *no Power employs*”
 “*conscript troops in distant and tropical stations.*”
 (The italics are ours.) “France recruits her”
 “Algerian army corps mainly in Europe; but”
 “the distance is short, and the climatic condi-”
 “tions of Algeria differ little from those of the”
 “Var. The French colonial forces in Cochin”
 “China, Tong King, Madagascar, Martinique,”
 “and West Africa, are made up of volunteers”
 “from the regular army or of disciplinary bat-”
 “talions. German colonial troops are also”
 “volunteers attracted by pay and other advan-”
 “tages. Thus, the governing condition that”
 “our foreign garrisons must be composed of”
 “men voluntarily recruited, is special only in”
 “the sense that the proportion of our troops”
 “serving abroad is immensely greater than in”
 “the case of any other army.”*

“What!” cries a critic, “you say that the”
 “voluntary system is unjust, and at the same”
 “time you acknowledge that our foreign service”
 “must be a voluntary one?” We admit the
 apparent inconsistency; but it is apparent only.
 The justice of compulsory service lies in the
 fact that every citizen is treated alike, without
 distinction of class or wealth. It would be
 impossible for every man during the short course
 of his training to take his turn at garrisoning
 some distant part of the Empire. Therefore we
 must maintain for this purpose a long service

* “The Proper Precautions for Imperial Safety.” — Sir G. S. Clarke,
Nineteenth Century, April, 1900. DCC A

Army, as we do at present, and ensure that the men who enlist in this force are well paid for their service, and well provided for on their return to civil life. This is one of the "burdens" indissoluble from Empire.

But the case is very different with Home Defence. The only fair, as well as the only adequate, solution of the problem of Home Defence lies in the exercise of the undoubted right of the Sovereign or the State to call upon every citizen to bear arms in defence of his country—in other words, in the adoption of Universal Military Training. The right alluded to has been recognized again and again by the great legal authorities of this country, and clearly affirmed by prominent statesmen and others; and it is the *constitutional basis of our system of national defence*; for the Militia Ballot Act, as it now stands on the Statute-book shows that the *existing law is that of universal personal service for Home Defence*.

The right of the State to demand the personal service of every able-bodied citizen in defence of the country is founded on nature and reason. It is obviously the first duty of a citizen to defend his country; to refuse or shirk that duty is to place in jeopardy that independent national existence which is the necessary condition of the free and happy development of the community.

In accordance with this fundamental principle, we find that in the earliest times every citizen was a soldier; and it was only when a nation had obtained security by its readiness for defence that industrial progress became possible. As

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this progress increased, those who profited by it gradually managed to shift the burden of military service on to the shoulders of the professional soldier, who was very highly paid. But the principle that the citizen owed personal service to his country was never quite lost sight of, least of all, strange to say, in England; for here the national jealousy and fear of the unconstitutional use of the Standing Army led to a constant assertion of the importance and advantages of the Militia, as being the constitutional force, depending ultimately upon the recognition of the obligation incumbent upon all men to serve the Sovereign in defence of the realm.

Meanwhile, as the industrial "struggle for existence" became more acute, and the stakes at issue for each country more valuable, it was seen that the nations must revert to the first principle of manhood service, submitting to that tax as the *only safe insurance* against the loss of the fruits of industry by an unsuccessful war.

We alone have thought that we could escape this natural law, on account of our insular position, and the maritime supremacy which, in a manner, resulted from it. Indeed, before the days of steam, and while we possessed the absolute command of the sea, which we had in the early part of the century, it really seemed as if we could enjoy the unique privilege which Englishmen seemed to look upon as their indefeasible right—that of "eating our cake and having it," as if we could expand, conquer, colonize and annex new territories everywhere, and yet remain free from the responsibilities

which such acquisitions entailed, viz., the need for their defence. But with the narrowing of our Home Seas, brought about by the advent of steam, with the growth of foreign fleets and armies, the enormous increase in our wealth, and the open or secret dislike with which we are regarded by many foreign Powers, we can no longer refuse to recognize the possibility of invasion, nor can we ignore the fact that in Asia and Africa we have become a Continental Power, whose frontiers march with other great Powers possessing unlimited military resources.

With regard to the legal recognition of the right of the Sovereign to demand armed service of all, the following quotations from Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown" will suffice. In defending Hampden's refusal to pay ship-money, Mr. St. John admitted certain positions in favour of the Crown to be too clear for controversy. Thus, "it must needs be granted" ". . . that as the care and provision of" "the law of England extends in the first place" "to foreign defence" [that is, defence against invasion], "it secondly *lays the burden upon*" "*all.*"* When Charles I. ascended the throne, "the law recognized the obligation of every" "citizen to bear arms, either in the county" "force or in the trained band of his town or" "city."†

And again: "By an early Statute (the" "Statute of Winchester, 1285), every freeman" "between the ages of fifteen and sixty years"

* Clode, "Military Forces of the Crown," Vol. I., p. 4.

† *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 16.

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"was obliged to be provided with armour to"
"preserve the peace."*

In 1757 the Militia Ballot Act was passed, establishing a militia force "to be raised by" "ballot only—the principle of voluntary service" "being ignored."

We conclude this chapter by citing a few of the many important declarations made by prominent statesmen and others on the general principle of obligatory service for Home Defence.

In his speech on the Training Bill, June 24, 1806, Lord Castlereagh referred to the Levy-en-Masse Bill in these words: "The principle" "of that Bill rested on the undoubted pre-" "rogative of the Crown to call upon the services" "of all liege subjects in case of invasion; and" "the only power that was added by that Bill," "was the power of organizing and training" "those men who were subject to this exercise" "of prerogative; so that, in case of invasion," "the prerogative might be effectually exerted" "for the defence of the country."†

"What we require is that the whole manhood" "of the country should undergo a course of" "military training. . . ." "In the last resort" "the independence of a State depends not only" "on the willingness but the ability of the" "nation as a whole to take up arms in self-" "defence."‡

"I am a believer, out and out, in the doctrine"

* *Ibid.*, Vol. I., p. 31.

† Cobbett's "Parliamentary Debates," Vol. VII., p. 818.

‡ Lord Roberts' Speeches and Letters.

“ of a great nation relying for its own defence ”
“ and the defence of its possessions on its whole ”
“ manhood, and not on a limited professional ”
“ class. . . . The voluntary principle overlooks ”
“ the great moral value of the idea of a general ”
“ patriotic obligation. As every citizen in this ”
“ country has a right to have a voice in the ”
“ control of its destiny, so he is bound on the ”
“ same principle to be prepared to serve for its ”
“ protection.”*

* Lord Milner's speech in the House of Lords, July 10, 1906.

CHAPTER II.

THE NECESSITY FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING FOR HOME DEFENCE.

"Salus populi suprema lex."

**"He shall forswear and put away
The idols of his sheltered house;
And to necessity shall pay
Unflinching tribute of his vows."
The Reformers—RUDYARD KIPLING.**

"The whole military system as it stood at that date was tested by the war in South Africa. . . . The true lesson of the war is that no military system will be satisfactory which does not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the Regular Forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be."—*Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa.*

"This particular defect [the lack of a system of national military education] in our military organization has cost the country no less than a hundred millions sterling; that it was a principal indirect cause of the outbreak of war; that for some months it left the United Kingdom practically denuded of trained soldiers; and that it produced the most perilous international situation in which the Empire has found itself since the days of Napoleon. Only an extraordinary combination of fortunate circumstances, external and internal, saved the Empire during the early months of 1900, and there is no reason to expect a repetition of such fortune if, as

appears probable, the next national emergency finds us still discussing our preparations."

SIR GEORGE TAUBMAN-GOLDIE. *Memorandum published with the Report of the War Commission.*

"If there is one lesson to be gleaned from British military history it is the hopeless and irremediable inefficiency of the voluntary system."—**HON. JOHN FORTESCUE,** *Author of the "History of the British Army" (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.).*

It is fully recognized that the nation will not submit to the sacrifice involved in the acceptance of the principle of compulsory training and service for Home Defence unless it is convinced that the measure is necessary. In the last chapter we have dealt with the fundamental justice of this principle, and in another chapter we shall draw attention to some of the manifold advantages, physical, moral, and industrial, as well as military and naval, which will accrue from its adoption. But we are fully alive to the fact that the average voter, "the man in the street," will, as a matter of fact, be primarily interested in the answer to his question "is it necessary?"

On the other hand, we are faced with the difficulty of deciding what, under the circumstances, can give convincing proof of the necessity of a particular measure in the matter of national defence. Clearly there is only one thing that can give final and convincing proof, and that is the overwhelming disaster of a successful invasion of these shores, with all its ruinous and humiliating consequences. But short of that, what we have to do is to convince the average sensible man and woman that the present system is inefficient and insufficient, that it has always been so, and that

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it must continue to remain so, because its inefficiency and insufficiency are not due to this or that extraneous circumstance, to this or that Minister of War, or to the lack of money, but "essentially to the voluntary system itself," and that therefore the compulsory principle is *necessary* if we are to attain national security.

This chapter will therefore be devoted, primarily, to a close examination of the Territorial Force, and of its fitness for the purpose for which it exists, and, secondarily, to a survey of the voluntary principle, as the sole basis of our recruiting system in the past. From this survey it will readily appear that, although there can be no question of departing from the voluntary principle as applied to our Regular Army, yet the adoption of a truly national basis of recruitment for our Home Forces would directly and indirectly contribute to remove many of the evils incidental to the mercenary system, admittedly the only possible one in the case of a professional Army.

THE TERRITORIAL FORCE.

Its Functions: Can it fulfil them on the basis of voluntary recruitment?

"The contemplation of large numbers by the people of this country, who are unable to take into account questions of war efficiency and war organization, necessarily promotes dangerous national illusions."—THE RT. HON. R. B. HALDANE.

If one were asked to express an opinion on the value of a tool or instrument, the first question

one would ask is: what is it for? It is a question constantly and conveniently shirked by the champions of the voluntary system, who seek to cover its total unsuitability to modern requirements or to democratic age by loud asseveration of their admiration of the Territorial Force. In their admiration of the good will and the patriotism of the men who gallantly attempt to train themselves for national defence they proceed to draw the conclusion that the Territorial Force is excellent and well fitted for its task *because* the majority of the Territorials are actuated by an admirable spirit. They do not trouble to inquire what is the purpose for which the Force exists, and anyone who, keeping this purpose clearly in view, points out that the Force, under present conditions, is unfitted, and must remain unfitted, to fulfil that purpose is denounced as unpatriotic, as almost guilty of treason.

The truth which we have to realize is that the Territorial Force is really the bedrock of our whole scheme of National and Imperial Defence. That scheme depends upon three factors:—

1. A supreme Navy, having at least the two-power standard with a 10 per cent. margin, which is admitted to be necessary by both political parties.

2. A highly-trained long service Army for garrison and police duty, and as a striking force in time of war.

3. The trained manhood of the whole people, capable of giving complete freedom of action to the Navy and Army by providing security against invasion, and by giving that power of expansion,

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by voluntary effort in a great emergency, the necessity of which was declared to be "the main lesson of the war" in South Africa, in the report of the Elgin Commission.

The first two forces are inseparably linked with and dependent upon the third as the condition for their effective action. Without it they must prove quite inadequate in the clash of war with a first-class Power to-day.

This view has been fully recognized and clearly laid down by Mr. Haldane himself. Speaking at Newcastle in September, 1906, in one of those early speeches in which he launched the Territorial scheme on the waters of public opinion, he said that he hoped eventually to see a defensive force of 800,000 or 900,000 men, a "nation in arms" which, he added, was "the only safeguard for the public interests should war break out." He proposed to reduce the Regular Army but, at the same time, to "base it upon the armed people" which, being trained as a whole, would amply compensate for the loss of regular soldiers. "The problem," he said, "is not a problem of the "Regular Forces nearly so much as the problem "of a nation in arms, of the people as a whole," "with all the forces of the country welded into "one."

Finally, in his memorandum explanatory of the Army estimates, dated February, 1908, he stated that the Territorial Army "is designed " ". . . to free the Regular Army from the "necessity of remaining in these islands to fulfil "the functions of Home Defence; a further result "will be to permit of greater freedom to the "

"Navy." Speaking at the Royal United Service Institution, he said: "the essence of the duty of" "a Territorial Force is to protect against" "possible invasion." Moreover, both Mr. Haldane and the Under-Secretary of State for War have admitted that the Striking Force cannot be allowed to leave these shores until the Territorial Force has undergone the hardening process of six months' training which is now officially admitted to be necessary so that the Territorial Force may be capable of meeting effectively an invasion of 70,000 men.

We propose, therefore, to examine here the plain question: is the Territorial Force capable of performing the functions officially allotted to it by its creator?

Can it meet invasion?

Can it free the Regular Army from the duties of Home Defence?

Can it permit greater freedom in the Navy?

We shall show, by a simple analysis of facts and by the admission of Mr. Haldane himself, that it can do none of these things, except under conditions which may make their performance a matter of indifference.

A modern army requires three things—

1. Sound organization.
2. Adequate numbers.
3. Proper training.

ORGANIZATION.

We have shown in Chapter II., Part I., that the organization of the Territorial Force is thoroughly sound.

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The Territorial scheme stands there as an admirable framework or skeleton; it requires only the patriotism and self-sacrifice of the nation as a whole to clothe it with flesh and blood.

NUMBERS.

But the 800,000 or 900,000 men which Mr. Haldane promised have dwindled down to an establishment of 312,577 men, the number asked for as the minimum of the Territorial Force. After two years of such recruiting as has never been seen, the number obtained on April 1, 1910, was 278,951, giving a deficiency of 33,626.*

The important point about this question of numbers is that all independent authorities admit that the voluntary system will produce between 270,000 and 280,000 men who are ready to give up their holiday and a considerable amount of their leisure to learning to defend their country while their neighbours look on—270,000 to 280,000—and *no more*. This has been admitted in the clearest terms by men like Mr. George Wyndham, himself an "ex-Under-Secretary of State for War, by Lord Esher, who may well claim to have contributed a large proportion of the success of the Territorial Force, and by the Duke of Bedford, one of the ablest as he is one of the most impartial authorities on Army questions.

The bedrock fact is that, in spite of every

* On November 15, 1910, Lord Lucas stated that the deficiency on September 30 was 44,374.

species of cajolery, in spite of every effort, not forgetting the generous self-sacrifice of the officers and men of the Force itself, the numbers that have been obtained by voluntary service for Home Defence remain at about the figure of the old Volunteers and Yeomanry.

The latter numbered 277,830 on October 1, 1905, and cost £1,971,000, while the Territorial Force (including the Yeomanry) numbered 272,562 on October 1, 1909,* and cost £2,650,000. No later figures are available at the present moment as regards the cost, but it is obvious that, if there is to be any approach to efficiency as regards equipment, ranges, musketry, travelling allowances, boots, and the many legitimate demands made by the County Associations, the expenditure will have to be well-nigh doubled again. Those fully competent to form a judgment from intimate knowledge of the needs of the Territorial Force believe that, to get the best results that are obtainable under the voluntary system, the 270,000 men of the Territorial Force will cost not much under £5,000,000.

How does this figure of 270,000 men compare with our requirements in order to enable us to meet the raid of 70,000 men which is admitted to be possible even if we have "an unassailable supremacy at sea"?

Napoleon laid it down that imperfectly trained troops must, in order to have any chance of success against highly-trained men, be in a

* As we have seen, the numbers were 4,000 less at the corresponding date in 1910.

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superiority of four to one, and Lord Roberts, who has had more experience in leading voluntary troops than any man in the world, fully endorses this opinion. Hence, for an invasion of 70,000, a field army of 280,000 is required. And all authorities agree that, in addition, not less than 200,000 men are required for garrisons, local defences, and for Ireland. "You want," said Mr. George Wyndham in the House of Commons on June 27, "300,000 men in your Territorial" "Force as a central (Field) Force to crush or" "deter the raid of 70,000 . . . 100,000 would" "be needed for local defence and another 100,000" "for garrisons."

We have seen (Chapter IV., Part I.) that the Territorial Force is, as regards numbers, at least 200,000 below the minimum required, in order to make it "under all circumstances, a properly" "equipped and organized force capable of dealing" "effectively with a possible invasion of 70,000," to quote the standard laid down by Mr. Asquith in the course of the discussion on Imperial Defence on July 29, 1909.

TRAINING.

But the question of numbers is, after all, a secondary one. It matters little—to the enemy!—how many men and boys we have enrolled in the Territorial Force if their training is so inadequate that it would be "little short of murder," as General Sir Henry Brackenbury has declared, to pit them against the highly-trained troops of an invading army. "It is preparedness" "for war," said Mr. Haldan  in 1906, "which is"

"the key to the sort of organization we ought to" have in peace. If you try to do anything else "you fail," and the quotation from one of his official utterances which we have placed at the head of this section shows that he is fully aware of the futility of numbers without "war efficiency."

Let us see what is the "preparedness for war" of the Territorial Force. So much dust has been thrown in the eyes of the public by the foolish flattery which one or two distinguished generals have lavished on the Territorials, that it will be well to recapitulate the terms of training laid down for the Territorial soldier.

He must be seventeen years of age, and he enlists for four years. In the first year he must do forty drills of an hour each and a minimum of eight or a maximum of fifteen days in camp. In the next three years he must do ten drills of an hour each annually, and a camp of eight or fifteen days. The physical examination is often purely nominal, and a glance at some of the battalions that went into camp this summer (1910) was sufficient to show that many of these keen lads were under seventeen, and quite unfit for the very moderate marches demanded of them, with the result that, in several cases, the men could not, and in a few cases would not stand the racket.

The musketry of the Territorial Force is, in many cases, disposed of by the firing of a given number of rounds (minimum twenty-three) on the nearest range—often half a day's journey off—on a winter's afternoon.

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We must remember that the above is the *minimum* peace training laid down for the Territorial Force. It is incomparably less than the training of any army or militia in the whole world. But even this minimum is not attained by a considerable number of the men of the Force, which was 33,600 short of its establishment on April 1 of this year.

In October, 1909, there were in the Territorial Force nearly 100,000 boys under 20; 53,000 were serving under a one year's engagement of whom 17,000 disappeared on June 30; and 23,500 did not attend camp at all, even for eight days. Yet they are duly reckoned among the numbers of our trained Home Army. Moreover, 39,000 recruits and 25,000 "trained men" failed to qualify in musketry, while 35,000 were not even tested at all. In other words, out of 204,000 men now serving in the combatant arms, about 100,000 have either failed to qualify in musketry, or had not fired at all.

Even official optimism seems to have been a little shaken by these figures, and so an ingenious device has been discovered for making the Force more than "efficient" in musketry. It is very simple. The standard has been lowered and, *by making this retrospective*, many recruits who had failed when the Return was issued will, in future, be classed as "trained shots," without having necessarily fired another shot.

There is no other army in the world whose training for war is carried out on such lines as this.

But in truth, we need not have said so much

to prove that the Territorial Force is, as far as its peace training is concerned, totally unfitted to meet the only troops against which it is expressly intended to fight. For this unfitness has been admitted, in unequivocal language, by no less an authority than Mr. Haldane himself. Speaking at Ashford in 1908 he said: ". . . we" "are able to give so comparatively little training" "to our soldiers in time of peace that they" "would not be ready to help should invasion" "become imminent"; and Lord Lucas has, more recently, admitted that the Force cannot, with its present training, meet highly-trained troops—precisely the same condemnation as Mr. Haldane bestowed on the Yeomanry and the Volunteers when he proposed to sweep them away in order to make room for the new model, the Territorial Force!

What then is the proposal? It is to give the Territorial Force six months' training—*after the outbreak of war!* This period has been generally admitted to be required to give troops of the second line that course of continuous military drill, discipline and physical training which are the foundations of the modern soldier. It is the period of recruit training laid down for the Special Reserve and, broadly speaking, it is the equivalent of the training undergone by the rank and file of the Swiss Army, that model militia which has earned high praise from the military experts of every nation. Nor is there any doubt whatever that, with such a period of recruit training, the Territorial Force would be a splendid Home Defence Army, fully capable of performing

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the Second Line functions which have been assigned to it.

But what are we to say of the proposal to give this recruit training—*for that is what it is*—after the outbreak of war? The armies and militias of the world vary much in the matter of the length of training required of the young soldier. But there is not, in the whole world—and there never has been—an Army the recruit training of which is officially intended to begin after war has broken out. Indeed, it seems almost incredible that such a proposal should be seriously put forward.

For observe what it means.

The Territorial Force is essentially intended :—

1. To guard against raid or invasion.
2. To free the Regular Army from the duty of Home Defence.
3. To free the Navy and allow it to leave these shores to seek out and destroy a hostile fleet in its own waters.

Let us take these points one by one.

A raid is, in its very essence, a sudden attack, carefully calculated to effect its purpose largely in virtue of the very element of surprise. It will, therefore, take place at the very outset of hostility. As Moltke said, in discussing the question of oversea invasion, in the Danish War in 1864, "Success depends upon absolute" "secrecy and complete surprise." A raid will, therefore, take place, if at all, at the outset of hostilities; probably, as Count Reventlow has pointed out, without previous declaration of war. It is well to remember that 117 wars occurred

between 1700 and 1870, of which 107 were commenced without declaration of war. We saw a good instance of a raid in the attack upon the Russian ships in harbour at Chemulpo on February 8, 1904, followed by the immediate landing of the Japanese troops.

That is a raid. Short, sharp, violent, at the very outset of war. And the Territorial Force, which is especially intended to guard against raids, will *begin* its six months' war training some time after the events have occurred which it is intended to prevent!

The whole war between Prussia and Austria in 1866 was over in *six weeks*, culminating in the crushing defeat of Königgrätz.

The first seven *days* of the Franco-Prussian war saw the decisive battles of Wörth, Spicheren and Weissenburg, carrying with them as surely as fate the débâcle of Metz and Sedan.

Again, take the question of freeing the Regular Army from the duties of Home Defence. We have been told, on the authority of the War Minister himself, that the Regular Army would not be allowed to leave these shores till the Territorial Force has gone through its hardening process of six months' training, for "no Army" "is worth anything which is not ready to take" "the field."

Fifty-three years ago a thrill of horror went through this country at the news of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. Thousands of our fellow countrymen, ay, and hundreds of white women and children, were suddenly exposed to the fury of a fanatical horde of natives, and many are still

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alive who remember the nightmare horror of those days. For the last four years we have had ample evidence of the sinister forces of sedition and murder which are at work in India, and which may break out again into open violence and rebellion.

If, which God forbid, such a calamity were to occur, is there any Government which would dare to hesitate about sending out every available man and boy of the Regular Army and the Special Reserve down to the rawest recruit? Or will a Minister of War venture to insist upon our fellow countrymen and women waiting for six months until the "hardening process" is complete and the Regular Army can be sent away with safety to our own skins? Of course, Mr. Haldane would be the first to scout such a suggestion under such circumstances, and we should be left to face the possibility of attack from a European Power with the finest Army and the second best Navy in the world, our land defence consisting of about 270,000 Territorials, many of them under twenty years of age, many of them physically unfit to march ten miles in full kit, and the vast majority totally unfitted, by the habits of their ordinary civil life, to withstand the heavy strain of campaigning in bad weather.

Finally, there is the question of the strategic freedom of the Navy.

Hitherto, for 500 years past, it has been the traditional function of the Navy, at first as the unconscious outcome of the spirit of a maritime people, and later as the conscious policy of far-seeing naval strategy, to seek out and destroy the

enemy in his own waters, the principle being to regard the enemy's coast line as our frontiers.

Lately, we have been treated to a new naval gospel whereby we are informed that "The Navy realizes that it may be tethered" [by the egregious proposal to keep it tied to Britannia's apron strings until the Territorial Force has got itself ready for Home Defence] "and it does not protest against it."* Of course, officers on the active list at the Admiralty cannot "demand to be released from the duty of" "concentration for the defence of this country," and they cannot "ask the Government to institute any form of compulsory training for" "Home Defence."

But the naval officers who are free to speak have done so over and over again, and have emphatically protested against this doctrine of a manacled fleet. The best proof of the considered opinion of the Navy is the fact that 86 Admirals, including five Admirals of the Fleet, and hundreds of junior naval officers are members, and amongst the keenest supporters, of the National Service League.

Let us summarize the situation as regards this six months' training which the Territorial Force is, officially, to receive after a war has broken out.

It means that:—

1. For six months there must be a close time for raids, with due notice from the enemy of his intention to invade us at the end of that period.

* Lord Lucas, in the House of Lords, July, 1910.

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2. For six months the "striking force" cannot strike—the Regular Army must not leave these shores even to assist our defenceless fellow countrymen in India or Egypt.

3. For six months the Navy must not carry out its traditional work, even supposing that a danger, dimly foreshadowed as yet, were to threaten our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand.

It is clear, therefore, that the Territorial Force is not capable, and cannot be made capable under voluntary conditions, of fulfilling the functions for which it exists. In other words, the necessity of compulsory training for Home Defence is established.

We now turn to a brief survey of the voluntary system in so far as it has been the sole basis of our recruitment in the past. The lessons to be learnt from a close study of our military history have been given by the highest authority, the Hon. J. D. Fortescue in his book "The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803–1814," in which he describes our efforts to raise troops during the Napoleonic Wars. Mr. Fortescue summarizes his conclusions thus:—

"England cannot, any more than any other nation, fill the ranks of her Army in a great war without compulsion."

* * * *

"The ultimate end for which all our military organization must exist is the maintenance of the Regular Army, our only offensive land force."—WINDHAM.

* * *

"The true basis of such an organization is national training."—WINDHAM, CASTLE-REAGH.

I. *The voluntary system has always failed to supply the requisite numbers, except in times of reduction.*

"At the outbreak of the war there were in the Regular Army and Reserve insufficient trained men of an age fit for foreign service to meet the emergency which arose, even when practically the whole Reserve had been used. . . . The force which proved to be actually necessary had to be hastily improvised. . . . there can be little doubt that much of the duration and cost of the war was due to the necessity of this great improvisation."—*Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa.*

It is to be observed at the outset that, while in theory the soldier enlists for certain wages which, with his keep, clothing, etc., are reckoned to be at least equal to those of a common labourer,* whenever there has been urgent need of men, recourse was had to a bounty system (or, as we shall see later, the physical standard was lowered).

Thus, "from 1715 to 1867 it was found"
"necessary, from time to time, to offer a bounty,"
"in order to induce men to enrol themselves in"
"our Voluntary Army. In 1745 the bounty"
"for the Guards was £6. . . . The bounty for"
"the ordinary recruit in 1803 was £16. . . . In"
"1855 the bounty was £8 for the Infantry, £9"
"for the Marines, and £10 for the Artillery."
"Bounties continued to be given, at varying"
"rates, until 1867, when they were abolished;"
"but I have no hesitation to saying that, with"
"our present system of recruiting, it would be"

* Mr. Arnold-Forster showed very clearly ("The Army in 1906") that the soldier is now far better off than the labourer in civil life.

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"necessary to revive them if we become involved "
"in a great war."*

This prediction was fully verified during the Boer War, bounties having reached the highest figure known : viz., £22 offered to the men of the Reserve Battalions, who were only engaged to serve for one year (1900), be it remembered. 30,000 of these came forward out of 50,000 expected by the Government; nearly 10,000 were rejected on medical inspection. A bounty of £10 was offered to recruits for the Militia.

But even high bounties have often failed to secure the necessary number of men. On November 8, 1775, at the outbreak of the American War of Independence, the Minister of War stated, in the House of Commons, "that
"all his exertions had failed in recruiting the "
"Army to its requisite strength. . . . The "
"bounty had been raised, the standard lowered "
[history repeats itself, and with the same results],
"and attempts had been made to *enlist even* "
"*Roman Catholics* and to incorporate foreigners "
"singly into the British regiments, but all had "
"failed in the expected effect. "

In 1806 a similar recruiting crisis occurred.
"Throughout the whole war great difficulty was "
"experienced in providing a proper supply of "
"soldiers"—(Alison's "History of Europe," xi., 105)—"the hulks were drained, and the prisons "
"emptied more than once, to supply the want "
"of recruits." (Dupin's "Military Force, of

* Captain Hime, "Universal Conscription: the only answer to the Recruiting Question."

Great Britain.") The bounty rose in 1804 to £16 16s., but all these measures failed; the effectives were 25,000 below the establishment in 1806, and in that year Parliament was again called up to decide "how we are to insure to" "this country what unquestionably it has never" "had, a never-failing and adequate supply of" "regular soldiers."*

In 1859 the Royal Commissioners on Recruiting said: "Although authority was given" "nearly three years ago, in consequence of the" "Mutiny in India, to raise an additional 65,000" "men, and although, in order to facilitate that" "operation, the bounty was increased and the" "standard—as is unavoidable when so many" "men are required—was lowered to such an extent" "as to bring boys instead of men into the ranks, the" "establishment of the Army is not quite com-
plete."

In 1805 the deficiency in the Regular Army amounted to 25,000—(according to another return, 49,000); in 1806 it was the same; in 1814 it was 32,314 below its establishment; 7,949 in 1826; 7,643 in 1831; 9,280 in 1871; in 1898 the Regular Army was 13,531 short of its establishment (the number wanting to complete the Army and the Auxiliary Forces was 75,090). In 1910 the shortage in the Regular Army was 4,400, and the total deficiency was 66,651, although the establishment of our forces had been reduced by 80,000 since 1907–8.

In the "Nineteenth Century" for April, 1900,

* Mr. Windham's speech in the House of Commons, 1806, in Alison.

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Sir G. S. Clarke wrote, "The establishment" "strength of our multifarious military bodies is" "never reached. The principle has always" "failed in peace; it has now failed in war."

Even during the South African War, the deficiency was 142,000 (1901). But more serious than the lack of men is the shortage of officers. Mr. Haldane stated in the House of Commons (March 4, 1908) that the shortage was 5,000 for Home and Colonial troops.

In the Special Reserve, there is a shortage of 1,183 subaltern officers, and in the Territorial Force the deficiency is over 1,400 (September, 1910). In other words, nearly 7,600 officers are wanting to complete for war our existing forces.

II. The Voluntary System has generally failed to supply sufficient men fit for the duties of war.

"This war has burnt into my mind in a way nothing else could have done, that the condition of our Army constitutes a terrible danger to the existence of our Empire. I have learnt here that nothing but the very best will do, and we have too often the worst."—*Letter from Japan written by GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON to the late Mr. H. O. Arnold-Forster, Secretary of State for War.*

I. AGE.—Great Britain is the only first-class Power which recruits its Army largely from immature boys of eighteen, the age of service beginning after the completion of the twentieth year in most other countries, a practice which is in accordance with the unanimous opinion of medical experts, as to the danger of submitting youths under twenty even to peace duties of military service.

During the Crimean War, when Lord Raglan was told

* Parkes' "Military Hygiene," etc.

that there were 2,000 recruits ready to send to him, he replied that those last sent were so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies; he preferred to wait. Sir John Burgoyne described the reinforcements sent out as "a vast number of recruits," and said he would prefer a handful of real men to this mass of immature boys. It was the same with the reinforcements sent out in the Indian Mutiny. "During the" "Indian Mutiny I remember reading of men who were" "sent out and were at once put into hospital, and out of" "a detachment perhaps of seventy one-third would come" "back never having done a day's real soldiering."*

History repeated itself during the Boer War, for many of the later Imperial Yeomanry had to be sent home by Lord Kitchener as quite unfit for any military duties whatever; while other large numbers could not be regarded as anything but "a vast number of recruits," since Lord Kitchener could make no use of them until they had had several months' training in riding and shooting.

The tendency is towards a continuous increase in the number of young recruits. In 1873 the number of the Infantry at home was 53,465. Of these, 15,220 were under twenty-one and over forty—i.e. about 28 per cent.

In 1909 the number of Infantry at home was 63,902; of these, 30,804 were under twenty and over forty (latter only 674)—i.e. about 48 per cent., while 63 per cent. were under twenty-one.†

The ratio per thousand of recruits under seventeen was :

In 1878	...	...	...	...	37
In 1908	...	...	...	...	43·4

II. HEIGHT.—For the Regular Army the minimum was:—

5 ft. 6 ins. in 1845.
5 ft. 3 ins. in 1904.
5 ft. 2 ins. in 1908.

* General Sir William Codrington, speaking as chairman at the discussion on Captain Himes' essay, 1875.

† General Annual Return for 1909.

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III. WEIGHT.—In the Regular Army the proportion of recruits weighing under 9 st. 4 lbs. was :—

611.1 per 1,000 in 1900.

633.0 per 1,000 in 1908.

In 1900 44.2 per 1,000 weighed under 7 st. 12 lbs.

In 1908 71.5 " " " 7 st. 12 lbs.

In 1900 25.5 " " " 7 st. 2 lbs.

In 1908 32.8 " " " 7 st. 2 lbs.

It is to be observed that the average of a large number of German recruits examined in 1877 by Dr. Felzer was: Height 5 ft. 5.75 ins., weight 10 st. 3.3 lbs., and Dr. Felzer expressed the opinion that men weighing less than 9 st. 6 lbs. should not be admitted into the German Army at all. It is obvious that even allowing for a difference in the average age, the application of such a rule would exclude a good deal more than half the men now being enlisted for service in the British Army.

IV. CHEST MEASUREMENT.—Before 1883 the minimum was 34 ins.; it is now 32 ins.

The rejections for physical unfitness were :—

In 1900 27.4 per cent.

In 1904 35.23 "

In 1909 29.9 "

The average physique of the recruit for the Regular Army in 1900 and 1908 was :—

	Age.	Height.	Chest Meas.	Weight.
In 1900 ...	19.9	5 ft. 5.4 ins.	33.9	8 st. 12.1 lbs.
In 1908 ...	19.8	5 ft. 6.2 ins.	33.3	9 st. 2.1 lbs.

The average British youth of seventeen and nineteen respectively, according to the Anthropometric Committee of the British Association (1883) was :—

Age.	Height.	Chest Meas.	Weight.
17	5 ft. 6.24 ins.	34.19 ins.	9 st. 4.9 lbs.
19	5 ft. 7.29 ins.	34.98 ins.	9 st. 13.6 lbs.

* This percentage does not include the numbers rejected on physical grounds by recruiting sergeants and recruiters. General Sir F. Maurice puts the probable total percentage at 60.

The average recruit of 1908, who was 19½ years of age, was nearly 1 in. narrower in the chest, and 3 lbs. lighter than the average boy of 17, and he was 1 in. shorter, about 1½ ins. narrower, and 11½ lbs. lighter than the ordinary youth of 19.

It is only when we realize the physical type of the average British recruit that we can fully appreciate the splendid behaviour of these men in the field. We do not mean to say that the immature boys of eighteen and nineteen, who form so large a percentage of our Army, are sent out on active service. They are not.* But a very large percentage of those who go out to fight their country's battles are only just out of their teens, and their constitutions, poor perhaps by heredity, have been weakened by a life under miserable conditions, physical and moral, before they entered the Army as boys of eighteen or less. No words are adequate to do justice to the admirable way in which these men behaved throughout the South African war. "The men are splendid," as Sir Redvers Buller said, and the nation is justly proud of them.

But has it ever occurred to the people of Great Britain that they are in a great degree responsible for a considerable part of the suffering so bravely borne by Tommy Atkins? The saddest part of the sad business of war is in reality the long list of casualties from disease, and when men of poor physique are exposed to the hardships of war, the deaths from disease form a large percentage of the total number of deaths.

* A large number of Militia under twenty were, however, sent out to the South African War. (See Elgin Report.)

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The proportion of men who died from disease to the total number of deaths in the

Franco-Prussian War	was 35.5 per cent.	(Prussian)
South African	" " 62.6	" (British)
Russo-Japanese	" " 25	" (Japanese)

Of deaths from wounds and disease which occurred in hospital, the proportion due to disease was

59.3 per cent.	during Franco-Prussian War	(Prussian)
87	" " "	South African War (British)

An allowance must, of course, be made for the prevalence of enteric fever and dysentery in South Africa, where the *climate* is, however, extremely healthy ; but this will not account for the extraordinary disparity between the figures, especially when we remember the frightful severity of the winter of 1870-71, and the rapidity with which the German infantry marched in the early stages of the war.

The explanation is to be found in the examination of the figures for officers and men respectively. They give us this significant result, that while the percentage of deaths from disease to the total number of deaths among the officers was 32.4, the percentage among the men was 64.7, or *twice as high*. What do these figures mean ? They mean that while the officer, who was a strong, healthy man, easily resisted the attacks of disease, the private soldier was in a large number of cases quite unfit for the "heavy duties of war," and consequently fell a ready victim to disease where a stronger constitution would have thrown it off.

In the Franco-Prussian War, on the other

hand, it was the *average German man*, called to arms after the completion of his twentieth year, who had to battle with the hardships and vicissitudes of a terrible campaign, whereas our Army is made up of men drawn largely from the proletariat, with a boyhood and early manhood too often spent in the slums of our great cities* and a constitution undermined by foul air and bad food. It is an Army largely made up of such elements as these which had to face, not only the enemy's bullets (this they do easily in virtue of their national character), but short rations and long marches, fierce heat and bitter cold, enteric and dysentery. Does anyone doubt for a moment that the deaths due to disease would have been far less if these conditions had been met by a foreign-service Army with a high physical standard, reinforced by the voluntary service of previously trained healthy "average citizen" soldiers? The amount of disease and death, which was *not* inevitable, but due to the poor constitutions of our soldiers, is the price *they* paid for the glorious voluntary system of which we love to boast.

Service in the regular, foreign-service Army is necessarily voluntary; but if every citizen went through a few months' preliminary training on attaining the military age, the basis of the recruitment of our Regular Forces would be truly national, and the reinforcements in time of war,

* Out of rather more than 11,000 recruits who wished to enlist in Manchester in 1899, 8,000 had to be rejected on medical inspection; while of the 3,000 who were not rejected only 1,000 could be put into the Regular Army, 2,000 being placed in the Militia. In the same city the rejections for physical unfitness in March, 1905, amounted to 90 per cent.

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provided by voluntary effort from the National Army, would not only be trained, but physically up to the average of the race.

III. *The Voluntary System is enormously costly, and must become ever more so.*

"It is apparent from the figures which appear in the Annual Estimates that this Army, imperfectly prepared, wasteful in its methods, and unsatisfactory in its results, is one of the most costly machines ever devised."

—Extract from Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War (the late Mr. H. O. ARNOLD-FORSTER), with regard to the Reorganization of the Army, 1904.

In closing the discussion (at the Royal United Service Institution) on Captain Hime's Prize Essay in 1875, the Chairman, General Sir William Codrington, said that all the seventy-nine essays which had competed for the Gold Medal agreed in one point, that we do not get the man who is efficient for our purpose. "Now, if we do not get the man that is most serviceable for our purpose," he added, "we get a most expensive article."

What was true in 1875 is true now. Indeed, matters are a good deal worse. For, while the quality of the recruit is, on the whole, not as good, his price is steadily increasing.

A study of Army expenditure throughout the century shows a constant tendency towards increase in the cost of the soldier. Leaving out of account the votes for the Auxiliary Forces, we find that the total cost per man was £53 6s. in 1810; £68 10s. in 1830; £79 in 1853-54; £90 in 1859-60; £100 in 1874-75; £113 12s. in

1897-98; £115 in 1898-99, and £127 in 1905, and £163 in 1908.

Let us now compare the cost of our Army with that of the chief Continental Powers, for it is only by so doing that we can realize the enormous cost of the "voluntary" soldier. The reader is to bear in mind, while following these figures, that we pay our high price *for men drawn mainly from the proletariat*, while the other nations pay for the services of their average citizens with the physique, intelligence and morale that belong to the nation, not to a class—and that the poorest and least capable in the whole community.

Taking precisely the same basis for purposes of comparison, namely, the total effective peace-footing of the permanent military forces divided into the total Army Estimates, we have the following figures for 1908:

	Cost per head.			Debt per head.			Debt charge per head.		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Great Britain ...	163	0	0	17	11	1	0	12	9
United States ...*	294	0	0	6	1	9	0	1	2½
Germany ...	57	0	0	2	18	5	0	2	2
France ...	45	0	0	30	18	4	1	5	1
Russia ...	36	0	0	6	11	0	0	5	4
Austria-Hungary	43	0	0	4	18	6	0	4	0
Italy ...	48	0	0	15	15	7	0	13	5
Japan ...	34	0	0	5	7	4	0	7	2

* Exclusive of pensions.

We have added the debt per head of population, as that debt has been incurred by us in carrying on our wars largely by the aid of foreign mercenary troops in our pay, as well as in the extravagant outlay involved by our unpreparedness for war.

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But the above does not give an adequate idea of the cost of our Army unless we note the enormous *wastage* that goes on under our voluntary system. The following figures are official for the years 1905-1909 :

	1905.	1906.	1907.	1908.	1909.
Died... ..	1,432	1,489	1,186	1,141	967
Deserted	3,085	2,979	3,091	2,938	2,787
Invalided	4,226	3,234	2,928	2,455	2,185
Discharged for misconduct	3,090	2,121	2,119	2,254	2,055
Discharged as not likely to become efficient	1,822	1,248	928	943	907

IV. *Expedients to avert Failure.*

We have seen that, in spite of our enormous Army expenditure, it has never been possible to obtain the forces voted by Parliament, and that, whenever there has been a special need for large numbers, the favourite methods for procuring them were to offer large bounties and to reduce the physical standard below that "which has been recognized as necessary for soldiers." But even these methods often failed, as we have seen above.

It is interesting to note what was done by the Government under these circumstances. They resorted to two expedients :

1. The employment of foreign mercenaries.
2. The application of *limited conscription*.

1. The employment of foreign mercenaries for supplying the deficiencies of our Army is out of the question for the future, having regard to the attitude of other nations on the subject. Foreign

troops were largely employed by the British Government at various periods from the Revolution (1688) down to the Crimean War, the last occasion on which such troops were used by us. In 1813 nearly 54,000 foreign mercenaries were serving in our Army; and Clode says that the numbers we employed from 1804 to 1813 were small as compared with those engaged by us in earlier wars.

Speaking in the House of Lords on July 10, 1906, Lord Roberts said: "Those allies, my " "Lords, acting with us in consequence of " "treaties and subsidies, did actually give us in " "the past the services . . . of those large " "military forces which only a National Reserve " " . . . can be expected to supply in the " "future. . . . The Duke of Marlborough " " . . . had only comparatively a small " "number of British troops under his command " "in the War of the Spanish Succession. But " "for the aid given by the Germans, the " "Austrians and the Dutch . . . Marl- " "borough's famous victories could never have " "been won. . . . It was the same in the " "next great historical struggle—that of the " "Seven Years' War. . . . Then, again, " "in the third and greatest of these historical " "struggles—the struggle against Napoleon— " "we should have been unable to bring about " "our great enemy's downfall had it not been " "for the co-operation of the vast military " "forces of other Powers. . . . At " "Waterloo . . . less than 24,000 British " "soldiers shared the honours of that great "

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"battle, the balance—47,760 men—of the"
"Duke's [Wellington's] force being made up"
"of foreigners. Even as lately as the Crimean"
"War we found it necessary to employ a"
"German Legion." *

2. The other expedient for filling up the ranks of our Army was *impressment*, and, later, the *application of limited conscription*.

In feudal times the obligation to military service rested upon all, "in addition to which" "obligation the military tenures laid upon" "those who were land-owners more specific" "duties to aid the King in his wars, either" "with personal service or the means of subsist-"
"ing an Army." †

As Lord Wemyss well said, speaking in support of the Militia Ballot Bill in the House of Lords on July 1, 1900: "*It was a conscript army that won the glorious victories of Crécy and Poitiers.*"

In Charles I.'s reign impressment was the usual mode of recruiting, though this was a violation of the law, which only allowed impressment *in the case of sailors*. Indeed, the press-gang continued to be the regular and orthodox way of recruiting for the Navy till as late as the nineteenth century. "For service in the Navy" "such a power has in modern times been ad-"
"judged to be constitutional." ‡ Just as Waterloo was won partly by the militia troops raised by

* See also Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown," vol. ii.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 17.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 355. See also Royal Commission on Manning the Navy, 1859.

the ballot, so Trafalgar and all our great naval victories were won by sailors largely recruited by the press-gang.*

In 1640 Parliament passed an Impressment Act to raise an Army in Ireland; and an Act passed in Philip and Mary's reign recognized the authority of the Crown to impress soldiers "to" "serve in the wars, or otherwise, in defence of the" "realm," while the 35 Elizabeth, c. 4, made provision for the invalid soldiers who had been "pressed for Her Majesty's service" in the fight with the Spanish Armada.†

Coming to measures taken in later times, Clode notes at the outset "that the great principle of" "supply throughout the last century was that" "of conscription limited to the criminal and" "pauper classes."‡

"It is a stern fact that limited conscription" "was resorted to on almost every occasion on" "which troops were required from 1695 to" "1781." §

It was limited to imprisoned debtors from 1695 to 1702. It was applied to criminals in 1702, and it was extended to paupers in 1703. ¶

With regard to the conscription of criminals, Clode says: "The exact number of this class" "admitted into the Army during the Peninsular" "War is not easily traceable. *Three Régiments*" "—one of military distinction—were thus formed," "and others were recruited."

* See "Sea-Life in Nelson's Time." J. Masfield. (Methuen.)

† Clode, vol. i., pp. 352, 353.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 10.

§ "Universal Conscription," etc., Captain Hime.

¶ Clode, vol. i., pp. 11-16.

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The Act of 1708 is described as one "to" "stimulate voluntary enlistment under the apprehension of impressment." But the Act of 1756 "was one of impressment only, not embracing" "voluntary offers of service." It is interesting to note that under the first of these Acts no man under 5 ft. 5 ins., under the second no man under 5 ft. 4 ins., was to be impressed.

Finally, under the provisions of the Act of 1778, smugglers and men deserting, their families were to be impressed, while a reward of 10s. was given to anyone discovering a fit man for impressment!

Such were some of the means adopted to fill the ranks of the Army in this country, where liberty and equality before the law are supposed to be fundamental axioms. The conscriptions described "were limited, or class conscriptions." They were, therefore, both vicious in theory and tyrannical in practice, being founded upon the monstrous principle that in emergencies some men are bound to serve their country and some are not, and it came to this, that those who by the misfortune of their birth and other circumstances were already at a disadvantage in the struggle for life were made to bear the largest share of that burden which should fall equally on all.

The principle of *universal* obligation was the basis of the Ballot Act of 1757, which laid down that every able-bodied man is bound to serve his country in time of need. Unfortunately, substitution was allowed, with the inevitable result that those who were in better circumstances bought themselves off, and left the ranks

full of poor substitutes; in other words, it was limited or class conscription under another and more pleasing form. This is still the principle as it exists in the present Militia Ballot Act, which is only suspended from operation, having been in abeyance since 1832.

V. Reasons for the Failure of the Voluntary System.

"The breakdown is in almost every case attributed essentially to the nature of the voluntary system itself, which makes it impossible to demand a reasonable standard of efficiency without greatly reducing the forces."

—**DUKE OF NORFOLK.** *Speech in the House of Lords, June 28, 1904, with reference to the Report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission on the Auxiliary Forces, the main recommendation of which is given at the end of this chapter.*

It may, perhaps, have occurred to the reader that there is possibly some undiscovered reason for the failure of the voluntary system in this country, and that if we could only lay our finger upon this "unknown quantity" we might give the voluntary system a fresh lease of life, and continue (as a nation) to shift our responsibilities on to other shoulders. Unfortunately, there is no mystery whatever about the case of the failure we have described. *The failure of the Voluntary System is due simply and solely to the progress of industry, and to the spread of the industrial spirit which is its natural and inevitable concomitant.*

History shows that man naturally passes through three distinct phases in his attitude towards the military life. There is the early

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age of society, in which every man is a warrior, partly by dire necessity of the struggle for existence, partly by the sheer love of bloodshed and plunder inherent in savage man.

Then, when security has been gained and plunder has produced plenty, man turns to the arts of peace in order to obtain from them the means of enjoyment. Agriculture, industry, and commerce begin to flourish, and gradually absorb more and more of the population, leaving the military career to the adventurous and ambitious spirits.

Finally, the last phase is reached, in which nations are compelled to revert to the original conditions of universal military service. Just as *necessity* made every man a warrior in order to defend the community in the early "struggle for existence," so *necessity* calls for the armed service of every citizen in order to preserve the enormous accumulation of the fruits of industry from the aggression of jealous competitors in the new "struggle for existence"—the struggle for the markets.

History shows us only one alternative to this necessity—the employment of foreign mercenaries, which led to the ruin of Carthage, and eventually of Rome.*

It remains for us briefly to indicate the relationship between compulsory military training for Home Defence and the recruitment of our

* The lessons of History are admirably dealt with in a lecture given by Mr. Ellis Barker, at the Royal United Service Institution on February 27, 1907, Lord Roberts in the chair, under the title "National and Non-National Armies." This lecture has been republished by the National Service League, price 3d.

Regular Forces on voluntary lines, from which it will appear that, so far from the principle of compulsion, as applied to Home Service, interfering with the recruitment of our professional Army, it is ultimately necessary to provide for that voluntary force what Mr. Fortescue has called "the true basis of such organization," namely "*national training*."

Our Regular Army at present is a thing apart from the great mass of the people, who care nothing and know nothing of military matters. In many districts a young fellow who enlists in the Army is regarded as a disgraced and depraved member of society. And it is only in those counties where the soldier is most often seen at work or at play that his sterling merits are duly recognized. The unpopularity of the Regular Army is based on two main causes:—

(1) During the wars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries every expedient short of national training was tried to fill its ranks, such as the purchase of substitutes for the Militia, from which many recruits were obtained, and the wholesale enlistment of criminals, and even lunatics, thus filling the Army with the poorest and most undesirable elements of the population.

(2) The Regular Army of to-day does not offer permanent employment to those who join it.

Recruits enlist for seven years' colour service, at the end of which some 90 per cent. have no option but to pass into the Reserve, being thus left to make a fresh start in civil life at the age

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of 25, with nothing but their meagre Reserve pay to fall back upon.

The reason for this apparently short-sighted policy is that our military authorities, whatever they may please to *say* about the fitness of the Territorial Force for war, *know* full well that the only men on whom they can confidently rely in a sudden emergency are the trained soldiers in the Army Reserve.

By the adoption of compulsory military training for the Territorial Force as advocated by the National Service League, not only would the readiness for war of our Home Defence Army be assured, but recruiting for our Oversea Regular Army would be stimulated in the following manner :

(a) Many young men who at present see nothing of soldiering would be brought into touch with a military life in the Territorial Force, and would elect to enter the Regulars as a profession. This view is amply borne out by the results of the training in the old Militia and in the present Special Reserve, which have generally contributed from 12,000 to 15,000 recruits annually to the Regular Army.

(b) With an efficient National Army to fall back on, the *raison d'être* of an Army Reserve of the present size would disappear. Colour service could be extended, fewer recruits would therefore be required, a careful selection could be made from those offering themselves, and better provision could be made for the Regular soldier on his return to civil life.

(c) The fact that men of all classes would for

a time perform military service side by side would raise the Regular Army in the estimation of the people, a result which would in itself have the most excellent effect on recruiting.

(d) The Regular N.C.O. of good character will be the backbone of the short-service Territorial Force, and more than 11,000 will be required to train the annual contingent of recruits for the Home Army (*see* p. 144 where the cost of our proposals is given in detail). This prospect of permanent and suitable employment on the training staff of the National Army will offer a tangible inducement to men who at present do enter the Regular Army because they see no future before them — except unemployment and the workhouse.

Thus, Nature and History alike speak to us in a clear voice. . Fortunate above other nations, they say, you have in the past been enabled, as an island race, to escape the sacrifices demanded from other peoples. They have learnt the noble lesson of personal self-sacrifice in many a bitter struggle for existence, in many a season of humiliation; they have seen their territories invaded, their cities in ruins, their villages in flames, their homes desecrated, their women insulted; they have had to submit to the hard terms of the conqueror, and have groaned under the taxation necessary to pay the huge indemnity demanded as the price of defeat. Well, they have learnt the lesson of preparedness, and stand armed and ready to defend the fruits of their labours. You, on the other hand, know nothing

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of a struggle for *existence*, of a war carried into your own homes. Supreme beyond all question on the seas, and enjoying internal peace while all the world was at war, you have conquered, colonized and expanded till you own one-fifth of the habitable globe, and you have easily piled up a wealth and commerce that are the envy of less fortunate nations. But now these nations have not only large and splendidly-trained armies, but powerful and rapidly growing fleets which are undermining your maritime supremacy year by year, while you find it ever more difficult to fill the ranks of your small Army, or even to supply the men necessary for your Fleets. The real sinews of war are, ultimately, *men*, not *money*. It is time, high time, for you to face the question : Will you bring the sacrifice of personal service to your country which is demanded as a *national insurance* against disaster, or will you risk the loss of all your wealth and commerce, the invasion of your territories, and the inevitable loss of all your Colonies and possessions which such an invasion would entail? If so, future generations will point the finger of scorn at you, as a nation which, while willing to enjoy the fruits of greatness, selfishly refused to recognize the responsibilities which that greatness implies.

"A thousand years scarce serve to form a State,
An hour may lay it in the dust."

—BYRON.

We conclude this chapter with the following extract from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary Forces :

"The principles which have been adopted,"

"after the disastrous failure of older methods,"
"by every great State of the European"
"Continent, and by Japan and Argentina, are,"
"first, that as far as possible the whole able-"
"bodied male population shall be trained to arms;"
"secondly, that the training shall be given in a"
"period of continuous service with the colours,"
"not necessarily in barracks; and, thirdly, that"
"the instruction shall be given by a body of"
"specially educated and highly-trained officers."
"We are convinced that only by the adoption"
"of these principles can an army for Home"
"Defence, adequate in strength and military"
"efficiency to defeat an invader, be raised and"
"maintained in the United Kingdom. . . . We"
"humbly submit . . . that Your Majesty's"
"Militia and Volunteer Forces have not at"
"present either the strength or the military"
"efficiency required to enable them to fulfil the"
"functions for which they exist, that their"
"military efficiency would be increased by the"
"adoption of the measures set forth in the fourth"
"section of this Report, which would make"
"them valuable auxiliaries to the Regular"
"Army; but that a Home Defence army capable,"
"in the absence of the whole or greater portion"
"of the Regular Forces, of protecting this country"
"against invasion, can be raised and maintained"
"only on the principle that it is the duty of"
"every citizen of military age and sound"
"physique to be trained for the national defence,"
"and to take part in it should emergency arise."

PART III.

The Programme of the League.

THREE things are required to assure the safety of the British Empire. These are :

1. A strong Navy, with *at least* a 10 per cent. margin over the combined forces of any two Powers.

2. A highly-trained long-service Army to act as a striking force in time of war, and also to provide permanent garrisons for our coaling stations, for India, and for other parts of the Empire with a large native population.

3. A great trained Reserve of men—a *Pan-Britannic Militia*—consisting of all able-bodied white men throughout the Empire. This Militia would be essentially intended for Home Defence in whatever part of the Empire it happened to be raised—the Australian Militia for Australian Defence, the Canadian for Canada, etc. It would *never* be called on for garrison duty away from home, but it would form a Reserve of men who could be called upon to fill up war casualties in the ranks of the foreign-service Army, and to reinforce it to any extent in a big war.

How would this National Reserve be obtained? The daughter nations, Australia and New Zealand,* have shown us that it can only be obtained

* It seems probable that the South African Union will make National Service, the basis of her defensive forces. Thus, since this

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by providing that every able-bodied youth shall be obliged to undergo sufficient training to enable him to take his place as an efficient defender of his country in the day of need. And, in order that his services may be available in time of war, that there must be a complete organization by means of which the trained material can be utilized with the maximum economy of labour and time and the minimum of friction.

What, in the case of the Mother Country, is this organization to be, what should be the duration of training, at what age will it take place, what will be the number trained, what will be, approximately, the cost? These are the practical questions to which the League is asked to give a practical answer in order that the large body of public opinion which has now accepted the principle of universal compulsory training shall have clear ideas of the practical working of the great national reform when the nation finally decides upon its adoption.

The National Service League fully realizes that these are reasonable questions, and it has therefore laid before the nation, in outline, a scheme which will show how the principles we advocate could be carried out in practice. But the League wishes to guard itself against misunderstanding.

The object of the League is, essentially, to secure the acceptance of a great principle, that of the personal duty and obligation of every citizen.

book was first published (1900), three of the Five Nations will have fallen into line with the principles then put forward for a Pan-Britannic Militia.

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to be trained to take his proper share in the work of national defence. That principle once accepted, it will be for the nation, through its expert advisers, to lay down the precise lines on which the training can best be carried out in harmony with our needs on the one hand and our conditions—social, industrial, etc.—on the other.

The League has, however, decided to submit a scheme, not as that which is ideally the best, but simply as affording a practical example of how compulsory training would work out in practice. This step has at least the advantage of affording a basis of discussion; of showing that, neither as regards numbers, nor cost, nor interference with civil employment, is there any serious difficulty to face. Above all, it has the great advantage of sweeping away the many absurd proposals that are attributed to those who advocate compulsory training; we refer to such ideas as compulsory service in the Regular Army abroad or barrack life for two or three years at home, or those fantastic misconceptions as to the cost of a system of universal training which unfortunately owe their origin largely to the misleading document issued by the late Mr. Arnold-Forster while he was Minister for War,* and to statements, apparently based on this document, which have been made more recently by responsible statesmen.†

* Cd. 1909 of 1904.

† On November 23, 1903, in the debate upon Lord Roberts' great speech in the House of Lords, the Earl of Crewe said:—"The existence of that force, trained in the manner in which the Special Reserve is trained, which, I believe, is the demand made, would mean, I suppose, an addition of something like £20,000,000 a year to the

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We will merely add that the scheme, though put forward only by way of illustration, is drawn up by a committee of experts who may claim to speak with high authority on the subject.

The immediate object of the National Service League is to form a great body of public opinion in favour of the two principles stated below, with a view to Universal Military Training for Home Defence being made the Law of the Land by Act of Parliament.

PRINCIPLES.

1. That it is the duty of every able-bodied man, high or low, rich or poor, to defend his country in case of national danger.

2. That to perform this duty efficiently he must be trained in time of peace.

PROPOSALS.

To secure the practical adoption of these principles, the League advocates that, subject to certain exemptions to be defined by law, including those necessary to provide for the requirements of the Navy, the Regular Army, and the Mercantile Marine, every man of sound physique, without distinction of class, shall be legally liable during certain years of his life to be called upon for service in the Territorial Force, for Home Defence only.

Army Estimates." Mr. Haldane, speaking at the City Liberal Club, said that "of course" Lord Roberts did not trouble about the addition of a trifling sum like £20,000,000 to the Army Estimates, and, in spite of the facts published by the National Service League, and fully debated in the House of Lords in July. 1909, we find Mr. Herbert Samuel referring vaguely to the "vast expenditure" which would be entailed by the adoption of National Service.

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In order to fit him for this duty we urge that, subject to the exemptions indicated above :

1. One continuous training of four months for the Infantry (with longer periods, not exceeding two additional months, for the other arms) shall be compulsory for all able-bodied youths in this country between the ages of 18 and 21, without distinction of class or wealth. Such training shall be followed annually for the next three years by (a) a fortnight's training in camp in the ranks of the Territorial Force, (b) a musketry course, with such further drills as may be prescribed for that Force.

2. The men thus trained shall be liable, up to the age of 30, to be called out for service in the Territorial Force, for Home Defence only, at a time of grave emergency so declared by Parliament.

Combined with the above system, as much physical drill and military instruction as possible shall be given to all boys previous to their reaching the military age, as part of the curriculum in all schools.

The National Service League welcomed the Territorial Force when it was launched, and has consistently endeavoured to make it a success, for it recognizes the great superiority in organization and capabilities that this Force provides as compared with the old Volunteer Force.

The League, however, feels bound to point out two fatal defects inherent in the Force as at present constituted :

(i.) Insufficient training. (ii.) Want of numbers and of power of expansion.

The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act

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provides that the Force shall, on the outbreak of war, be mobilized for six months' training; the training in time of peace being inadequate. The National Service League contends that the training for war should be carried out *before*, not *after*, the outbreak of hostilities. This can only be done if training is universal and compulsory.

It is to remove the two defects indicated above that the National Service League urges its proposals.

The methods by which it is suggested that the adult training should be put into practice are briefly summarized in the Memorandum on the National Service Bill,* which came up for its second reading in the House of Lords on July 12, 1909, and in spite of the opposition of both the Front Benches was only defeated by a majority of 123 to 103. We reproduce this Memorandum here.

NATIONAL SERVICE (TRAINING AND HOME DEFENCE) BILL. [H.L.]

Memorandum.

"This Bill imposes on all male British subjects"
"resident in the United Kingdom the obligation"
"of serving in the Territorial Force between the"
"ages of eighteen and thirty. There are, how-"
"ever, excluded from the operation of the Bill"
"all officers and men of the Navy and Regular"
"Army and of the Naval and Military Reserve"
"Forces (so that the existing voluntary system"

* * To be obtained at the Offices of the League, price 1½d.

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"of raising the Regular Forces will in no way
"be interfered with), and all persons who reach"
"the age of eighteen before the date on which"
"the Bill comes into operation."

"Subject to certain modifications, every"
"person who comes under the Bill will be in"
"exactly the same position as a person who now"
"enlists voluntarily into the Territorial Force ;"
"and will thus during his term of service have"
"to undergo training, and be liable to be called"
"out for home defence in case of imminent"
"national danger, but will be under no liability"
"to serve outside the United Kingdom."

"Under the Bill liability to training will not"
"(as is now the case) extend over the whole"
"term of service, but will be limited to four"
"years—normally the first four years of the"
"term, but in exceptional cases the second to"
"the fifth years, or the third to the sixth."

"The first year's training will be recruit"
"training, and will be four months for men in"
"the Infantry, and not less than four or more"
"than six months for men in other branches."
"In each of the three next years, fifteen days"
"training as well as a course of musketry and"
"attendance at certain drills will be required."

"Liability to attend on *embodiment* (i.e., in"
"case of imminent national danger) will remain"
"exactly as it is under the Act of 1907."

"The Bill secures absolute equality of treat-"
"ment as between all classes, inasmuch as"
"under no circumstances will any person be"
"able to buy his discharge or to procure any kind"
"of exemption by means of a money payment."

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“The Bill provides for the exemption from”
“training of (i) men who have served at least”
“three years in the Army or Navy, ministers”
“of religion, and (in certain cases) only sons”
“of widows; and (ii) persons physically in-”
“capacitated and certain persons employed in”
“public service; and also for the disqualification”
“of criminals and persons of bad character. All”
“persons in class (ii), and also persons dis-”
“qualified, will, if their incomes exceed fifty-”
“two pounds per annum, be required, in each”
“of the four years during which they should”
“have been trained, to pay a special military tax”
“amounting to one per cent. of their incomes.”

“As regards officers, it is proposed that first”
“appointments should only be given to persons”
“who have either been through recruit training”
“or held commissions in the regular army.”

“After the Bill comes into operation, volun-”
“tary enlistment for the Territorial Force will”
“cease, but men now in the Force will complete”
“their current terms of service.”

NUMBERS.

The estimated strength of the Home Defence Army to be raised under our proposals is as shown at the bottom of page 142.

In Switzerland the number of medical rejections annually amounts on an average to 47 per cent., and a similar result is experienced in Germany. This figure may, therefore, be taken as a fair estimate for medical rejections, and 1 per cent. is allowed for legal exemptions under our proposals. (See also Memorandum of Bill.)

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The number of British emigrants in 1907 was just under 200,000 (see Board of Trade Return for Emigration and Immigration, 1907). We have taken 5 per cent. of the number as the proportion of able-bodied youths of 18. The number of British sailors in the Mercantile Marine is about 180,000, and it may reasonably be assumed that some 8 per cent. of these are youths of about 18 years of age.

The number of lads reaching the age of 18 in any one year in the United Kingdom is (according to the census of 1901) about ... 416,000
In estimating the number who would come up for annual Recruit Training we must deduct—

48 per cent. for medical rejections and legal exemptions	...	...	...	...	200,000
Recruits for Navy and Marines	...	...	...	...	8,000
Recruits for Regular Army...	...	...	...	...	35,000
Emigrants	...	...	...	...	10,000
Mercantile Marine	...	...	...	...	15,000
					268,000
Leaving to be trained each year	...	...	...	...	148,000
Say 150,000.					416,000

Allowing 5 per cent. per annum wastage, the numbers trained annually would be as follows:—

Recruits	...	...	...	...	150,000
Territorial Army	{ 1st year, men			142,000	
	{ 2nd " "			135,000	
	{ 3rd " "			128,000	
					405,000

In addition to the above, who would be undergoing annual training, there would be some 600,000 or 700,000 men below the age of 30

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who had passed through the ranks of the Territorial Army, but who would be liable to be called up for service in case of grave national emergency.

Briefly stated, under the proposals of the National Service League, the country would have a Territorial Army of some 400,000 men, all of whom had done—at least—four months' recruits' training. There would also be an annual contingent of 150,000 recruits undergoing training, and, in addition, there would be a Reserve of some 600,000 or 700,000 men, who had passed through the ranks of the Territorial Army, and who would be liable for Home Service.

The training proposed for the Territorial Army being practically identical with that now given to the Special Reserve, it is not considered necessary to make any special provision for the training of that Reserve as a separate force. Such a Reserve must, however, be provided, and this need would be met by the offer of a bounty of £1 10s. per annum to those men who undertook the liability for foreign service. The number of such men allowed for in the "Estimates of Numbers and Cost" is 80,000, that being the number laid down by Mr. Haldane as required for the Special Reserve. Under the proposals of the National Service League these men are included in those who are still undergoing their training in the Territorial Army. There is, however, no reason why, if the Military Authorities desired, the men for the Special Reserve should not be taken from those who have completed their training in the Territorial Army, and, if

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necessary, the number could be largely increased. If, however, this course were adopted an additional charge would have to be allowed for further annual trainings.

COST.

The cost has been calculated on two bases :

(a) On a proportional cost of the Regular soldier as given in the Army Estimates (1908-09), with certain modifications.

(b) On Mr. Haldane's figures as to the cost of the Special Reserve.

In the case of the recruit undergoing his training a deduction of 6d. per day has been made from the pay of a Regular soldier, on the principle that, once home defence is regarded as a national duty incumbent upon all citizens, high and low, rich and poor, it would be absurd to pay the citizen soldier the same rate as is paid to the man for whose services we have at present to compete in the open labour market, and who enters the Army as a profession.

With this exception the cost in both Estimates A and B is calculated on the cost of the British Regular soldier, admittedly the most expensive soldier in the world, except the United States Regular, and the probable saving due to an Army raised on the compulsory system as compared with one raised on a voluntary basis has not been considered.

It should also be borne in mind that, in Estimate A proportional charges for educational establishments (Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy, Woolwich),

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Field Marshals' Pensions, etc., etc., are included, though it is obvious that such charges have little relation to a Territorial Army.

The average period of recruit training has, in both estimates, been taken as five months, the mean between four months for the Infantry and six months for the other arms, and a full staff of officers and N.C.O.'s (Regular), on the scale of fifteen officers and seventy-five N.C.O.'s per 1,000 men, has been allowed for these 150,000 recruits. Moreover, charges are allowed for this staff during the whole year, although the longest period a recruit would be up for training would be six months. This has been done in order that a sufficient staff may be available if it is decided to carry out the training of all the recruits simultaneously. If, however, the training is carried on throughout the year half this staff would be sufficient, and a saving of about £1,000,000 would result thereby, and would have to be deducted from our final estimates.

These two bases of calculation give an almost identical result as regards the net additional cost of the Territorial Force under the proposals of the League. The figures are :

					£
Estimate A	...	...	...	3,859,199*	
„ B	...	...	...	3,806,372	

The accuracy of these estimates has been disputed by the War Office authorities, who, in a

* For full details as to calculations of cost see pamphlet, " Estimate of the Numbers and the Cost involved under the Scheme of Training proposed by the National Service League." To be obtained at the Offices of the League, price 1d.

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Memorandum, No. 101, dated July 8, 1909, claim that the extra cost of the proposals of the League will be £7,820,000, a considerable reduction, it will be noted, from the £20,000,000 of less than one year before.* A close examination of the War Office Estimate will reveal the fact that every effort has been made to maintain a high figure, with the somewhat unhappy result that this remarkable document succeeds in stultifying itself.

Thus we are told in paragraph 4 that, "the" "fundamental fallacy in Estimate A is the" "assumption that a soldier trained for fifteen" "days costs one twenty-fourth of the annual" "cost of a soldier trained all the year round."

On the very next page, in paragraph 11, the War Office make use of this same "fundamental" "fallacy" to inflate their own estimate.

"The Territorial Force is estimated to cost" "normally about £10 a head annually, of which" "roughly £4 10s. may be assigned to the fort-" "night's camp. . . . Four and a half months'" "extra camp for 150,000 men, making allow-" "ance for items which would not increase in" "proportion to the duration of the training" "would cost about six millions" or £40 a head. By applying "the fundamental fallacy" we get: cost of a fortnight's camp = $\frac{1}{6} \times 40 =$ £4 8s. 11d., or practically the War Office figure. It is in the estimate of £6,000,000 for extra recruit training "that the real fallacy lies." £40 per head is allowed for a camp training of

* See pp. 136 and 137, note.

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four and a half months (with hire of the necessary horses), but with no allowance for administration, clothing, equipment, ranges, etc., while the cost of training the recruit for the Special Reserve *for six months*, with allowances for all the above items, and many others, is only £27 19s. 6d.*

Again, £750,000 is added to the cost of the training staff of seventy-five Regular N.C.O.'s for every 1,000 men allowed for by the League on the grounds that "sergeants and colour-" "sergeants, all pensionable and with the right" "to marry, would be required, and £150 would" "not be too high a rate to take."

In the Army Estimates, 1909-10, the cost of the sergeant-instructors of the Territorial Force is given as £86 per head.

These two extra items alone account for some £3,750,000 of the War Office Estimate which, without that figure, approaches to within £250,000 of those published by the League.

The publication of this Memorandum in which it is stated that "the Territorial Force is estimated to cost about £10 a head annually" gives us, in conjunction with Mr. Arnold-Forster's White Paper, yet another independent method of calculating the cost of the League's scheme based,

* Mr. Haldane (Haddington): The estimate of £27 19s. 6d. includes barrack accommodation, clothing, pay, bounty, messing allowance, provisions, equipment, arms, ammunition and charges for travelling, fuel and light, enlistment expenses, barrack stores, and all other expenditure which can be regarded as personal to the man. It does not include any portion of the cost of the establishment of Regular soldiers assigned to a Special Reserve Battalion. The average cost of an infantry private of the Special Reserve after his recruit year is about £9 a year. (In Parliament, December 14, 1908.)

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be it noted, on official figures published with the express intention of proving the prohibitive cost of any system of compulsory service.

COST OF THE SCHEME OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE CALCULATED FROM WAR OFFICE ESTIMATES (METHOD C).

In Mr. Arnold-Forster's White Paper (Cd. £
..1909 of 1904) it was stated that the cost of training 190,000 men for one year would be £13,765,000. From this it follows, by a rule of three sum, that the cost of training 150,000 men for a period of five months would be 4,527,960

This gives the cost of the recruit training.

According to the reply published by the War Office to the National Service League "Estimate of Numbers and Cost," Memorandum No. 101 of July 8, 1909, the gross cost of the Territorials is £10 per head per annum.

The increase in the numbers of the Territorials by the adoption of the League's scheme would be 92,000 men, *i.e.*, 405,000, as against 313,000, the present establishment of the Territorial Force. This gives an additional sum of 920,000

As the cost of the annual training.

There must be added in addition a bounty of £1 10s. to each of 80,000 of these Territorials to induce them to undertake the liability to serve abroad with the Regulars in case of war, thus taking the place of the Special Reserve 120,000

	5,567,960
Deduct cost of Special Reserve ...	1,301,665*
	<u>4,266,295</u>

* In W. O. Memorandum, No. 101, this figure is put at £2,000,000.

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In Mr. Arnold-Forster's White Paper it is stated that the pay of a recruit has been reckoned at 1s. per diem. The rate of pay for recruits in the scheme of the League is 6d. a day less than that given to Regular soldiers.

Now the present pay of the Regular soldier averages about 1s. 3d. per diem. The pay of a Recruit would consequently amount to 9d. per diem, *i.e.*, 3d. a day less than is allowed in Mr. Arnold-Forster's calculations.


Three pence a day for 150,000 men for five months works out at £281,250.

Deducting this sum from our previous result, we get a final total of £3,985,045, as calculated from War Office figures.

We thus get these three results, calculated upon three independent bases, but *each* founded on official figures :

				£
Estimate A	...	...	...	3,859,199
" B	...	...	...	3,806,372
" C	...	...	...	3,985,045

It would be difficult to conceive a more striking tribute to the substantial accuracy of the League estimates.



PART IV.

The Advantages of Universal Compulsory Training in the Territorial Force.

"An armed people is the true constitutional militia of the Kingdom."—BURKE.

"National Service means not only national safety; it means national health, national strength, national honour, and national prosperity."—LORD ROBERTS.

"For my own part I venture, however paradoxical it may seem, to express the conviction that the nations who, like the Germans, adhere to the principle of Universal Military Training are perfectly right, and in the long run the peoples who are prepared to undergo the toil and face the danger of personal service will outstrip, not only in war, but also in the competitions of peace, the peoples who shrink from it."—VISCOUNT MILNER. *Speech in the House of Lords, July 10, 1908.*

It has been shown that the adoption of compulsory military training in the Territorial Force will make our Home Defence Army fit to do the work for which it is intended. It will give strategic freedom to the Navy, allow the Regular Army to leave these shores whenever Imperial necessity calls for it, and give us security against raid or invasion.

It has also been shown that this result can be

secured at the cost of about four millions sterling additional to the present Army Estimates.

It might well be claimed that, if National Service will give us national security and that peace which, as Walpole declared, is England's greatest need, we should be guilty of incredible folly if we, the wealthiest Empire in the world, with enormous stakes at issue, were to grudge spending an additional four millions a year in order to make our present expenditure effective. For a sea wall which will not keep out a tidal wave is so useless that the money spent on it might just as well have been thrown into the sea. Effective armaments alone are worth their cost.

If a physician were to save a man's life in return for a moderate fee we should certainly regard the patient as a fool were he to complain that he had not got value for his money. But if, besides merely saving his patient's life, the physician were to reconstitute his health so completely that the man were to find himself far better than he had ever been, with muscles taut, nerves braced, lungs breathing deeply, and the blood coursing through his veins with the joy of vigorous youth, we should think the fee a trifle, and we should feel that hardly any sacrifice of money or of comfort could have been too great to have secured such a result.

National Service will prove such a physician to the British people. It will, as a direct result, save the nation and the Empire from the disasters of war and from the ruinous results which war must inevitably entail to a highly industrial

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nation like our own. But we propose in this chapter to glance briefly at some of the most important indirect results which will follow upon the adoption of National Service, all of which have been tested and exemplified by the most careful investigation and the experience of other nations.

ADVANTAGES.

1. National Service would immensely improve the physique of the nation, for its manhood would have to go through a period of physical training. They would at one period in their lives be removed from the unhealthy conditions of life in great towns, and be given four to six months' training in camps of exercise where they would get physical training under the best conditions, good food, plenty of air and sleep, and a regular life. It is superfluous to emphasize the advantage which such a "breathing space" would be to the masses of our industrial population, who often have to enter upon the severe struggle of life after a youth spent under unfavourable conditions. National Service would strengthen many a shaky constitution and give back to the industrial army thousands of sturdy recruits with an increased wage-earning capacity and an insurance against the breakdown which too often hits a man who has had, and can have, no such chance under present conditions.

No one who has the slightest experience of the difference wrought in the physical condition of slum lads who are sent to a seaside camp by some philanthropic society, or in the weedy

youths who enter the Special Reserve, needs to be told of the extraordinary difference which military training produces, and it is almost incomprehensible that a common-sense people like ours should apparently be content to allow its greatest asset, the physique of its people, to be undermined and neglected when they have at hand the same means of arresting physical decay as has been adopted by all the civilized nations of Europe and the Far East. As it is, hundreds of thousands of our male population get no physical training at all, and as 79 per cent. of our population is now urban, it is clear that we are on the road to lose that physical superiority which used to be our pride, and which was undoubtedly largely the basis of our national greatness. Meanwhile the other nations are gradually improving the physique of their peoples, and careful investigation shows that the Germans, the French, the Italians, the Swedes, and, since the adoption of National Service in 1872, the Japanese, have increased the stature of their people and have added materially to the wage-earning period of the mass of their citizens.

National Service would secure this priceless boon, and there is no other means by which the bulk of our male population can be reached than by this universal tonic, which gives a man in return for his service to the country an improvement in his physique, and, thereby, in his chances of success in his civil career.

2. The training of our youths in discipline, duty, obedience to authority, manliness and self-mastery would prove a moral factor of untold

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value in the life of the people. During his period of military service every man would learn the lesson of discipline, comradeship, co-operation, the subordination of self to a great cause, devotion to duty, and thoroughness in the performance of the smallest detail. He would learn the nobility of work done not merely in return for a daily wage, but as a service demanded of him by his country and his Flag, wherein he would work "in an orderly, soldierly, well-" "guided and wholesome way." Under the inspiration of such practical service he would get imbued with that feeling of personal responsibility and that spirit of self-sacrifice for the good of the community without which patriotism has no meaning and citizenship is little more than a name. Above all, he would realize that he, mere unit though he be, has a real share in his country's fate. He would be linked for one short period in his youth with national ideas, and he would imbibe something of the tradition and the spirit of the great people to which he belongs. Can anyone doubt that such practical teaching of citizenship would produce that revival of nationhood, that real and living patriotism of which we see so little nowadays, or which is confined to so small a section of the population. Yet that patriotism is, we believe, as true as it has ever been in the past. Only it lies asleep and has never been awakened by the call of national duty. Hence we see the growing tendency among all classes of the population to think less of duty and more of pleasure—to get the utmost from the State and give as little

as possible in return. Duty is a thing that can be taught as well as decimals, and the experience of every other nation, as well as the efforts of our own voluntary organizations for training the young, show that there is no finer school for it than military training.

3. National Service is the only means of supplying our needs by a method which would be fair to all. The present system is really only conscription under a new form. One man is taken because he is patriotic enough to give up his leisure and his holidays while nine other men benefit by his efforts, which are fruitless precisely because they are not shared by the general body of citizens. The injustice of the present system is most clearly seen in the case of employers and employed in large works. At present the man who refuses to let his employees serve in the Territorial Force gets an enormous advantage over the patriotic employer who puts no obstacle in the way of his men; and in time of war this unfairness would be felt still more severely. There are thousands of men to-day who would gladly perform their service for their country if they realized that it was part of the law of the land, and that all shared alike in the honourable duty which the law imposed. But they do not see why, when the obligation is not universal, they should do it instead of enjoying their leisure in the sports and recreations which are a natural and legitimate means of maintaining health and fitness.

4. Service side by side in the ranks of the national army would bring together all classes of

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the community to their mutual advantage. This would prove a powerful lever for securing those objects of social amelioration and reform for which all philanthropists and educationalists are striving. In this connection we may quote the following passage from a letter received from Mr. T. C. Horsfall, J.P., of Macclesfield: "I am" "convinced that in no country where the people" "are as kind-hearted as most English people are" "would it be possible for the slums and semi-" "slums of London and Manchester to co-exist" "with compulsory military service."

The Elberfeld system of voluntary personal service among the poor, which is being so largely adopted in Britain, is the direct outcome of the universal training in citizenship which the German system of compulsory service gives to German youth of all classes.

5. By rescuing our physical and moral degenerates from the slums of our great cities, and letting them feel that they, too, could be of use to their country, we should turn them from hooligans into men. Those who have had much experience in the training of boys know that there is no surer appeal to the best instincts which are present, even in those who have had the most wretched up-bringing, than the expression of confidence in their ability to play an honourable part in the life of the community. And if a lad will respond to the idea of "playing up" for his club or his football or cricket team, how much more likely is he to "play up" to the idea of being a decent, self-respecting citizen if he is made to realize that he himself can serve his country in

his own degree as well and truly as the highest in the land by giving his physical and moral strength to his country for a few months when on the threshold of manhood !

National Service is indeed nothing more than the completion of civic education. It is an educational system pure and simple, only it is education on the broadest lines, education for citizenship. "Education," says Ruskin, "does not" "mean teaching people to know what they do not" "know. It means teaching them to behave as" "they do not behave. And the true compulsory" "education which the people now ask of you is" "not catechism, but drill. Compulsory ! Yes," "by all means ! 'Go ye out into the highways'" "and hedges, and compel them to come in.'" "Compulsory ! Yes, and gratis also. . . . You" "are to spend on National Education, and to be" "spent for it and to make by it, not more money" "but better men ; to get into this British Island" "the greatest possible number of good and brave" "Englishmen. *They* are to be your 'money's'" "worth."

6. National Service would be a great benefit to labour. On the one hand the educative training given to the young labourer during his period of service would mean, as I have shown, an immense improvement on his physique and health, and a valuable lesson in methodic work. All competent observers are agreed that one of the chief factors in the extraordinary commercial and industrial success of Germany is the magnificent training in method and organization which is given to every man who passes through the ranks of the national

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army. His service is, in fact, made as far as possible a school of life, and the requirements of a modern army are so multifarious that most men are naturally put to that work which they have chosen as their means of livelihood. Thus tailors, shoemakers, mechanics, railway workers, engineers, fitters, butchers and bakers fall naturally into their proper places as soon as they have learnt the elements of their military work. But they have imbibed feelings of solidarity, and have learnt to relate their personal activities to their country's needs.

It is obvious, too, that National Service would, to a considerable extent, relieve the labour market by allowing the older married man to remain employed while a certain number of young unmarried men would be taken off the labour market for some months every year.

7. The simple fact that the British Empire would be strong to resist attack would be the surest guarantee of peace in nearly every part of the globe. At the present moment, the very wealth and extent of our Empire and commerce, *ill-defended as they are*, are a perpetual incentive to attack on the part of those nations which are aiming at a larger share of the world's trade, and to whom the deposition of Great Britain from her commercial supremacy would mean a large increase in wealth and prosperity. Now, as in the past, the true maxim is: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*.

8. If every Briton in our great Empire were to go through the same military training, an indissoluble tie would be formed, uniting the whole of our race in the strong bonds of a

brotherhood-in-arms. Thus the great question of Imperial Federation would find its simplest and most natural solution. History has shown us again and again that nothing is more powerful in strengthening the spirit of national unity and in obliterating petty and local jealousies than common service under one flag. It was the statesmanlike perception of this truth, founded on some of the strongest instincts of human nature, which enabled Chatham, that great Englishman, to turn the rebellious hatred of the Highlanders into the magnificent loyalty which has given us some of the finest regiments in the British Army; and which has recently impelled our late antagonist, General Louis Botha, to bring forward proposals for National Service, in the newly established Parliament of United South Africa, which will have the result of converting the splendid men who fought against us in 1899-1902 into keen soldiers of the King.

To summarize the points upon which we have touched, National Service would give us the means of organizing our national resources, physical, moral, and intellectual, for the common wealth. The vital problem which we have to face to-day is really this, that we have not organized the Man-Power of the nation, while every other people has done so. A hundred years ago, when the nations of Europe were struggling for existence, we, in the supremacy of our sea-power, could afford to look on complacently while our natural energy and our unequalled geographical position enabled us to out-distance every other nation in the international competition.

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To-day we stand as the only people which has not organized its Man-Power, face to face with a nation like Germany, which gets from its people every ounce of efficiency by passing its manhood through the public school of the national army.

And, mark this, there is absolutely no other way of organizing our Man-Power. There is no other way by which we can reach the vast bulk of our people. Religion, philanthropy, education: all these are admirable. But they mainly reach those who, on the whole, stand in least need of them, and they do not bring the touch of nationhood with them. They do not light up that steady flame of enthusiasm which personal service to the nation brings with it.

We have the finest raw material in the world, and we can still maintain not only our Empire but our ability to serve the world and the cause of civilization as we have done in the past, *if* we will accept the moderate sacrifice which National Service entails.

But we cannot fulfil our great mission without such sacrifice, shared by all classes alike, bringing all men into friendly contact in common service to the Flag, bridging the chasm which separates the classes from the masses, and solving, maybe, by the virtue of a great ideal, some of those social problems which at the present moment cause so much bitterness between parties and denominations.

It is sometimes alleged that, in spite of a wonderful apparent prosperity, England has really attained the zenith of her greatness, and shows many signs of that decadence which has,

through all ages, attacked nations which have grown wealthy too easily and at the cost of a widespread idleness, luxury, love of pleasure, and dislike of duty and responsibility. Whether there be any truth in this allegation or not, it is certain that in the adoption of universal military service we have at hand a splendid tonic and the best antiseptic remedy for such a state of things.

If the Angle-Saxon race rises to the noble sacrifice of personal military service to the Empire, it will stand so splendid, strong and self-reliant among the nations of the world that we may well give the lie for centuries to come to the theory that there must necessarily be growth, culmination and decay in the lives of nations. Nor can any student of history doubt that our retention of the hegemony of the world must be as beneficial to the cause of civilization, justice and liberty as it is naturally desirable to the British race.

PART V.

Objections.

THE previous parts of this book have been chiefly concerned with the arguments in favour of compulsory training. It is now proposed to examine those which at various times have been put forward against it.

1. "It is an interference with the liberty of the subject."

Certainly. So is every measure which subordinates the comfort of the individual to the welfare of the community. The payment of taxes (which was strongly objected to by doctrinaire democrats in America after the War of Independence as an infringement of individual liberty, the suggestion being that it should be left to the good will of each!), compulsory education, the Factory Acts, the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the sanitary laws, the obligation to assist the police, etc., are all instances of the universal tendency of a civilized community to compel its members to relinquish part of their liberty for the benefit of the whole. If, therefore, the individual may be legitimately compelled to relinquish part of his liberty where merely the comfort and convenience of the community is in question, it is obvious that it is

in every way proper that he should do so where the greatest need of the community—namely, its safety and existence—is at stake.

2, "It is unnecessary."

Enough has been said in a previous chapter to show that the necessity is not only proven, but clamant. If experience and common-sense and the weighty verdicts of impartial and expert Commissions can prove anything, the voluntary system, as applied to our "national" (as distinguished from our professional) forces, stands condemned on every single ground. Moreover, even the complacency of the most insular Briton will probably admit that there is some force in the circumstance that every single modern nation (including the island nation of Japan) except the United States has in the last hundred years abandoned the voluntary system as inefficient and obsolete, and substituted the only one which enables a nation to bring to bear upon the supreme national need the whole of the national resources, physical, moral and material. The unique position of the United States, thousands of miles from any possible aggressor, must not mislead us, whose situation is totally different.

3. "It is un-English."

If it were it would not matter a jot, as long as it is necessary and advantageous. But it is, as a matter of fact, the most ancient principle of English law, dating from the time of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd, through the trained bands and Militia to the Ballot Act of 1757, the enactments of which are still in force, and only suspended

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annually.* Only the *freeman* was, in ancient times, compelled to serve; the serf was not allowed to do so (cf., the Samurai of Japan). Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt were won by men trained to arms as part of the duty of citizenship. By an abuse of the same principle, many of Nelson's sailors were recruited by the press-gang. The German patriot Scharnhorst, in establishing the system of universal service in 1806, pointed to the English Militia as his model.†

As to the sentiments of our forefathers, Kingsley has well described them in the following words:

"They felt, those old forefathers of ours,"
"that loyalty was not a degrading but an"
"ennobling influence; that a free man can"
"give up his independence without losing it;"
"that independence is never more called out"
"than by subordination; and that a free man"
"never feels himself so free as when obeying"
"those whom the laws of his country have"
"set over him."

4. "The Territorial Force can be made"
"effective and can save us from Universal"
"Military Training." Although this is really the same argument as No. 2, it is so commonly put forward by many who are quite sincere in their belief that we can continue to rely upon

* "The Militia Ballot Acts and the Acts relating to the local Militia are still unrepealed, and could be enforced if necessary." Mr. Haldane in the House of Commons, April 13, 1910.

† For the history of Compulsory Military Training in England, see Stubb's "Charters," and Coulton's "A Strong Army in a Free State."

the system of patriotism by proxy and in the face of nations organized, armed and trained, go on relying for our Home Defence upon a force which depends upon the good will and the convenience of a limited number of people, that it is worth while briefly summarizing the case once more.

The Territorials are a patriotic body of citizens who enable the nation to lay claim to a patriotism which is purely vicarious. They cannot, from the nature of the case, become a force capable of meeting highly-trained European troops, the only ones they are intended to meet:

(a) Because they cannot as a body give sufficient time to the necessary training. As Mr. Wyndham pointed out in the House of Commons on June 27, "We do not get" "the minimum number, we do not get the" "minimum training, we do not get simultaneous" "training."

(b) Because, from the lack of sufficient training of a continuous kind, the standard of discipline is not sufficiently high to enable such troops to take the field against Regulars.

(c) Because no conceivable method, no dodging or twisting or pretending, will enable a large body of citizens to give the requisite time to military training unless *all* employers and employed alike are obliged to share the burden.

(d) Because the voluntary method cannot bring into the national forces the true average of the national qualities, physical, mental and moral, and fails to supply the school of discipline and patriotism precisely for those who need it most.

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(e) Because it is essentially unjust that one man should be asked to fulfil the most important duty of citizenship for ten others, who avoid it.

5. "It would lead to a spirit of militarism and aggression." If by militarism is meant the subordination of the civil to the military power, the thing is inconceivable in a country where the contrary tradition is so deeply rooted. If by militarism is meant a spirit of discipline and the subordination of personal advantage and comfort to a great purpose, then certainly universal training would lead to it, much to the national benefit. Gladstone said, "The great" "need of the English people is discipline," and no serious observer, be he Liberal or Tory, Radical or Socialist, will deny it. As for the spirit of aggression, we may look for it, perhaps, in a professional army, or in one where men take to soldiering for the love of fighting. But the last place where we shall find such a spirit is in a nation where every man may be called upon to fight in time of war. In such a nation there is an infinitely greater guarantee of peace than where the people can plunge into war light-heartedly, with a comfortable conviction on the part of the shouters that somebody else will have to stand the shooting. It is a literal truth against which the members of the Peace Society may batter their heads as against a stone wall—that there is no surer way of guaranteeing peace than to show men how serious a thing war is, and how much to be avoided, except where the national honour and the most vital interests are at stake. It is not a paradox but a truism to say

that the surest road to universal peace lies through universal training.

6. "Violence is always wrong, and therefore war is wicked and unchristian, and" "preparation for it is equally wrong." Violence or force is the only means given to nations, as to individuals, to resist wrong, and to maintain the right. The whole of the equilibrium of nature depends upon laws which are the expression of governed force. Similarly the balance of power among nations depends upon the equipoise of forces dormant in time of peace, and by their presence contributing to maintain peace. Weaken one of these forces or fail to maintain it, and you contribute at once to that disturbance of equilibrium which is war. A weak Britain must be a serious menace to the peace of the world, especially as the extent and the wealth of the Empire present a temptation to poorer but virile nations. A weak British Empire is like an egg in a basket of stones. While the stones are at rest the egg may remain unbroken, though it is always in danger from the pressure to which it is exposed. Shake the basket and, whatever may happen to the stones, the egg will most certainly be broken.

As to violence being always wrong, Christ's action in driving the money-changers out of the Temple with whips is sufficient proof that force is legitimately used not only in defending right but in chastising wrong-doing. We could quote countless authorities of statesmen and ministers of religion who have emphasized these truths. But perhaps nothing better has been said on the

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subject than by John Ruskin and ex-President Roosevelt.

"As it is at their own peril," wrote Ruskin, "that any race extends their dominion in mere " "desire of power, so it is at their own still " "greater peril that they refuse to undertake " "aggressive war . . . whenever they are " "assured that their authority would be helpful " "and protective . . . I tell you that the " "principle of non-intervention, as now preached " "among us, is as selfish and cruel as the worst " "frenzy of conquest, and differs from it only by " "being not only malignant, but dastardly."

Mr. Roosevelt, who received the Nobel Peace Prize during his visit to Europe this year, said in his message to Congress in 1906 :

"Peace is normally a great good, and normally " "it coincides with righteousness ; but it is " "righteousness and not peace which should bind " "the conscience of a nation as it should bind the " "conscience of an individual, and neither a " "nation nor an individual can surrender con- " "science to another's keeping. . . ."

"Nothing would more promote iniquity, " "nothing would further defer the reign upon " "earth of peace and righteousness, than for the " "free and enlightened peoples, which, though " "with much stumbling and many shortcomings, " "nevertheless strive towards justice, deliberately " "to render themselves powerless while leaving " "every despotism and barbarism armed and " "capable to work their wicked will."

So, too, the Australian Labour Leader (formerly Prime Minister of the Commonwealth) says :

“ War, with all its attendant misery, should only ”
 “ be entered upon as a last resort ; but just as ”
 “ it is criminal to encourage an unnecessary ”
 “ war, so it is suicidal to neglect adequate pre- ”
 “ paration for defence against aggression.”

With regard to arbitration, we cordially welcome the advance that is being made towards the principle of committing difficulties and differences between nations to arbitration before having recourse to the “ arbitrament of the ” “ sword.” Some wars could undoubtedly have been avoided if such a course had been taken, and it is obvious that, in such questions as the delineation of boundaries, compensation for damage to life and property, etc., the delay obtained by submitting these matters to a tribunal must have the effect of smoothing away the angry passions which are apt to be aroused by hasty and ill-informed Press judgments on such matters.

But there will always be questions affecting the vital interests of nations which they will never agree to submit to the judgment of a third party. Great Britain, for instance, could never tolerate an attack upon Australia or New Zealand. Nor could she regard the acquisition of Holland and Belgium by a great military Power with indifference, since it would mean a vital blow at her naval Power, upon the supremacy of which, in turn, her very existence depends.

7. “ It involves too great an interference with trade and industry.” In the first place, it might legitimately be urged that a system of national training and education which will give back to the army of industry many thousands

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of men annually whose physique has been strengthened, whose discipline and sense of duty has been improved, and who have acquired habits of industry, punctuality, and order, will not be likely to cause any permanent loss to industry. The attitude of mind which regards any time not spent in actual industrial labour as unproductive, is the same as that which objected to compulsory education because children would be prevented from earning wages for their parents, an objection which we still find whenever the suggestion is made that the school age should be raised. Yet it would be difficult to find to-day a single individual, be he greedy manufacturer or selfish parent, who would wish to return to the appalling days of "productive" (?) child-labour, or who does not recognize that, even from the purely material point of view, the compulsory withholding of children from wage-earning until they have acquired the basis of an education is sound policy, and "pays."

But, as a matter of fact, the actual interferences with trade and industry under a system of *universal* training would be very slight with the short initial period proposed—four to six months at eighteen years of age.

A very careful calculation made by an employer of labour on the basis of the Census Returns and the number of males engaged in different pursuits in this country, shows that during the main period of training (the period of three or four months) employers would be deprived of not more than 2.58 per cent. of the nation's available labour. Of course, in the case of the fortnight's

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training, the interference would be even much less than this, especially as all men would not be trained at the same time.

Other figures kindly supplied by some eighteen Lancashire firms give a slightly higher average for the number of youths of eighteen who would be away on their recruits' course in any one year.

Description of Business.	Total Number of Workpeople Employed,	Total Number of Lads 18 years old employed.	Percentage on Total Number Employed.
(1) Mill	165	6	3·6
(2) Mill	244	7	2·8
(3) Mill	250	5	2
(4) Mill	300	7	2·3
(5) Machine Makers and Engineers	4,000	180	4·5
(6) General Engineers	175	8	4·5
(7) Tool Makers, etc.	190	6	3·1
(8) Tool Makers, etc.	460	11	2·4
(9) Tool Makers, etc.	400	16	4
(10) Iron Foundry	96	8	8·33
(11) Colliery	613	22	3·5
(12) Boiler Maker	15	5	3·3
(13) Spindle Maker	65	3	4·6
(14) Spindle Maker	70	2	2·8
(15) Iron Foundry	90	0	0
(16) Brass Foundry	30	1	3·3
(17) Brass Foundry	60	2	3·3
(18) Contractor	140	5	3·5
Percentage in eighteen firms of youths of 18 who would be taken, out of total employed... ..			3·43

These figures afford ample confirmation of a fact on which we have constantly insisted—that the training suggested by the League, *if compulsory for all*, would entail no serious interference with the industry of the country.

It is interesting to find that these calculations,

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arrived at quite independently, coincide almost completely with the facts ascertained in the case of the Swiss and Norwegian firms (which are under a similar Militia system), of which a list is given below :

PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES AWAY ON THE RECRUITS' COURSE IN A NORMAL YEAR IN A NUMBER OF SWISS AND NORWEGIAN FIRMS.

SWITZERLAND.

	1906. Per cent.	1907. Per cent.
Sulzer Bros.	2·6	—
Suchard, Neuchatel	1·17	2·07
Maschinenfabrik, Oerlikon	2·44	1·01
Nestlé & Co.	2·52	1·36
Peter & Kohler	2·12	·64
Berner Alpenmilch Co.	1·35	3·80
Bell & Co.	1·43	·23
Schweizerische Lokomotiv Co.	4·95	6·09
	—	—
Giving an average, on these figures, of	2·32	2·17

NORWAY.

Roros Copper Mines	3·1	2·1
Saw and Planing Mills	1·5	·62
Messrs. Tostrup	5	—
Steen & Strong	4	—
Trondhjem (including repetition courses)	5·9	—
	—	—
Giving an average, on these figures, of	3·9	1·36

Finally, the proof of the pudding lies in the eating, and the country which is our most formidable and efficient rival in the markets of the world is precisely that one which removes the

bulk of its best manhood from "productive" employment for from two to three years—and finds that it gains thereby industrially far more than it loses.

8. "I have nothing to fight for; the country does not belong to me." This is an argument which is sometimes heard at working class meetings. It is no use saying that it means the negation of patriotism. Of course it does. But it is our education which is at fault, which has allowed men—citizens!—to grow up with no other notion of patriotism but that of a sentiment which may have some meaning for the rich and the well-to-do, but which cannot be expected from the poor man who has nothing but his thews and sinews in the shape of capital. Yet this is said in a country which gives a free education to the children of the poor citizen, feeds them if the parent is unable to do so, provides old-age pensions for all over seventy, is about to give invalidity pensions, has a large and growing Labour representation in the House of Commons, a Labour man as a Cabinet Minister, and which offers to the energetic and capable man "a career open to the " "talents" in those over-sea Dominions where he finds himself not among strangers but among men of the same blood, speaking the same tongue, living under the same laws, and where the Government is, in some cases, entirely carried on by representatives of Labour. No, let the Russian mujik deny the claims of patriotism (he does not do so), but there is no Briton, be he never so poor, who can truly affirm that his country has done, and does, nothing for him, and

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that therefore she has no claim to his personal service.

But it is unnecessary to deal with any further and minor objections. For what, after all, do they amount to? That the men of Great Britain are asked to make some small sacrifice for the maintenance of peace and in order to enable their country to protect her interests, her trade, her commerce, and her Empire, and to be true to the obligations she has undertaken towards the smaller and weaker Powers. It is a sacrifice far less than that willingly given to their country by the French, the Germans, the Austrians, Russians, Italians, Danes, Greeks, Bulgarians, or Japanese. We do not believe that, if it is put fairly and squarely before the people, they will hesitate to accept it. For what that is worth having has ever been attained by man or nation without sacrifice? The athlete, the student, the artist, the saint, the statesman: do any of these achieve anything of any value without long days, months and years of sacrifice? Can we then hoodwink ourselves into believing that, while every other European nation, great and small, has recognized training for national defence as the first and most sacred claim of citizenship, we shall be allowed to keep this vast Empire and enjoy its fruits of wealth and dominion and prestige—ay, and *power for good*—if we shrink ignobly from giving a short space of our early manhood to the service of the Commonwealth?

CONCLUSION.

WE have in these pages placed before the public a full statement of the case for Universal Compulsory Military Training; we have shown that, while we *seem* stronger than ever, we are emphatically *far* weaker for defence than we were a century ago, both in relation to the enormous responsibilities that rest on our shoulders and to the increase in the "materials for military aggression" in the hands of foreign Powers.

No man who seriously considers these phenomena can doubt that the moment has arrived when we must make some sacrifice in order to guard that which we have perhaps acquired too easily. In other words, the *necessity* for Universal Military Training primarily for Home Defence is clear.

But, fortunately, this is a case in which sacrifice brings its own reward. There is no question here of amputating a limb in order to save the patient. Rather is it the application of a *tonic* to the body politic—a tonic called for by many symptoms that resemble anæmia and debility. And we have, as Britons, the privilege of showing the world that we can *offer* this sacrifice to our country of our own free will. While other peoples (except Switzerland and France) have merely acquiesced in the measures

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taken by their Governments for the nation's good, it lies with the people of England to decide whether they will rise to the great idea of a self-denying ordinance which shall at once make them truly strong, and give them national security and that lasting peace which Walpole declared to be England's greatest need. Thus, too, we shall acquire that racial immortality which every great people must desire, while if we refuse to accept the clear teaching of the present and the past, we must in our turn inevitably decline and fall as did the great and wealthy Empires that are gone for ever.

“Once to every man and nation
Comes the moment to decide
In the strife of Truth with Falsehood
For the good or evil side.

* * * *

“Then it is the brave man chooses,
While the coward stands aside,
Till the multitude makes virtue
Of the faith they once denied.”

Therefore we conclude this book with

AN APPEAL TO ONE AND ALL.

Are You a Conservative? Then join the LEAGUE, which advocates a measure founded on the principles of ancient English law, and giving the only possible guarantee of present safety and future greatness.

The late Lord SALISBURY said: "*The defence of the Country is not the business of the War Office or the Government, BUT THE BUSINESS OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES.*" May 9, 1900.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN said: "*The privileges which we enjoy involve corresponding obligations.* The responsibilities must be reciprocal and must be shared in common, and I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY EMPIRE MAY BE SAID TO BE ON A SURE FOUNDATION WHICH IS NOT BASED UPON RECOGNIZED COMMUNITY OF SACRIFICES."—*Report of the Colonial Conference, 1902.*

Are You a Liberal? Then join the LEAGUE, which aims at a really fair measure, which would advance the social welfare of the people by bringing all classes into closer contact, and improving the physical, mental, and moral condition of our vast urban population.

Mr. GLADSTONE said (1859): "No community which is not primarily charged with the ordinary business of its own defences, is really or ever can be in the full sense of the word a free community. THE PRIVILEGES OF FREEDOM AND THE BURDENS OF FREEDOM ARE ABSOLUTELY ASSOCIATED TOGETHER; TO BEAR THE BURDENS IS AS NECESSARY AS TO ENJOY THE PRIVILEGES, IN ORDER TO FORM THAT CHARACTER WHICH IS THE GREAT ORNAMENT OF FREEDOM ITSELF."

Sir HENRY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN said: "The personal duty of the defence of the sanctity of our country and homes ought to be the duty of every man capable of carrying arms."—HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1900.

Are You a Democrat? Then join the LEAGUE, the proposals of which are modern and democratic. "I myself am a believer in the Swiss System, by which every able-bodied man is compelled to train for a short time, so that, at any rate, he may be capable, at a pinch, of being produced as an efficient soldier. I believe that is a really democratic system of defence. Switzerland is the purest democracy existent in Europe, and would not endure but a democratic system of defence. I believe that it is an honourable system of defence under which every man would be able to look down on his neighbour who was not sharing the work, and from which no man could escape except by some subterfuge or some just and legitimate plea. It is a traditional method of defence in this country."—Lord ROSEBERY at Edinburgh, December 4, 1908.

Are You a Socialist? Then join the LEAGUE, which aims at a reform strictly in accordance with the principles of co-operative socialism.

"*Home Defence is a duty for all who are capable of fulfilling that duty.*"

"*Not a standing Army, but a Nation in Arms.*"—AUGUST BEBEL.

Are You an Employer of Labour? Then join the LEAGUE, which will give you a healthier, happier, more methodic, more punctual, more energetic, more *efficient* employee. "The labour of a man who has gone through a course of military drill is worth eighteenpence a week more than that of one untrained, as through the training received in military drill men learn ready obedience, attention, and combination, all of which are so necessary in work where men have to act promptly and together."

—The late Sir JOSEPH WHITWORTH.

See Leaflet N, by T. C. HORSFALL (gratis).

Are You a Working Man? Then join the LEAGUE, which aims at securing for you a SHORT healthy training in camp and under canvas, raking your sons and brothers away more frequently from the impure atmosphere of towns, to develop their lungs and limbs side by side with their fellow citizens of every rank and station; all at the cost of the State. We do *not* propose "conscription" under which the poor man serves while the rich man escapes, but the UNIVERSAL TRAINING OF ALL YOUNG MEN for HOME DEFENCE. "A regular and compulsory military training . . . would be good for the health and manhood of the nation."

—*Social Democracy and the Armed Nation*. By H. QUELCH, Editor, *Justice*.

See Leaflet "To the Working Men of Great Britain," by Colonel STOCKLEY (price 1d.), and other Leaflets.

Are You a Clergyman? Then join the LEAGUE, which wishes to give the whole people a valuable training in those qualities of self-control, manliness, discipline, and obedience which are so vitally important to the moral welfare of a nation. "I hope that the LEAGUE and its work will receive the cordial support of the clergy and of all who realize that ability and readiness to endure hardness is an integral element in Christian character."—The Right Rev. THE BISHOP OF EXETER.

See Leaflet L, "Religious Thought and National Service" (gratis).

Are You a Lover of Peace and a Hater of Jingoism? Then join the LEAGUE. There is no better guarantee of peace than to be armed, and no better cure for Jingoism than to make every citizen feel that he will himself have to serve in war. Professional armies have often been the instruments of aggression, and dangerous to liberty—national militias never. *Si vis pacem para bellum*. "It is safe to say that there is an infinitely stronger peace party in every country in which military service is compulsory than there is in this country with its voluntary system."—*Social Democracy and the Armed Nation*.

Are You a Philanthropist? Then join the LEAGUE, which would rescue the hoodigan and the loafer while young and still amenable to good, and teach him to live his life "in an orderly, soldierly, well-guided wholesome way" (RUSKIN), letting him realize that he, too, has a share in his country's fate, and thus save him from the workhouse, the prison, and the lunatic asylum. "After thirty years spent in the slums, my profound conviction is that nothing will go half so far towards the prevention of pauperism, drink, sloth, and all its consequent abominations as compulsory military training."—Rev. HUGH B. CHAPMAN, Chaplain of the Savoy.

See Leaflet N.

SOME REASONS WHY EVERY BRITON SHOULD JOIN THE LEAGUE.

Because the reform it urges would

Strengthen the national fibre and the sense of civic duty by bringing all men into relation with national ideas through personal training during youth.

Strengthen the national health by sound physical development and training in hygienic principles given in all our schools, and continued during the period of military or naval training.

Strengthen the Navy by giving it complete freedom of movement and the material for an adequate naval reserve.

Strengthen the Army by freeing it from the work of "Home Defence," and providing for it a truly national basis of recruitment.

Strengthen our industrial organization and increase our commercial efficiency by the training in discipline, in the co-operation of many units for one purpose, in punctuality and orderliness imparted to the rank and file of our workers.

Ensure the permanent success of the Territorial Force by giving it adequate numbers and adequate training *before—not after—* the outbreak of war.

Equalize the burden of national defence and help the Territorial Army in the task which it is striving to fulfil, and which ought in justice to be shared by all citizens.

Bring to bear upon the most important business with which a nation can have to deal—namely, National Defence—the knowledge, the interest, and the criticism of the national mind.

Replace hooliganism and jingoism by the self-control and sense of responsibility which comes from personal military training.

Safeguard the nation against war by showing that we are prepared for it, and ensure that, should war break out, the whole national forces may be brought to bear in order speedily to re-establish peace.

ORGANIZE OUR MAN-POWER.

NOTICE.—If you wish to further these objects and to Help Us, send this to one of your friends.

If you have friends who are interested in the safety and welfare of the country, the Secretary of the National Service League will be pleased to forward leaflets to them FREE on receipt of a post-card giving their names and addresses.

BRANCHES IN EVERY PART OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Extract from the Memorandum and Articles of Association showing the Objects and Constitution of the League.

The objects for which the League is established are:—

To secure the legislative adoption of universal naval and military training for National Defence.

To spread information showing (a) the vital importance to the British Empire of the maintenance of a reserve of trained men; (b) the physical, moral, and industrial benefits resulting from general naval and military training, especially in large towns.

To urge these matters on public men.

The League shall be independent of party politics, but may co-operate with any political party.

The League shall be under the direction of a President, Vice-Presidents, General Council, and Executive Committee.

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The subscription for Ladies and Members of the Territorial Force is at half-rates, except in the case of subscriptions of Associates.

EVERY SYMPATHIZER SHOULD, ABOVE ALL, JOIN THE LEAGUE.

To the Secretary,

THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE,

72, VICTORIA STREET, WESTMINSTER, S.W.

Or to

The Honorary
Organizing Secretary for

SIR,—I approve of the objects of the National Service League, and desire to support them.

Please enrol my name as.....of the National
Service League, for which I enclose value
£.....s. d.

† Name.....

Full Address

† See above. † Please state full title for printing (if member of Territorial Force, give rank and unit).

NOTE.—The Liability of Members under the Articles of Association is limited to the payment of 10s.

APPENDIX.

A. COMPARISON OF MODERN CAPITAL SHIPS BUILT OR BUILDING ON APRIL 1, 1910.

(Compiled from 'Dilke Return'.)

Country.	Battleships.			Armoured Cruisers.	
	"Dread-nought" Type.	Laid down 1900-1905.	Laid down 1893-1899.	"Invincible" Type.	Laid down 1896-1905.
United Kingdom...	14	13	25	6	35
Germany ...	10	12	8	3	9
United States ...	8	14	7	NH	13
France ...	6	6	5	NH	18
Japan ...	4	3	8	NH	13
Russia ...	4	5	2	NH	5
Italy ...	2	6	2	NH	7

B. COMPARISON OF MILITARY STRENGTH.

Country.	Annual Military Expenditure.	Total Number of Trained Men immediately available in Peace time.	Total Number of Trained Men available after 15 days of War.	Remarks.
Germany ...	£ 37,400,000	620,000	3,750,000 (a)	(a) 1,150,000 Active Army and 1st Reserves 600,000 Landwehr 2,000,000 Ersatz and Land-sturm <u>3,750,000</u>
France ...	32,000,000	600,000	3,000,000 (b)	
United Kingdom...	27,300,000	120,000	325,000 (c)	
Belgium ...	2,600,000	50,000	180,000	
Holland ...	2,300,000	21,000	180,000	
Denmark ...	670,000	14,000	75,000	

Note.—The Territorial Army is not included in the estimate of British Forces, because, unlike Continental Reserves, it is not formed of men who have been trained in the ranks of the Active Army, and, according to Mr. Haldane's own statements—

"It is said with great truth that we are able to give so comparatively little training to our citizen soldiers in time of peace that they would not be ready to help should invasion become imminent." [At Ashford, June 17, 1908.]

"If we relied on the Territorial Force to deal with that situation, I agree that we should rely on very little. . . . On the outbreak of hostilities the second line force becomes mobilized, but mobilized to go into war training." [In Parliament, March 10, 1908.]

(b) 1,200,000 Active Army and 1st Reserves
600,000 Depots
1,200,000 Territorial Army
3,000,000

(c) 120,000 Regular Troops normally in U.K.
134,000 Army Reserve
71,000 Special Reserve
325,000

C.

TRANSPORT FACILITIES.

1. TONNAGE REQUIRED TO TRANSPORT TROOPS.

German Regulations.

For voyage not exceeding 2 days : 1 ton per man, 2 tons per horse.

For voyage not exceeding 10 days : 2 tons per man, 4 tons per horse.

All German mercantile steamers are surveyed by the Department of Sea Transport.

Japanese Regulations.

For despatch of Mobilized Division (complete except horses) from Home Ports, tonnage allowed is $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons per man.

2. SHIPPING AND QUAY SPACE AVAILABLE.

The average British and German Merchant Shipping lying in the German North Sea or Baltic Ports on any given day is 400,000 tons net.

The Quay frontage in the German North Sea Ports allows 114 Ships, each 300 feet in length, to be berthed alongside the Quays simultaneously (see *The Times*, September 10, 1907).

3. GERMAN TONNAGE NORMALLY IN PORT.

Date.	Port.	Tonnage.	Remarks.
March 20, 1908 ...	Hamburg ...	127,986	20 Hamburg-Amerika Ships 8 Norddeutscher Lloyd Ships German Shipping " " " "
March 20, 1908 ...	Bremen ...	65,427	
January 25, 1905 ...	Hamburg ...	188,000	
May 30, 1905 ...	Hamburg ...	200,000	
June 2, 1905 ...	Hamburg ...	157,000	

4. THE SEVEN LARGEST STEAMSHIP OWNERS IN THE WORLD.

Line.	Head Office.	Total Tonnage.	No. of Ships of, and over, 10,000 tons and 12 knots speed.
Hamburg-Amerika ...	Hamburg ...	870,000	14
Norddeutscher Lloyd ...	Bremen ...	752,000	16
White Star ...	Liverpool ...	461,000	22
British India ...	London ...	453,000	Nil
P. & O. ...	London ...	400,000	5
A. Holt ...	Liverpool ...	350,000	Nil
Elder Dempster & Co. ...	Liverpool ...	346,000	Nil

5. BRITISH AND NORTH SEA PORTS COMPARED.

Port.	Net Tonnage entered and cleared in 1906.	Port.	Net tonnage entered and cleared in 1906.
Hamburg ...	22,504,378*	Tyne Ports ...	9,069,847
London ...	19,407,942	Bremen ...	6,121,341*
Liverpool ...	15,270,858	Hull ...	5,445,450
Cardiff ...	13,488,648		

* Including Coast Trade.

Appendix

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6. TIME OF PASSAGE FOR TORPEDO CRAFT AT 20 KNOTS AND TRANSPORTS AT 15 KNOTS.

UNITED KINGDOM.

Torpedo Craft.

Voyage.	Hrs.	Voyage.	Hrs.
Rosyth to Tynemouth	6	Sheerness to Yarmouth	4½
Harwich to Tynemouth	12	Dover to Yarmouth	4½
Sheerness to Tynemouth	13½	Portsmouth to Dover	5
Dover to Tynemouth	14	Portland to Dover	8
Rosyth to Hull	12	Devonport to Dover	11½
Harwich to Hull	8½	Devonport to Torbay	2
Sheerness to Hull	10	Portland to Torbay	2½
Dover to Hull	10½	Dover to Hastings	2
Rosyth to Yarmouth	15	Portsmouth to Hastings	3
Harwich to Yarmouth	2½		

Transports.

Dublin to Holyhead	4	Rosslare to Fishguard	4
Dublin to Liverpool	8	Cork to Fishguard	9½

GERMANY.

Torpedo Craft.

Emden to Rosyth	21	Emden to Sheerness	14½
Emden to Harwich	12½	Emden to Dover	14½

Transports.

Hamburg to Tynemouth	28	Emden to Hull	18½
Bremen to Tynemouth	26½	Hamburg to Yarmouth	21½
Emden to Tynemouth	22	Bremen to Yarmouth	20
Hamburg to Hull	25½	Emden to Yarmouth	14½
Bremen to Hull	24½		

FRANCE.


Torpedo Craft.

Dunkirk to Harwich	3½	Cherbourg to Portland	3
Dunkirk to Sheerness	3½	Cherbourg to Devonport	5½
Dunkirk to Dover	2	Brest to Devonport	8
Cherbourg to Portsmouth	4		


Transports.

Dunkirk to Hastings	4½	Havre to Torbay	10
Calais to Hastings	3½	Cherbourg to Torbay	6
Boulogne to Hastings	2½	Brest to Torbay	11½
Havre to Hastings	6		


I.—The Defence of the Empire's Trade.



A. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (BRITISH EMPIRE).




B. TONNAGE OF WAR FLEET.




C. TRADE DEFENDED PER TON OF WARSHIPS.


II.—The Insurance on Merchant Shipping.



A. NOMINAL TONNAGE OF BRITISH SHIPPING.




B. MONEY EXPENDED ON NAVY.




C. INSURANCE RATE PER TON OF SHIPPING.

(187)


III.—The Empire's Fighting Strength.



A. POPULATION OF BRITISH EMPIRE.



B. BRITISH SUBJECTS CARRYING ARMS.




C. INHABITANTS DEFENDED BY EACH ARMED MAN.


* Figures for 1805 not available.

† Exclusive of Colonial Forces.


IV.—The Duty of the Expeditionary Forces.



A. AREA OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.




B. REGULAR AND RESERVE TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE OVERSEA.



C. AREA DEFENDED BY EACH SOLDIER.


* Includes Militia.

V.—Fulfilment of Home Defence Duty.




A. POPULATION OF UNITED KINGDOM.

(The numbers dependent on imported food are in lighter shade.)




B. NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS AND TERRITORIALS.




C. NUMBER OF MALES OF MILITARY AGE TO EACH VOLUNTEER OR TERRITORIAL.

VI.—The Insurance on Home Trade.



A. TRADE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.



B. NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

8½ % IN 1850



5¼ % IN 1909



C. THE PERCENTAGE RATE OF INSURANCE.

N.B.—The year 1850 is chosen for the above comparison as coming at the end of thirty-five years of peace, and immediately preceding the Great Exhibition which it was hoped would initiate an era of Universal Peace.



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